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Abstract
Intergovernmental agreements are a common and useful instrument in federal
systems, serving a variety of purposes from establishing new social programs, regulating
agricultural practices, and even changing a country's constitution. Despite their
importance, there have only been limited attempts to understand agreements in a
comparative context or to provide a theoretical framework for their study. This
dissertation addresses both of these deficiencies by comparing the use of agreements in
seven federations and considering why certain federations form more agreements than
others.
In order to understand these differences in intergovernmental agreement
formation, this thesis proposes an institutionalist approach with two components. First,
agreements are defined as intergovernmental institutions, and thus, their creation is
characterized as a process of institutional formation. Second, seven institutional variables
are proposed as factors which are expected to affect the likelihood that a federation will
form agreements. These are: the constitutional division of powers (including
centralization and overlap), the existence of intrastate federalism, the size and status of
the federal spending power, the size of the welfare state, the number of constituent units
and the presence of lasting forums for intergovernmental relations. To test these
hypotheses, data were gathered from seven federal systems, including two nascent ones:
Australia, Canada, Germany, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the
United States. Each federation and its record of intergovernmental agreement formation
is examined qualitatively in light of each of the seven variables. The results of the
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individual country studies are then compared to determine whether the institutional
approach provides a consistent explanation of agreement formation.
This analysis finds that the formation of intergovernmental agreements seems to
be greatly influenced by the institutional environment. While each hypothesis was not
confirmed in every case, in unison they provide a comprehensive explanation for the
record of agreement formation in six of the seven federations. The institutional approach
provided only a partial explanation in the German case, however, indicating that there are
some shortcomings to this theory. Despite these limitations, this thesis represents an
effective comparative approach to the study of agreements and a successful application of
institutional theory in comparative politics.

Keywords: Federalism; intergovernmental relations; comparative politics;
institutionalism; intergovernmental agreements; Australia; Canada; Germany; South
Africa; Switzerland; United Kingdom; United States.
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Chapter One: Introduction
In 1964, William Riker began his seminal work Federalism: Origin, Operation,
Significance with the declaration "This is an Age of Federalism".1 He justified this grand
statement by observing that the 20th century had seen the emergence of multiple
federations (from only six to a total of eighteen) and that half of earth's landmass was
governed by countries claiming to be federal in character. Almost half a century later,
Riker's observation may have even greater veracity. In 2011, there are twenty-five
federations that cover 45% of Earth's landmass, contain 40% of all citizens and account
for nearly half of global Gross Domestic Product.2 Moreover, these totals do not include
nascent federations such as the United Kingdom or decentralized unions like Italy; nor do
they take account of modern confederal arrangements, such as the European Union,
which have been greatly influenced by the theory of federalism. As federalism remains a
proven method of balancing the competing forces of unity and diversity, it will continue
to remain important both to governments and to the study of politics.
Given the prevalence of federations, it is more important than ever for political
scientists to understand the structures and functions of these political systems. Many
aspects of federal systems have already been studied extensively, both in individual
federations and in comparative analyses, including the design of constitutions and
representative institutions, the balance of power between national governments and
constituent units, the systems of fiscal transfers, and the processes of intergovernmental
relations. Despite the significant existing scholarship concerning federalism, many

1

William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), 1.
All figures from the CIA World Factbook. The number of federations was taken from Ronald Watts'
Comparing Federal Systems, 3rd ed., (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008), 12-18.
2

2

aspects need further study, notably the ways in which governments within a federation act
collectively. In particular, the topic of intergovernmental agreements, their creation and
their role in federal systems is one area that deserves serious consideration and further
study.
The term "intergovernmental agreement" encompasses a large category of
intergovernmental arrangements, all of which are useful means of achieving coordination
within federal systems. Intergovernmental agreements are known by a variety of names,
including accords, concordats, frameworks, compacts, memoranda of understanding and
interstate treaties. They may be formal or informal: from a well-publicized, written and
legally-enforceable document to an ad hoc arrangement between officials. Agreements
may also serve a variety of purposes, from grand bargains that change a federation's
constitution to simple accords through which governments recognize each others' drivers'
licenses. By considering a few examples of intergovernmental agreements, their
importance and versatility to policy-makers and the public will be made clear.
In the more than two dozen federal and confederal systems, there are hundreds of
intergovernmental agreements pertaining to virtually all aspects of government activities.
In many federations, the introduction of new government programs requires collaboration
between national and subnational authorities. The introduction of public hospital
insurance in Canada required an agreement between the federal government and the
provinces.3 In the United States, forty-six states have signed the Compact for Education,
in order to provide for a common educational policy forum.4 For Australians, even
counter-terrorism policy is subject to a formal accord, the Intergovernmental Agreement

3
4

Canada, Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Act Agreement, 1958.
United States, Compact for Education, 1965-1980.
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on Terrorism and Multijurisdictional Crime, which clarifies responsibilities and
coordinates the joint action of governments to deal with national security threats.
Another common type of agreement concerns the management of shared
resources. In the United States, dozens of agreements have been created to control the
management of interstate water supplies. Agreements have been used to create
independent commissions to oversee the use of major rivers such as the Arkansas, the
Colorado, and the Rio Grande.5 India also uses agreements to manage shared water
resources as it is home to dozens of interstate accords governing agricultural management
and common water usage.6 Sometimes, agreements are even formed to manage resources
that governments are not normally known to possess, as was the case in a 1955 Swiss
concordat concerning the "prospecting and exploitation of oil".
Occasionally, intergovernmental agreements are used to initiate major
constitutional or political change in a country. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the
United Kingdom. Although not formally a federation, the United Kingdom's continuing
process of devolution has increasingly endowed the country with federal features, such as
fully functional subnational governments, a division of powers and a system of fiscal
transfers. In addition to being passed into national law, the entire framework of
devolution was also ratified by an intergovernmental agreement between the national
government and the new administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.7 Thus,
the UK provides an example of an intergovernmental agreement serving, at least in part,
as the framework for the entire nascent federal system.

5

See: the Arkansas River Basin Compact, 1971-73, the Colorado River Compact 1922-44 and the Rio
Grande Compact, 1939, all in the United States.
6
A recent of example of this is the 1994 Agreement to create the Upper Yamuna River Board in India.
7
United Kingdom, Memorandum of Understanding - Devolution, 1999.
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While there are not many examples of countries using agreements to establish
entire federal systems, other federations have also relied upon agreements to serve as the
foundation for major constitutional developments or institutional changes. In 1999, the
Commonwealth and state governments in Australia agreed to a significant reform of
Australia's system of taxation and fiscal transfers.8 This agreement restructured the
system of equalization, made more tax revenue available to the states and established a
new council to monitor fiscal relations. Ten years later, the governments of Australia
came together to create another major fiscal agreement, though this time the focus was on
reforming government spending on major programs such as education, health care and
welfare.9 Agreements can also create new institutions to allow for collaboration between
governments. A good example of this occurred in Switzerland, where all twenty-six
cantons participated in a 1993 agreement to form the Conference of Cantonal
Governments. This body is now the peak institution for Swiss intergovernmental
relations and an important forum for Swiss governments. Of course, even when
governments can agree on significant alterations to a federation's constitution and
political institutions, actual changes may not be forthcoming. Canada's attempts at
"mega-constitutional" reform in the 1980s and early 1990s failed when intergovernmental
agreements between the Prime Minister and the Premiers failed to win the approval of
enough legislators or citizens.10 Despite lack of success, this reaffirms the important role
played by agreements in constitutional reform.

8

Australia, Intergovernmental Agreement on the Reform of Commonwealth-State Financial Relations,
1999.
9
Australia, Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations, 2009.
10
These two Canadian agreements were the Meech Lake Accord of 1987 and the Charlottetown Accord of
1992.

5

While all of these are good examples of agreements serving as measures to
coordinate the policies of governments within federations, many of these might seem
distant and abstract to the average citizen. Yet intergovernmental agreements are not
solely concerned with changing constitutions, managing rivers or establishing elaborate
fiscal transfer systems; many agreements are formed to address specific matters, a
number of which are immediately relevant to citizens. Nowhere is this more apparent than
in the field of education, a policy area which tends to be fertile ground for
intergovernmental agreements. German governments have used agreements to determine
the number and distribution of university places which will be opened to prospective
students.11 American states attempted to tackle teacher shortages (and surpluses) by
signing the NASDTEC interstate agreement, which allows for the recognition of
educational qualifications from other states.12 Australia, Canada and Switzerland have
all, at one point or another, used intergovernmental agreements to fund post-secondary
education and grant scholarships to students.13 Education is not the only field in which
agreements can have a noticeable impact on the public. Turning on the television in
Germany might expose one to the effects of an agreement as broadcasting rights and fees
are governed by a series of accords formed by the länder. In Switzerland, the sale of salt
is regulated by an intergovernmental agreement.14
Given the important roles that intergovernmental agreements play in federations,
it is surprising that there have been few efforts to study them and their formation.
Generally, intergovernmental agreements receive only passing consideration within wider
11

Germany, Agreement regarding the distribution of university places, 1972.
United States, National Association of State Directors of Teacher Education and Certification, 2000.
13
For example, see: Australia, Commonwealth-State Policy on Financial Assistance to Group
Apprenticeship Schemes, 1979, Canada, Adult Occupational Training Act Agreement, 1967, and
Switzerland, Intercantonal University Agreement, 1997.
14
Switzerland, Intercantonal agreement on the sale of salt, 1973.
12

6

investigations of federalism and intergovernmental relations. When they are the focus of
scholarly inquiry, the context is usually a specific federation or policy area, with limited
theoretical analysis as to what agreements are and how and why they are created.
With such a noticeable gap in the literature on federalism and intergovernmental
relations there is a need for a comparative and theoretical study to provide new insight
into intergovernmental agreements. This investigation attempts to fill both voids: it
compares the use of agreements in seven federations and uses this to test a set of
hypotheses concerning the factors that are most likely to affect agreement formation.
Specifically, the goal will be to understand those accords which bring about change to the
entire federation: the creation of national intergovernmental agreements.15 As there is no
definitive theoretical treatment for the study of intergovernmental agreements available,
this project draws upon existing institutional theory to construct a new framework for the
study of these accords. Specifically, two elements of institutional theory will be used in
this examination of agreements. First, agreements will be defined as a specific type of
intergovernmental institution. While this is consistent with the existing literature, the lack
of a definitive theoretical understanding of agreements makes this a necessary first step.
Second, and more contentiously, this study will propose a set of institutional factors that
best explain why some federations seem to form more agreements than others. By
studying intergovernmental agreements through an institutionalist perspective, these
institutions can finally be understood in a comparative context.
In addition to the literature review, Chapter Two will propose a core set of
hypotheses. There are several reasons why governments might seek to form particular
15

A national intergovernmental agreement is an agreement that is adopted by all (or nearly all) of a
federation's subnational governments. This is explored further and defined more explicitly in both Chapters
Two and Three.
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agreements, and these can be understood in light of rational choice theory. But the
questions driving this dissertation concern the overall propensity of agreement formation
in federations. This is a systemic feature. Thus, Chapter Two lays out the hypotheses
that are the focus of this analysis. Seven institutional features are proposed as having an
effect on the likelihood of intergovernmental agreements being formed in any federation.
These institutional variables are:
1. The degree of constitutional overlap that exists.
2. The degree of centralization in the constitutional division of powers.
3. The size and status of the federal spending power.
4. The size and scope of the welfare state.
5. The existence of lasting forums for intergovernmental relations.
6. The number of subnational governments at the state/provincial level.
7. The existence of intrastate federalism.
A more complete explanation of each of these variables is provided at the end of Chapter
Two. Suffice it to say here that this study explores the working of these variables in
seven very different federations.
Chapter Three describes the methodology used in this investigation. It provides
an operational definition for intergovernmental agreements that is used throughout the
rest of the study. The chapter also describes each of the seven institutional factors in
greater detail and identifies the data sources used to compare these variables across the
seven cases: Australia, Canada, Germany, South Africa, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States of America. The bulk of this chapter is devoted to an
explanation of how the data were acquired for the seven federations included within this

8

comparative analysis as well as a description of other potential cases and why they were
not included.
The individual country analyses begin in Chapter Four with Australia. An
archetypal modern, industrial federation, Australia provides a good beginning for
examining the seven institutional hypotheses. Australia's notable institutional features
include a system of overlapping jurisdictions, frequent use of the federal spending power
and an extensive network of bodies and forums devoted to the conduct of
intergovernmental relations. These features provide a fertile environment for
intergovernmental agreements and help to explain why Australia ranks third in this study
in the number of accords that it has created.
Chapter Five continues the analysis with a discussion of Canada. An older
federation, Canada developed a federal system to balance the cultural and linguistic
cleavages of the English and French citizens who had settled there. Federalism was also a
response to the competing regional identities that had grown, in part, from Canada's vast
and diverse geographical setting. Canada is an interesting case as it is one of the more
decentralized federations, particularly when compared to the other countries included in
this study. Canada's system of intergovernmental relations also features a small, but
highly active spending power and, as with Australia, a large and well-developed system
of intergovernmental forums and institutions. Canada is one of the most prolific
federations in the creation of intergovernmental agreements, ranking second in this study.
Chapter Six introduces the first European federation in this comparison, the
Federal Republic of Germany. Germany has a long history with various forms of
federalism and multilevel government, going back to the Holy Roman Empire of the
Middle Ages. More recently, the Federal Republic has become the model for integrated,
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cooperative federalism, with both the federal government and the länder sharing
jurisdiction over most policy areas, including a large welfare state. Together, both orders
of government must work together to create and implement policy. Some of this
collaboration occurs through the federal upper chamber, the Bundesrat, which allows the
subnational governments to participate directly in the federal legislature. With the largest
number of agreements, it seems that at least some of the necessary intergovernmental
coordination is being fulfilled by these intergovernmental institutions.
The focus of Chapter Seven is South Africa, an interesting example of a new and
developing federation. In addition to substantial ethnic and linguistic diversity, South
Africa`s federal system must cope with the demands of a developing economy as well as
the historical legacy of apartheid. South Africa is a good example of a very centralized
federation in virtually all aspects, including the constitutional division of powers, the
institutions of fiscal federalism and the role of the African National Congress, the
dominant political party. South Africa is also unique in this comparison as it is the only
case in which no intergovernmental agreements have been created.
Chapter Eight returns to a more established federation by examining Switzerland.
Though Switzerland is the smallest federation, both by land area and population, it is one
of the most diverse, with multiple cultural, linguistic, religious and regional cleavages.
Switzerland`s twenty-six cantons often organize along these cleavages within
intergovernmental institutions and relations. In addition, Switzerland is an interesting
case for an institutional analysis as it possesses a system of administrative federalism that
centralizes legislative power in the federal government while still empowering the
cantons with substantial authority and flexibility to design and implement government
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programs. Switzerland ranks fifth in terms of the number of intergovernmental
agreements in this study.
Chapter Nine introduces the nascent federation of the United Kingdom. While not
technically a federation, the UK`s system of devolution has many of the same features as
a federal system, including enumerated powers for subnational governments, separate
subnational legislatures, financial arrangements and intergovernmental relations. Most
importantly for this investigation, the UK also possesses a formal system for
intergovernmental agreements allowing for an examination of these accords within a new
federal system. As a country in transition from a unitary state to the beginnings of a
federation, the UK is still quite centralized, particularly in the system of fiscal transfers
between London and the devolved administrations. The early returns of agreement
formation in the first decade after devolution place the UK in fourth place in this analysis.
Chapter Ten concludes the individual country analyses by examining the oldest
federation, the United States of America. The US began as the model for classical
federalism, possessing powerful subnational governments with clearly defined that
jurisdictions allowed for minimal overlap. While this may have been the original theory
for the American federation, the practice of federalism over more than two centuries has
led to increased overlap and centralization. The large number of states make national
intergovernmental relations very difficult - simply gathering senior representatives from
all fifty states can be problematic. Together, these factors have made it difficult for the
states to form national agreements in America, as the federation places sixth out of the
seven cases.
The final substantive section, Chapter Eleven, provides a comparative analysis
based on the results of the individual country chapters. This comparison has four primary
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components. First, this chapter examines each of the seven variables that were
hypothesized to have an effect on intergovernmental agreement formation. These
hypotheses are evaluated individually against the findings in seven case studies to
determine whether certain ones are more consistent with the data than others. Second, the
variables are combined into a single "formula" which is then reapplied to each of the
federations in order to determine how effective these variables are when used in concert.
This analysis will determine whether the institutional approach proposed by this study can
successfully explain the differences in agreement formation among these seven
federations. Third, the results of the previous analysis are then considered, with specific
attention paid to any cases which are not fully explained by the institutional hypotheses.
Finally, the chapter situates this study and its findings within the wider literature
concerning federalism and institutional theory. This discussion is followed by Chapter
Twelve, which concludes this study by summarizing the findings and suggesting
directions for future research.
As a whole, this study of intergovernmental agreements attempts to fill a
significant gap in the literature on federalism and intergovernmental relations. Existing
research on federations has previously focused on topics such as understanding federal
institutions, discussing the operation of federal systems and studying how and why
change occurs. By examining intergovernmental agreements, this investigation sheds
light on an understudied, yet important element of the institutional environment in federal
systems. Through the consideration of variables which may affect the formation of
agreements, this study also adds to our understanding of how federations function and
why these operations differ between countries. Additionally, this research provides an
institutional explanation for change in federal systems.

12

More specifically, this study provides a theoretical framework for the study of
agreements which is not restricted to a single policy area or national context. This
investigation also provides data on agreements in seven federations, as well as an analysis
of their institutional features. Finally, this analysis offers an explanation for why certain
federations form more intergovernmental agreements than others, providing a foundation
for future comparative research on this topic.
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Chapter Two: Theory and Literature Review
The goal of this investigation is to examine the formation of intergovernmental
agreements within federal systems. Specifically, it will compare the characteristics of
seven federations in order to determine whether certain institutional features increase or
decrease the likelihood that agreements will be created. This chapter will begin this
analysis by setting out the theoretical paradigm through which these questions will be
considered. First, the object of this study - intergovernmental agreements - will be
defined. Second, an institutional perspective will be proposed as the most appropriate
means of defining agreements in a theoretical sense. This will be supported by a review
of the existing scholarship on intergovernmental agreements. Third, this chapter will
argue that institutionalism is also the best way to understand the formation of agreements,
compared to competing alternatives. Fourth, six reasons for why an agreement might be
formed will be described. Fifth, this chapter will conclude by proposing seven
institutional features of federations which are believed to have an effect on the likelihood
of intergovernmental agreements being created. These will serve as the hypotheses that
will be tested throughout the rest of this comparative study.
By their very nature, federations require coordination between different spheres of
government in order to function effectively. Officials across all areas of government
must work with their counterparts among national, subnational and local governments in
order to design, fund and implement policy. This need for coordination can be met in a
number of ways, but one of the most common means is through the formation of
intergovernmental agreements. These agreements range from promises to exchange
information and contact lists, to the establishment and funding of new government
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programs, or even to changes of a country’s constitution. Agreements also come in many
forms, including negotiated outcomes of intergovernmental meetings, written compacts
between ministers and large-scale, publically scrutinized accords. Despite their impact
and variety however, intergovernmental agreements remain an understudied phenomenon,
particularly in a comparative context. The existing research tends to pertain to a specific
domestic context16 or as a secondary consideration within the wider scope of
intergovernmental relations and federalism.17 In order to advance the study of
comparative federalism as a whole, this topic needs theoretical consideration. This
chapter will explore these theoretical foundations by proposing that intergovernmental
agreements should be viewed as a form of institutionalization. It will examine the
explanatory power of the institutionalist perspective by canvassing the existing literature
on intergovernmental agreements, and will then use this institutional approach to suggest
six motives for the formation of agreements. It will conclude by discussing the seven
factors that affect a federation's likelihood of creating these institutions, which is the
focus of this investigation.

Definition and Scope
When studying intergovernmental agreements in a comparative context, it is clear
that there are a number of differences that exist between countries, including the number,
format, legality and even the appellation of agreements.18 In order to bridge these

16

Some examples of this include the works of Saunders (1995), Poirier (2004), Ridgeway (1971) and
Zimmerman (2002). These will be described in greater detail later in this chapter.
17
Some works on intergovernmental relations that also consider agreements include Painter (1996),
Bolleyer (2009), Linder (1994) and Elazar (1965).
18
Intergovernmental agreements have been given a variety of labels and names; sometimes, multiple terms
exist for these within the same federation yet there may be no significant substantive or legal difference
between the documents. The terms used for an agreement in English include, but are not limited to: accord,
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differences and give focus to this investigation, a common definition is required. For this
comparative investigation, intergovernmental agreements are defined as formal, written
accords between the recognized agents of two or more governments within a single
federal state. More specifically, the agreements that will be the focus of this research will
be national agreements - those which involve virtually all of a federation's subnational
governments of the provincial/state order.
There are two elements of this definition that require further clarification: the dual
restrictions that agreements must be formal and national in order to be included in this
study. In both cases, there is a theoretical and methodological justification for setting
these parameters (and the methodological issues will be more fully explored in the
following chapter). Formal agreements are the focus of this investigation because
informal, unwritten agreements between officials or politicians must be excluded for three
reasons. First, if minor, ad hoc and unwritten agreements are included, there is little to
distinguish an intergovernmental agreement from the processes of intergovernmental
relations as a whole. A decision between officials to keep each other informed of new
agricultural regulations could count as either an informal agreement or as an element of
intergovernmental relationships. While these activities are certainly important and
worthy of study, intergovernmental relations are already the subject of much scholarly
inquiry. Second, this definition treats agreements as specific institutions in order to
consider the process of agreement formation as an example of the creation of an
institution. This approach allows for the application of institutional theory, so that a
comparative and theoretical conception can be constructed. Finally, acquiring sufficient

concordat, common framework or scheme, compact, joint program or task, memorandum of understanding
and treaty. Country-specific terms will be discussed in later chapters.
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data on informal agreements would be difficult enough for a single federation and
virtually impossible for seven.
The reason for focusing on only national agreements is similarly two-fold.
National agreements are particularly interesting because they act as changes, even in
small ways, to the scope and function of a federal system. These agreements may be
horizontal - solely between subnational governments (i.e. state-state accords) - or vertical
- between different orders of government (i.e. federal-state arrangements) - but in either
case, they affect the politics and policies of the entire federation. From minor highway
policies to constitutional amendments, national agreements mark alterations and
adjustments to federal countries and provide insights into how federations develop over
time. As a methodological issue, acquiring a complete set of all bilateral and multilateral
agreements would be exceptionally difficult. Although these agreements remain
interesting elements within intergovernmental relations, the data available for them does
not approach the level of completeness required for this comparative analysis.
While the current literature does not make such explicit distinctions, it is
important to keep this definition in mind when reviewing the existing contributions. The
focus on formal, national agreements will be of particular importance when considering
the variables that are hypothesized to affect a federation's likelihood of forming such
accords.

Institutional Approaches:
Because intergovernmental agreements are an understudied (yet important)
element of federalism, they have been given only limited theoretical attention in existing
scholarship. This is especially true in the comparative context as there is no essential or
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seminal work on agreements which can provide an established theoretical framework to
serve as a foundation for this investigation. This is not to suggest that the literature is
devoid of theoretical considerations or that it cannot provide insight into the best ways to
approach the study of agreements, only that a comprehensive theory of intergovernmental
agreements is not available. Specifically, there are three elements of intergovernmental
agreements that merit deliberate theoretical exploration. First, what are agreements in a
generalized and theoretical sense? As previously mentioned, this comparative
investigation will argue that agreements are intergovernmental institutions, an
uncontroversial contention based on the existing literature. This question will be the
focus of the discussion in the current section. Second, why do governments seek to form
agreements? While there is less explanation for this in the existing literature on
agreements, rational choice theory will provide a foundation for understanding
agreements in a "micro" context. Third, what factors affect the likelihood that agreements
will be created? This question gets the least consideration in existing studies of
intergovernmental agreements (either directly or indirectly) and thus the literature offers
the fewest "guideposts" for the development of hypotheses. Institutionalism will serve as
the theoretical basis for the hypotheses that seek to explain why certain federations form
more agreements than others. Given the lack of current literature, the institutionalist
paradigm provides a useful beginning because of its common usage in the study of
comparative politics and federalism. This "macro" level of analysis is the primary focus
of this dissertation.
Since the focus of this investigation will be on the first and third of these
questions, some description of institutional theory is required in order to construct a
theoretical approach to intergovernmental agreements. Before delving into the existing
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literature on intergovernmental agreements, it is necessary to define this institutional
approach that will be applied in this study.. As one of the principal approaches to the
study of political science, the study of institutions is well-developed. Although it is not
possible to sample even a small portion of the existing institutional literature, certain
select sources can be drawn upon to provide a definition for institutions that can be
integrated with the study of agreements.
As a general introduction, the Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science defines
institutions as "a public body with formally designated structures and functions, intended
to regulate certain defined activities which apply to the whole population".19 While this is
far from an operational definition, it does preview many of the key concepts of
institutionalism: some form of structure, constraints for participants and the existence of
the institution as a public or recognizable body. A more complete definition can be found
in Douglass North's famous, cross-disciplinary approach to institutionalism, Structure and
Change in Economic History. He defines institutions as "a set of rules, compliance
procedures and moral and ethical behavioural norms designed to constrain behaviour of
individuals in the interests of maximizing wealth or utility of principals”.20 This
definition provides a more complete and specific understanding of institutions, combining
less formal and explicit norms-based arrangements as well as the effects of rules and
laws. Such an approach is appropriate for a comparative study of intergovernmental
agreements given the differences in institutionalization between countries.21 North’s
work is also useful as it explicitly clarifies that institutions are sites for interaction and do
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not necessarily produce cooperative outcomes, an important consideration for
intergovernmental relations, where conflict is always a possibility.
While these provide reasonable definitions for the focus of this study - agreements
as institutions - more details are needed to create an operational definition that can be
used for this research. A more comprehensive account is provided by B. Guy Peters,
from his 1999 work Institutional Theory in Political Science. In particular, he identifies
four attributes that distinguish institutional research from other approaches:
1. The study of institutions must involve some form of structure which must
transcend individual actors; it cannot simply be broken down into its individual
components while retaining its same qualities.
2. An institution must be enduring over time; the structure must outlast the
individuals who comprise it. Otherwise, it can be classified as a meeting or
gathering, but not an institution.
3. Institutions must affect individual behaviour, or more specifically, they must
constrain behaviour. The degree to which an institution accomplishes this is a
measure of its potency.
4. Finally, there must be some sense of shared meaning or norms for a structure to be
classified as an institution. Without a level of common understanding, an
institution cannot function effectively as its qualities may be misunderstood.22
These attributes that Peters observes among all institutional approaches to the study of
politics create parameters for crafting a theory of institutions within the field of
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federalism and intergovernmental relations. Within this context, these four stipulations
can be applied to focus on governments as the individual actors.
This brief sampling of definitions of institutions and institutional approaches to
political science is not meant to be exhaustive, or even a true literature review. Rather, it
is meant to provide a basic understanding of what the study of institutions includes so that
this approach can be applied to the existing study of federalism and specifically of
intergovernmental agreements.

Intergovernmental Agreements and Institutional Theory
This effort to construct an institutional basis for the comparative study of
intergovernmental agreements can be broken down into three components: how do
intergovernmental agreements fit within institutional theory, why do governments seek to
create these institutions, and what factors might help or hinder their formation?
Unfortunately, current scholarship on intergovernmental agreements – somewhat limited
to begin with – is seldom so theoretically deliberate. Much of the focus is on particular
national contexts, or restricted to a particular policy area. More commonly, scholarly
works briefly examine agreements as but one part of the vast area of study that is
federalism and intergovernmental relations. Despite this, the existing literature does
provide insights into these three areas, and particularly into how agreements can be
considered intergovernmental institutions.
The study of comparative federalism certainly supports an institutional approach
to the study of agreements. Much of the literature compares the institutional features of
federations, such as constitutions, government types (specifically responsible government
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versus separation of powers models), upper chambers and finances.23 The study of
intergovernmental agreements extends from this tradition, as their creation is often
influenced by the state of these institutional configurations. Agreements may amend
federal constitutions, or help to determine authority in areas in which there is no clear
direction. They also assist in the functioning of fiscal federalism, by coordinating
spending and programs across different governments, and they clarify responsibilities
when new policies and programs are enacted.. As such, intergovernmental agreements
remain a logical, but unexplored, area in the existing institutional studies of comparative
federalism.
As described earlier, Peters’ four criteria of institutions can provide a broad
guideline for examining literature specific to intergovernmental agreements. His first two
criteria – that institutions must transcend individual actors and must endure over time –
have been addressed in the literature on agreements, if often indirectly. Daniel Elazar, for
example, has characterized intergovernmental agreements within the wider scope of
mechanisms of intergovernmental relations by dividing them into two categories.
Informal mechanisms, including meetings and the exchange of personnel or expertise and
services, are more common, but are not enforceable or permanent. Formal mechanisms,
which include intergovernmental agreements, are more infrequent, but are also lasting,
even permanent, and add to the existing structure of the federal system.24 In this, Elazar
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sees agreements as extending the initial compact of the federal system and the devices
that affect the functioning of governments.
The concept that institutions must transcend individual actors can also be found in
a number of agreements that form agencies to monitor and administer their provisions.25
This is a common practice in the United States, where the Constitution (under Article I,
Section 10) empowers state governments to enter into treaties with each other; these are
often regulated by commissions so that their administration is beyond the particular
interests of the participating governments. While this is most often used in the United
States, the formation of new bodies to implement the provisions of an agreement is not
uncommon in Australia, Canada and Switzerland as well.26 Although such institutions
represent only a portion of intergovernmental agreements, it does indicate that agreements
can possess a high degree of formality and institutionalization. More broadly, they create
obligations that need to be fulfilled by whatever governments and officials are in place.
The issue of an agreement’s legality and enforceability is one common theme
throughout the literature, and one that has a bearing on issues of structure and longevity.
In the Swiss context, concordats are legally binding treaties between governments, with
the same force as any law.27 Similarly, intergovernmental agreements in Spain are also
entered into law, as are many German accords.28 In the United States, interstate compacts
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must be passed by both state legislatures and the national Congress, thereby becoming
national and state law.29 In all of these cases, the legally binding nature of many
intergovernmental agreements provides structure that transcends individuals and persists
over time as a statute would.
Given the differences between federations, however, the legality of agreements
alone is not an effective standard for institutionalization. Examining the development of
the economic union in Australia and Canada, Douglas Brown briefly addresses
intergovernmental agreements and their enforcement, observing that while agreements are
often constructed in legislative form, they are not meant to be justiciable - at least in the
Australian and Canadian contexts.30 Even when parliaments and legislatures pass
implementing legislation – a more common practice in Australia than Canada – some
governments have chosen parliamentary supremacy as opposed to trusting the courts.
Poirier confirms this in her study of intergovernmental agreements in Canada, which
focuses on the legal status (or lack thereof) of these institutions.31 Saunders finds that any
signatory in the Australian and Canadian federations can abrogate agreements
independently, citing the 1990 Canada Assistance Plan Reference by the Supreme Court
of Canada as well as decisions by Australia’s high court, including Tasmania v.
Commonwealth in 1983 the Railway Line case between South Australia and the
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Commonwealth.32 Yet these are rare examples, testimony again to the institutional nature
of agreements.
Even lacking an independent commission or strict legality and enforceability by
the judiciary, intergovernmental agreements can still fulfill the first two institutional
conditions. Australia and Canada are quite active in the formation of intergovernmental
agreements, many of which are renewed due to their continued relevance.33 Moreover,
agreements such as the Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations in
Australia and the Agreement on Internal Trade in Canada demonstrate that even
significant national issues can be addressed in an agreement that remains important to the
functioning of the federation, even if it lacks strict judicial enforcement.
Beyond the question of structure and permanence, do intergovernmental
agreements fulfill Peters' third criterion? Do they constrain behaviour? Many agreements
commit governments to the disbursement of funds, which would restrict them from
spending on other government priorities. Tanja Borzel finds that agreements may occur
for a few reasons, including: cooperation and coordination, the realization of greater
economic or political gains, and – most importantly for this discussion - the ability for
nation-wide institutions to constrain the power of the national government as well as
allow sub-national actors to access its resources.34 Arthur Benz also confirms that
economic and political incentives play a strong role in intergovernmental mechanisms,
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including the creation of new federal institutions.35 Specifically, he notes that conflicts
surrounding the distribution of resources can be a significant area of disagreement,
prompting measures to encourage cooperation, such as the formation of new agreements.
Brown found that agreements can influence behaviour in less direct ways, with their chief
functions being communication and administrative guidance .36 Ridgeway meanwhile
argues that agreements can also be used by subnational governments to prevent the
intrusion of federal authorities.37 In her examination of compacts in the United States,
Ridgeway observes that one of their uses is to address cross-border issues between states
before the federal government imposes its own agenda. All of these examples show how
intergovernmental agreements can constrain governments.
The final element of Peters’ description of institutionalism raises a major point of
contention in the literature on institutions in political science, one which has important
consequences for intergovernmental agreements. The question of whether institutions
can exist solely as a system of norms, as opposed to rules and laws, is significant given
that the conduct of intergovernmental relations possesses an important informal
element.38 March and Olsen argue that institutions can constrain behaviour by creating a
set of norms which participants acknowledge and follow.39 Atkinson elaborates on the
informal qualities of institutions, arguing that their salient quality is the “networks of
organizational capacity”, and the connections between individuals and groups which
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present a sense of structure.40 On the other side of the spectrum, some theorists argue that
rules and laws, rather than norms, are the key aspects of institutions. Weaver and
Rockman see institutions as “important frameworks of rules, capabilities and constraints
which determine (in part) the behaviour of actors”.41 These create explicit boundaries
that strongly affect any participants or their activities, including policy outcomes in
government. Writing in the field of international relations, Robert Keohane somewhat
reconciles these positions by defining international agreements as “explicit rules agreed
upon by more than one state” - and regimes - which arise “when states recognize these
agreements have continual validity”.42 This distinction acknowledges that institutions, at
least internationally, require continued participation and consent to remain relevant
(echoing the contention in Peters’ fourth argument).43
The need for some shared norms or understanding for the functioning of an
institution, has a small, but important, effect for intergovernmental agreements. An
institution cannot function without at least some common understanding among members.
As is the case in international relations, the degree of independence possessed by
governments in a federation means that this common understanding is crucial, for without
it, there is often no compelling force to keep participants involved and the institution
functioning. This is especially true in federations in which there is no independent
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authority, such as the judiciary, that can govern or enforce an agreement. Without a
common purpose, these agreements would be ineffective – for example, how can an
agreement involving the exchange of prisoners between jurisdictions in the United States
be effective if one party believes it does not need to maintain the prison capacity to
accommodate its obligations? The continued formation and functioning of such
agreements demonstrates that this dilemma is overcome constantly in numerous
agreements across most federations, as participants share an understanding of the
behaviour required by the agreement.
The existing literature clearly allows the classification of intergovernmental
agreements as a type of institution. What is less obvious, however, is whether
institutionalism is the best approach to study and explain agreements and their creation.
As previously mentioned, the limited literature on intergovernmental agreements rarely
attempts to construct a complete theoretical picture of these institutions. Bolleyer’s 2009
study, Intergovernmental Cooperation, provides one of the only examples of how
institutional theory and the study of intergovernmental agreements can be brought
together. It also serves as one of the few studies of agreements that uses a comparative
approach, examining Canada, Switzerland and the United States. She contends that
agreements exist within the wider context of "intergovernmental arrangements" - a very
broad category comprising elements of intergovernmental institutions and the practice of
intergovernmental relations - and their formation further institutionalizes the system of
interactions between governments.44 Bolleyer argues that the structure of governments,
and specifically the difference between power-sharing and power-centralizing systems,
along with the level of institutionalization in intergovernmental relations will determine
44
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how formal and (legally) binding agreements are and the degree to which they will
constrain their participants.45
While this is one of the few examples of an attempt to study intergovernmental
agreements in a comparative context, Bolleyer's approach is best used as an example of
institutional analysis, rather than a theoretical base for this study. There are several
reasons for this. First, Bolleyer's analysis of agreements is focused more on their quality,
as opposed to their quantity. Her primary inquiry concerning agreements is why some
seem to provide greater constraints in certain federations and not in others.46 This is in
contrast to the focus of this study which seeks to understand why agreements are formed
and what factors affect their creation. This quality (Bolleyer) versus quantity (this study)
distinction also leads to different points of emphasis in examining the data. Bolleyer
focuses only on certain agreements in 2004 and 2005 in order to explore their particular
characteristics, whereas this investigation attempts to examine all written and national
agreements since the end of World War II in an effort to analyze the effects of federal
institutions on agreements over time.
A second reason why Bolleyer's study cannot serve as the theoretical basis for this
project is that her operational definition of agreements is somewhat inconsistent, being
both too broad and too narrow, compared to what is used here. Bolleyer's definition
includes any written document forged between government officials, encompassing
anything from a meeting summary to a constitutional treaty, such as an interstate
45
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compact.47 A meeting summary may be nothing more than a recap of events, committing
the governments involved to no future action or responsibilities. Using such a broad
definition, it becomes difficult to distinguish agreements from the written process of
intergovernmental relations. At the same time, her focus is too narrow to be applicable
here because she is only concerned with agreements that come out of specific, national
intergovernmental arrangements (effectively, forums for intergovernmental relations).
This would exclude any agreements that are made simply through ad hoc contact between
officials or through less formal bodies.
Finally, she proposes only two possible variables that affect agreement formation:
the type of government institutions and the role of "intergovernmental arrangements".
The first variable concerns the degree of power-sharing found in representative
institutions within governments (both national and subnational), such as the difference
between parliamentary systems and presidential models. While Bolleyer uses this to
explain levels of formalization among agreements, this is less useful for this study as
agreements here do not necessarily involve legislatures. For example, in the United
States there are two types of formal, written agreements: interstate compacts and
administrative agreements. While the former requires the approval of state legislatures and thus is subject to the power-sharing dynamics that Bolleyer is interested in - the latter
needs only executive approval. In this study, both are counted equally as examples of
formal agreements. The second variable that Bolleyer considers - the role of
intergovernmental arrangements - is too broad in its original iteration to be applicable
here. One element of this category, forums for intergovernmental relations, does provide
the basis for a useful hypothesis and is included in the seven variables discussed at the
47
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end of this chapter. However, this variable alone is not sufficient to provide a thorough
explanation of agreement formation across federations. As will be demonstrated in the
examination of each of the cases as well as in the comparative analysis in Chapter Eleven,
the seven variables proposed here provide an effective explanation for a federation's
record of agreement formation.
What does this brief review of the literature concerning intergovernmental
agreements and institutional theory tell us about the state of existing research and the
potential for future studies? First, intergovernmental agreements are indeed understudied,
especially in a comparative context. Most current works focus on a single national
context and even a specific policy area. Second, there is limited scholarship on the
theories behind agreements, particularly why they are formed and what factors might help
or hinder their creation. Third, while agreements are generally understood to be political
institutions, there have been few attempts to determine the best approach to analyzing
them, whether via an institutionalist, rational-choice, socio-economic or some other
approach. Without clear guidance from existing examples, this investigation is left to
propose its own approach to intergovernmental agreements and deal with alternative
approaches in a hypothetical manner.

Alternatives to Institutionalism
This chapter began by outlining the theoretical propositions of this investigation
into intergovernmental agreements in two ways. First, agreements were defined as
"intergovernmental institutions", thus framing the central questions of this study in terms
of institutional formation and the factors that are most likely to affect it. The existing
literature on agreements as well as Peters' four criteria of institutionalism confirm the
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appropriateness of this position. Second, and perhaps more contentiously,
institutionalism was selected as the theoretical paradigm which would help to explain
differences in agreement creation between federations. This will be explained in greater
detail in the final section of this chapter. Stated simply, the broader theoretical contention
here is that agreements are institutions and the likelihood of their formation is explained
best by the institutional features of a federation.
To paraphrase William Livingston however, institutionalism is not the only - or
even the best - approach to the study of federalism.48 Other research methods and
paradigms have been used to analyze issues pertaining to federalism and
intergovernmental relations and some of these could be applied to intergovernmental
agreements as well. In particular, a sociological understanding of federalism, as
advanced by Livingston, and a rational choice approach exemplified in the works of Jon
Elster and, more specific to federalism, Barry Weingast are two potential alternatives.
Before continuing with this institutional understanding of agreements, it is worth briefly
considering whether either of these approaches might provide a better potential
explanation of the patterns of intergovernmental agreement formation in these seven
federations.49
The sociological approach argues that federalism is an institutional response to
economic, social, political and cultural forces.50 According to Livingston, federalism is a
reaction to certain conditions in a country, specifically diversity:
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Differences of economic interest, religion, race, nationality, language, variations
in size, separation by great distances, differences in historical background,
previous existence as separate colonies or states, dissimilarity of social and
political institutions - all these may produce a situation in which the particular
interests and qualities of the segments of the larger community must be given
recognition.51
Applied to the study of agreements, this approach would confirm that agreements are
institutions, but would argue that underlying social, political and economic factors are
much more likely to explain their formation than institutional variables. Rather than
considering the effects of the number of subnational governments or of the constitutional
division of powers for example, a sociological understanding might identify the number
of languages that are spoken in a federation or whether the practitioners of
intergovernmental relations usually strive for a consensus as key features of an
explanation of intergovernmental agreements.52
Without constructing a complete sociological theory of intergovernmental
agreements (a task for another study), it is impossible to identify which potential factors
might have the greatest effect on agreement formation. While this degree of specificity
may not be feasible, the concept that agreements might be affected more by political
culture and social variables than institutional ones can still be considered in a generalized
sense. For example, a sociological approach might predict that the relative cultural and
linguistic homogeneity of Australia and the United States makes those federations more
likely to form more national agreements than heterogeneous countries such as South
Africa and Switzerland. Other potential factors from this paradigm might include: the
differences between an adversarial and cooperative political culture, economic disparity
among the constituent units, the existence of past conflicts (such as civil war) and
51
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variations in the distribution of the population. These ideas will be revisited during the
analysis of the results (chapter eleven) in order to determine whether they provide a
convincing alternative explanation to the institutional analysis of this study.
Rational-choice theory provides a second possible alternative to institutional
theory as a means of studying intergovernmental agreements. The formation of
agreements could be viewed as the process of collective action or bargaining, which
Elster defines as a process through which actors attempt to resolve conflicting preferences
regarding cooperative arrangements.53 More germane to the study of federalism and
intergovernmental relations, Weingast argues that the institutional structure of fiscal
federalism provides subnational governments with incentives and constraints that will
guide their behaviour.54 Officials and decision-makers will operate in consistent patterns
based on their particular contexts, and this can be understood as rational actors
responding to stimuli. Applied to the study of intergovernmental agreements, these
rational-choice approaches would view these accords as the collective action of
governments acting on incentives to cooperate within the particular rules and strictures of
a country's system of intergovernmental relations. Differences between federations and
their records of agreement formation may reflect differences in the incentives and
constraints facing the actors, the rules of the game, and even the number of participants.
Unlike the challenge provided by the sociological approach to federalism,
rational-choice models are not incompatible with an institutional approach to
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intergovernmental agreements. Indeed, when looking at agreements in aggregate - as this
study does - as opposed to individual agreement creation, it could be argued that the
approaches are quite consistent. Institutions are already an important element of the
theory as they provide the rules, incentives and constraints which influence actors and
their decision-making.55 At the level of individual agreements, it is possible to consider
the actors and their choices, but when comparing federations and their entire records of
agreements, it is only useful to evaluate the structural factors which can affect all accords.
It would be impossible to consider the rationality, motivations and specific goals of the
thousands of officials and politicians across dozens of national and subnational
governments. Yet, these approaches remain interconnected as a federation's institutional
variables determine how easy it is for rational actors to form individual agreements by
providing the constraints, resources, norms and rules for their interactions.56 While
rational-choice theory may be an effective means of studying the formation of individual
agreements, it does not challenge the utility of institutional theory when comparing
aggregate records among federations.
Thus, two different approaches can be taken, depending on the level of analysis.
When examining the creation of individual agreements (the "micro" level), a rationalchoice approach is a useful method of analysis. The following section will briefly
describe a set of hypotheses regarding the formation of individual agreements that is
consistent with rational-choice theory. The analysis of a federation's entire record of
intergovernmental agreements (the "macro" level) requires a broader approach that
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institutionalism can provide. The relevant institutional factors will be discussed in the
final section of this chapter and analyzed over the remainder of this comparative study.

Reasons for Forming Agreements
While a federation's institutions may be the best explanation for why some
countries are more likely to form agreements than others, this does not provide an
explanation for why specific agreements are created. A federation's constitution or the
structure of its government can provide strong incentives and constraints for government
actors, but it cannot provide reasons for why a particular new health care accord, for
example, was signed. A separate set of hypotheses is required to understand and study
these processes. While an analysis of these variables is not undertaken by this study, they
are briefly listed here in order to clarify the differences between analyzing agreements
individually and in aggregate. Six reasons can be identified for why governments would
create intergovernmental institutions through the formation of agreements.
First, governments may seek to construct an enduring relationship. Agreements
have the advantage of creating a structure which, if effective, can outlast their original
participants. While it may be argued that behavioural norms alone may achieve similar
effects, institutions have the advantage of being public and less ambiguous in terms of the
responsibilities and privileges that they create. Institutions can help to establish a
permanent and continual relationship, where interaction might otherwise be one-off or
infrequent.57 As an example, the formation of the Council of Australian Governments
(COAG) has created an institutionalized setting for the practice of executive federalism,
leading to at least one meeting per year since its inception in 1992. By contrast, First
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Ministers’ Meetings in Canada occur on an ad hoc basis, by invitation of the Prime
Minister, and only ten have been held during this same eighteen-year period.58
Second, governments may seek to codify existing norms, strengthening them
through an institution. A formal agreement may strengthen norms by providing clarity
through the creation of explicit rules and providing a means of enforcement. A policyoriented instance of this can be found in the establishment of bilateral and multilateral
agreements in Switzerland between the cantons entrenching and improving coordination
among them in the field of post-secondary education, thus institutionalizing less formal
cooperation.59
Third, governments may seek to form agreements in order to realize more
effective cooperation. Theorists cite institutions as a means to overcome the dilemmas
involved in securing lasting cooperation.60 This is achieved through the characteristics
that an institution may possess: they can create a means to disseminate information
among participants; they can clarify rules and procedures whose ambiguity may have
impeded cooperation; and they can increase the likelihood of continued interaction
between the participants which can limit the possibility of defection.61 Natural resource
management is a policy area where this is common. The Murray-Darling Basin
Agreement in Australia, the Swiss concordats governing fishing in lakes that cross
cantonal borders (such as Lake Zurich) and any of the water management compacts of the
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United States (such as the Arkansas River Basin, Great Lakes Water Resources or the
Delaware River Basin Compacts, to name but three) illustrate the desire of governments
to create permanent institutions to help manage shared resources (all of these include
permanent, independent commissions to assist with management). Without the
institutionalized setting provided by intergovernmental agreements, these resources could
be mismanaged as individual actors attempt to maximize individual utility to the
detriment of all.
Fourth, national and subnational governments may create agreements as a means
of resolving conflicts. They may be a solution to existing disputes or simply a means of
preventing or reducing the incidence of future conflicts. This was one of the goals of the
Social Union Framework Agreement in Canada, which attempted to resolve a dispute
between the federal government and the provinces concerning the reliability of federal
transfer payments following cutbacks in the 1995 Federal Budget. Because Quebec
refused to sign the agreement, it was ultimately not fully successful in achieving the goal
of resolving the conflict.
Fifth, agreements may be used for political reasons, specifically making an
explicit statement or action on a particular issue. Among their qualities, these
intergovernmental institutions are visible and more easily observed than less formal
interactions and thus, policymakers can use them to demonstrate that they are addressing
topics of concern to citizens and interest groups. Intergovernmental agreements provide
something tangible that politicians and bureaucrats alike can refer back to when
questioned about what they have done to address concerns. While also made for
substantive reasons, the Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations in
Australia, the Millennium Scholarship Agreements in Canada and the Emergency
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Management Assistance Compact in the United States have all been publicized by
governments to demonstrate action on important files.
Finally, intergovernmental institutions can be the result of a powerful government
that seeks to address a specific policy goal that it cannot achieve by itself. This scenario
can occur when other reasons for institutionalization are not present while at the same
time the government possesses the resources to compel other governments into an
agreement. This is similar to the effects of a hegemonic power in international relations
theory. This can often be seen in Australia, when the federal government generally
possesses the financial means to initiate a new program, as well as concurrent legislative
authority, but lacks the ability to fully administer it.62 The 1983 Medicare and 1984
Commonwealth-State Housing Agreements provide examples of the federal government`s
power in action. This process is also not uncommon in Germany, where the federal
government has used its resources to form new agreements in the fields of media and
education policy.
In order for an intergovernmental agreement to be formed, there must be an
impetus and one of these six factors may be the reason for the accord. Without at least
one of these reasons, governments may still conduct intergovernmental relations, but they
will not embark on the process of agreement creation as the actors will have no incentive
to institutionalize. This should not be taken as a guarantee that the presence of even one
of these variables will necessarily lead to a formal agreement, however, as these are
necessary, not sufficient conditions. Negotiations may break down as participants
possess different goals, disagree over outcomes or lack the resources to implement the
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agreement. Moreover, the institutional characteristics of the federation will provide
general opportunities or impediments to the creation of agreements. These "macro"
characteristics will be detailed in the next section.

The Federal Environment: Fertile for Agreements or Not?
Although the question of why individual agreements are formed is an interesting
one, it is not the focus of this investigation. Instead, the focus of this inquiry is the
federation as a whole and the institutional variables that affect the likelihood that
agreements will be formed. The development of intergovernmental agreements does not
exist in a vacuum; as with all aspects of political activity, these institutions emerge from
within particular contexts or systems that may affect their form, substance and number.
These systemic factors are composed of a variety of institutional variables that define the
environment in which government actors function and intergovernmental agreements can
be constructed. The status of these variables may affect the degree of institutionalization
in federations and the number of agreements formed, as they provide a framework which
can encourage or discourage their creation.63 A modern federal system is composed of a
plethora of different institutions and thus, there are a number of potential factors that
might influence the formation of intergovernmental agreements. The goal of this study is
to identify and analyze those variables. While not necessarily exhaustive, this
investigation focuses on seven institutional features that are hypothesized to have a clear
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effect on the likelihood that a federation will create national, formal intergovernmental
agreements. The hypothesized variables include the following:

1. The Degree of Constitutional Overlap
2. The Degree of Centralization in the Constitutional Division of Powers
3. The Size and Status of the Federal Spending Power
4. The Size and Scope of the Welfare State
5. The Existence of Lasting Forums for Intergovernmental Relations
6. The Number of Subnational Governments at the State/Provincial Level
7. The Existence of Intrastate Federalism

What follows is a description of the seven variables and their expected effect on
intergovernmental agreement creation. These hypotheses are relatively straightforward
and will not be extensively described here since they will be operationalized in the
methodology chapter and further fleshed out in the individual country chapters. As there
is limited theoretical literature that proposes factors for agreement formation, these seven
hypotheses are drawn primarily from prominent institutional features of federal systems.
After examining these, other possible alternative institutional variables will be briefly
considered before concluding this chapter.

1. The Degree of Constitutional Overlap
The first variable is the degree of constitutional overlap and shared responsibilities
that exist within a federal system. Specifically, this variable examines whether a
federation has a "watertight" division of powers, with separate spheres for national and
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subnational governments, or whether it allows more than one order of government to act
in a single jurisdiction. This is not solely a measurement of concurrent jurisdiction those areas in which both orders of government are explicitly granted shared power; it
also includes policy areas in which both governments are active based upon separate, but
overlapping competencies.64 It is expected that the greater the degree of constitutional
overlap in competencies, the greater the number of agreements that will occur. This is
due to the need to coordinate policies within a field in which more than one government
has the legal authority to legislate; the more areas in which this occurs, the greater the
need for coordination, which can lead to intergovernmental agreements. As Watts
acknowledges, "overlaps and intergovernmental interdependence... require a variety of
processes and institutions in order to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration."65 For
instance, during a recession, federal and state governments might approach economic
policy in contradictory ways. The federal government could implement a new industrial
subsidy program to spur growth while state governments might be revoking tax breaks for
corporations in order to reign in budget deficits. Because both orders of government have
jurisdiction over the same area, they run the risk of their policies conflicting without some
form of coordination, such as an intergovernmental agreement. Another potential
example could involve a federal government seeking to establish a new infant health
program. If the subnational governments have jurisdiction over hospitals however, an
agreement would be required to ensure the implementation of this policy. Thus,
federations with many areas of overlap are expected to form more agreements. This
64
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could be the case in Germany - a federation with a large degree of constitutional overlap where we would expect to see governments engage in numerous agreements in order to
allocate the responsibilities of each government and engage in joint policy actions.66

2. The Degree of Centralization in the Constitutional Division of Powers
The second variable pertains to how centralized or decentralized is the
constitutional division of powers. In a highly centralized federal system, the national
government is more able to create policy without the consent of subnational governments
than it is in a federation with a decentralized constitution. When the central government
is able to act unilaterally in a large number of national matters, this reduces the need for
coordination and negotiation between the constituent units.67 Other things being equal, if
the national government decides it is advantageous to institute a new government
program and they have the power to do so, they will do it. In more decentralized
federations, the central government will likely have to negotiate with subnational
governments to achieve the same results. South Africa and Malaysia, with their strong
central governments, are good examples of this, as the national administrations hold
ultimate power over a large number of policy areas. In a more decentralized federal state,
the central government has less ability to address national matters unilaterally. When
subnational governments are more powerful, their cooperation with national policy
becomes more important as their participation can mean the difference between success
or failure. Likewise, subnational governments that can act autonomously may coordinate
between themselves to address common, national concerns, a situation not uncommon to
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the provinces in Canada. Rather than wait for federal leadership, strong provincial or
state governments in a decentralized system might seek to pursue agreements deal with
national matters, such as common agricultural policies. Thus, there are additional
opportunities for cross-territorial issues to be addressed with an agreement rather than
through the existing authority of a more powerful national government.

3. The Size and Status of the Federal Spending Power
The third variable addresses the constitutional allocation of taxation and spending
powers, as well as the ability of governments to spend outside their immediate
constitutional jurisdiction. In a large number of federations, national governments
possess greater revenue raising powers than needed, based on their required expenditures
(sometimes known as a "vertical fiscal gap").68 The federal spending power is the ability
of a national government to use these greater financial resources to spend money in areas
outside its normal jurisdiction.69 The use of this power may be controversial in certain
federations such as Canada, as subnational governments feel that it violates their
jurisdiction and does not respect their priorities.70 Yet it is this interdependence that
spending creates that imbues the spending power with its hypothesized effect on the
formation of intergovernmental agreements. More than simply a case of overlap, the use
of the spending power often creates obligations for subnational governments and opens
up new policy areas to potential coordination between governments. A national
68
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government seeking to fund a new prescription drug plan can transfer funds to
subnational governments to enact such a program, but there must be further measures such as an intergovernmental agreement - to ensure this money is spent as intended. As
such, agreements may accompany the use of the federal spending power to ensure money
is spent as intended and the policy goals of both federal and state governments are
coordinated.

Nigeria, Mexico and Malaysia are all examples of federations where the

national government possesses great financial resources.71 Australia also provides a
notable case of this because the federal government possesses a large share of total
government revenue and is able to spend this in state jurisdiction, often forming
agreements concerning programs such as housing, pensions and medical insurance.72
This last example is especially important as it illustrates that it is not enough for a
national government to simply possess substantial financial resources - it must also be
willing and able to spend in provincial or state jurisdiction. The use of the spending
power may be constrained by rules limiting its application, such as in Switzerland, or it
may be politically controversial, as it sometimes is in Canada.73 Permissive spending
rules and the established role of federal spending in subnational jurisdiction help to
explain the common use of the spending power in federations such as Australia.

4. The Size and Scope of the Welfare State
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The fourth variable that may affect the formation of intergovernmental institutions
is the size and scope of the welfare state, a measurement of the size of government.74 The
more areas in which governments create policies and programs, the greater number of
areas in which there is a potential for them to interact, conflict and enter into cooperative
agreements. The welfare state is particularly interesting as policies in this field often
involve both orders of government because subnational governments traditionally play a
large role in developing and implementing welfare policies, notably education and
healthcare. Unlike many of the other variables in this study, this is not a static
measurement as the welfare state changes overtime when new programs are added or
spending is reduced in austere times. For virtually all countries, the overall direction of
this change has been significant growth, especially since the Second World War, yet this
does not always occur in a linear manner.75
A larger welfare state should provide more opportunities for the formation of
intergovernmental agreements, leading to the hypothesis that the broader the scope of
government activity, the greater the degree of institutionalization that should occur. For
example, a federation with only public hospital insurance for the poor has fewer areas in
which cooperation is possible compared to a federation with full public health and dental
coverage for all its citizens. While there is no guarantee that the second federation will
form a national agreement pertaining to dental coverage, it is not possible for the first
federation to do so because such a program does not exist. Similarly, a group of
provincial or state governments seeking to set up a national scheme for dealing with out74
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of-territory patients can only do so if this area is covered by government policy. It is
expected that a larger welfare state, such as Austria’s or Germany’s would create more
need for coordination (and thus agreements) than that found in the United States, for
example. Because of the dynamic nature of this variable, a country's record of agreement
formation can also be compared against changes in its own welfare state over time to
determine whether these shifts are sufficient to affect the creation of new agreements.

5. The Existence of Lasting Forums for Intergovernmental Relations
The fifth variable to consider is whether lasting forums for intergovernmental
relations exist in a federation. Established or institutionalized bodies for
intergovernmental relations provide for regular and structured interaction between
government representatives.76 As Bolleyer argues, intergovernmental agreements are, in
part, the product of their institutional environments. While she contends that
intergovernmental forums affect the degree of institutionalization of arrangements, the
same relationship can be hypothesized for the number of agreements.77 The more
interaction that exists, the more opportunities that are available for governments to
discuss common concerns and create institutions. If a single government (national or
subnational) seeks to form a new air pollution agreement, it will be much easier to do so
if environmental ministers meet regularly and are already accustomed to working
together. Moreover, such regular meetings between politicians and officials can help
identify new areas where coordination through an agreement would be advantageous.
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Other things being equal, these forums should increase the total number of
agreements created. In contrast, federations which have a more infrequent and less
institutionalized system of intergovernmental relations are likely to have fewer
opportunities to form agreements. A specific example of this is the First Ministers'
Meetings in Canada. Unlike their Australian counterparts who operate in the regular and
structured Council of Australian Governments, the meetings of Canadian Premiers and
Prime Ministers are scheduled on an ad hoc basis and are not supported by a specific,
permanent secretariat. This could decrease the likelihood of national agreements in
Canada. Similarly, a more developed system of forums for intergovernmental relations,
such as regular ministerial and deputy-ministerial committees, can also increase the
likelihood that agreements will be created. In this way, Bolleyer's general observation
that the structure of intergovernmental arrangements has an effect on intergovernmental
agreements can be incorporated into this study.

6. The Number of Subnational Governments at the State/Provincial Level
The sixth variable is the number of subnational governments that exist within a
federation. This reflects a classic coordination problem: the more participants in a
negotiation, the harder it becomes to reach a mutually acceptable resolution. With every
new participant, it becomes more difficult for all agents to acknowledge or understand
common incentives and benefits to cooperation, while non-compliance becomes easier as
punishments become more complicated to enforce.78 Likewise, in a federation, the
greater the number of governments, the more difficult it is to reach an agreement, as each
78
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additional government increases the potential that disagreement will emerge.79 A
government seeking to create a new national accord can more easily do so with four or
five partners than with dozens. Furthermore, in federations with a large number of
subnational governments, such as the United States, India or Switzerland, it can be
difficult to get policymakers in the same place at the same time to develop agreements.
While federations with a large number of subnational governments will have more
difficulty in forming national agreements than those with only a small number, this is not
expected to be a linear relationship. There may be no observable difference in the
difficulty of coordinating nine provinces in South Africa compared to ten provinces in
Canada. Likewise, there may or may not be a specific "tipping point" - a number of
constituent units after which it becomes increasingly difficult to form national
agreements. Yet, even if these strict mathematical relationships cannot be identified, the
coordination problems caused by this variable should manifest themselves in the largest
federations (in terms of the number of subnational governments). In this way, the process
of forming intergovernmental agreements becomes increasingly complex and difficult as
the number of subnational governments increase, creating a substantial barrier to
institutionalization.

7. The Existence of Intrastate Federalism
The seventh and final variable that could affect agreement formation is the
existence of intrastate federalism. According to Donald Smiley, "intrastate federalism (is)
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the channelling of territorial particularisms within the central government itself."80
Generally, this occurs within the national legislative institution, usually through a
separate second chamber. As Ronald Watts observes, most federations maintain
bicameral legislatures, in which the second or upper chamber exists as a forum for the
representation of the interests of regions or subnational units.81 In theory, those
federations which have effective and active chambers of regional or subnational
representation have the ability to resolve issues of common concern within this body, as
opposed to doing so through processes of intergovernmental relations. Specifically, this
requires the full participation of representatives of subnational governments (such as in
the German Bundesrat) as opposed to simply including representatives elected by each of
the constituent units (such as in the American Senate). The former is an example of full
intrastate federalism while the latter is only a partial degree. While the elected
representatives may address matters important to subnational governments, they cannot
speak for these administrations and thus, cannot serve as a substitute for direct
intergovernmental relations. As well, each subnational unit should also have equal or at
least disproportional representation compared to the share it might earn based solely on
its population. Without disproportional influence for smaller states, governments may be
inclined to pursue executive federalism as a means of intergovernmental collaboration
because representatives may have a more equal voice in these forums (even if they do not
all possess the same capabilities).
The expected consequence of full intrastate federalism would be the formation of
a smaller number of intergovernmental agreements, as opposed to those federations that
80
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lack effective means of intrastate federalism, such as Canada or Malaysia. If subnational
governments have the ability to address common matters through national political
institutions, they may choose to do so instead of undertaking the process to form a
separate intergovernmental agreement. A subnational government seeking to harmonize
interstate trade tariffs may opt to pursue this goal through the national legislative process
instead of an agreement. Because direct representatives or delegates of subnational
governments can consent to such arrangements within the federal legislative process, the
existence of a body for intrastate federalism provides an alternative to national
agreements and this may decrease the likelihood of their creation.

These seven factors affecting the formation of intergovernmental agreements
provide useful hypotheses for the further examination of agreements. While the "micro"
hypotheses can explain why a single agreement is formed, these institutional features
contribute to our understanding of the differences between federations and why some
have a greater propensity to form agreements than others.
As previously mentioned, these seven institutional factors are not the only
possible variables that could have an effect on intergovernmental agreement formation.
While it is not reasonable to attempt to identify all other potential hypotheses and explain
why they were not included, a sample of potential alternatives can be briefly discussed.
Three alternatives specifically stand out: the type of government institutions (i.e.
Bolleyer's hypothesis); the structure of the political party system; and differences between
the constituent units.
The first alternative institutional hypothesis would apply Bolleyer's focus on the
type of government institutions to this study on the formation of agreements. Rather than
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focus on the level of institutionalization, this hypothesis might argue that the degree of
power-sharing required by government institutions will affect the likelihood of agreement
formation.82 For example, because governing power in the United States is divided
among two legislative bodies and a separately-elected executive branch, securing the
agreement of all three for an intergovernmental accord might be a significant obstacle.
As mentioned earlier, however, this comparative investigation does not restrict its
definition of agreements solely to those passed into law. Using America as the example,
there are two categories of formal agreements: interstate compacts - which require
legislative and executive approval as laws - and administrative agreements - institutions
which may be formed solely by the executive. While the government institution
hypothesis could certainly explain differences in first type of agreement, it offers little
explanation for the second. As well, most federations are Parliamentary, so differences in
power-sharing between them may not be as pronounced, reducing the effectiveness of any
explanation of intergovernmental agreement formation. Because of these shortcomings, it
was not included in this analysis.
The second alternative hypothesis is inspired by William Riker's work on
federalism. Riker argues that the degree of centralization in the party system is the key
variable in ensuring the federal bargain is maintained.83 A decentralized party system
diffuses power away from the centre and allows for subnational governments to maintain
their autonomy. Applied to the study of intergovernmental agreements, such a hypothesis
might suggest that the degree of centralization or decentralization in the party system can
explain differences in agreement formation. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear whether a
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more integrated or a more devolved party structure would lead to more agreements. A
centralized party system could allow for likeminded members of the same party to
quickly reach agreements due to a lack of ideological or political differences.
Conversely, coordination might be achieved without a formal agreement because
members of the same party could cooperate within their existing party organization. The
first scenario would make a decentralized party system more likely to produce a larger
number of agreements, but it is unclear if this possibility is more likely than the second
scenario. Given the lack of a clear hypothesis for the relationship between the party
system and the creation of intergovernmental agreements, this variable does not have the
clear causal logic as the seven that were included.
Finally, the differences between the constituent units could provide a possible
institutional explanation for agreement formation. An argument could be made that the
differences in size - in terms of either population or economies - between the states,
provinces, cantons or länder might make the creation of national agreements particularly
difficult. Extreme disparities in size and wealth may limit the number of areas in which a
national consensus can be reached and agreements formed. Moreover, single, large
subnational governments might possess sufficient resources to "go it alone" if their
demands are not sufficiently addressed.84 Unlike the previous two hypotheses, this
variable does have some ability to generate a potential explanation that is relevant to this
study. It is not, however, sufficiently different from "the number of subnational
governments" variable, and as the analysis in Chapter Eleven (Comparative Analysis)
will demonstrate, it does not add any further insight to this institutional explanation.
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While there are a number of interesting alternative institutional explanations that
can be advanced, many of these - as indicated by these three examples - have notable
shortcomings. They will be revisited in Chapter Eleven in order to confirm these
shortcomings and delineate the more effective explanation provided by the seven
institutional hypotheses that were originally presented.

Variables in Concert: How the Hypotheses Explain the Cases
With the seven institutional variables established as the focus of this study, it is
necessary to describe the two ways in which this theory will be applied. First, each
hypothesis will be considered independently in every case study in order to analyze what
effects, if any, they have on the formation of intergovernmental agreements. This
investigation will be used to determine whether certain institutional features seem to have
a greater impact on agreement formation than others and whether they are applicable in
all of the federations included here. Second, these variables will be considered together
in order to determine whether they present a convincing and coherent explanation for the
record of agreement formation in each of the seven federations. In order to accomplish
this second task, the seven variables must be categorized according to their expected
effect on agreement formation.
While all seven institutional features are hypothesized to have an effect on the
likelihood of agreement formation, it is clear that these effects are not identical. The
presence of certain features is likely to increase the likelihood of agreements, while others
should decrease this potential for agreements. Specifically, the seven variables can be
divided into three general categories based on their effects: those factors which are
conducive to national agreement creation, those which inhibit new agreements and those
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which reduce the potential for agreements by providing alternative sources of
coordination. The first category (factors conducive to agreements) is the largest and it
includes five of the institutional variables: Constitutional Overlap (1), the Degree of
Centralization (2), the Size and Status of the Federal Spending Power (3), the Size and
Scope of the Welfare State (4) and Institutionalized Forums for Intergovernmental
Relations (5). Depending on the intensity of their individual manifestations, these factors
create the conditions which are conducive to intergovernmental coordination, a necessity
for any agreement. The remaining two variables - the Number of Subnational
Governments (6) and the Existence of Intrastate Federalism (7) - reduce the likelihood of
agreement formation, but in different ways. The former variable inhibits or reduces the
likelihood of agreements while the latter provides an alternative means of coordination,
which can also reduce agreement formation.
Categorizing the variables along these lines is helpful as it provides a clearer
understanding of the combined effects of this institutional approach. If these institutional
hypotheses are to provide an effective explanation of the record of agreement formation
in each case study, then it is not enough for the variables to simply be present; as a whole,
these factors must be consistent with the agreements observed for each federation. This
means that in a federation with a large number of agreements, we would expect to see
several factors which are conducive to agreement formation, with minimal barriers
provided by the variables which inhibit agreements or allow for alternatives. Likewise, a
federation with few agreements would be expected to have a limited number of conducive
institutional features, but substantial barriers to agreement formation.
This relationship between the variables can be summarized in a simple expression:
CON – INH – ALT = IGA
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“CON” represents the five variables that are conducive to intergovernmental
coordination (and thus agreements), “INH” represents the factor inhibiting agreement
formation, while "ALT" stands for alternative means of coordination. “IGA” is a
federation’s overall likelihood of forming agreements. This is a simplified and orderly
way to present the results of the analyses from each of the federations, allowing for easier
comparisons.85 This "summary formula" is not meant to be a precise model that can
calculate specific values or replace the analysis of the country case studies. Instead, it is
meant to serve as an analytical summary device to reference the findings of the country
chapters and reiterate their basic relationships. In Chapter 11, the comparative analysis
will return to this conception of the institutional theory in order to review whether it is an
effective approach for explaining intergovernmental agreement formation in federal
systems.

Conclusion:
By drawing on the existing literature of institutionalism, this chapter has provided
a theoretical framework for the existing study of intergovernmental agreements, while
also proposing an avenue for future scholarship. Intergovernmental agreements meet the
four criteria set out by Peters in his definition of institutions and current research has
clearly treated agreements in this vein, if perhaps indirectly or implicitly. Moving beyond
the existing consensus on agreements as institutions, this chapter proposed six reasons for
why they are created as a means of explaining just what sort of institutions these
agreements are and what roles they play in federal systems. More centrally, agreements
85

It must be stressed that this is, in no way, an attempt to create a numerical value for a federation’s
potential to form agreements. Instead, this formula should be taken as a generalized summary of the
analysis and conclusions from each country chapter.
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were examined in a wider context – looking at the effects of other institutions on their
formation, the focus of this investigation. Examining these seven variables will provide
new understanding and a fresh perspective on agreements, while also contributing to the
existing literature on comparative federalism and intergovernmental relations.
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Chapter Three: Methodology
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the definitions, parameters, data sources
and methodologies of this comparative investigation. It will begin by building on the
discussion of the previous chapter by specifying the operational definition for
intergovernmental agreements that will serve as the foundation for the rest of this study.
This will be followed by a brief explanation of the qualitative approach to the analysis
and comparison of agreements. Next, the sources of data for the seven factors which are
hypothesized to have an effect on agreement formation will be described. Finally, the
chapter will conclude by explaining how the data were obtained for the federations that
were included in this study as well as the difficulties presented by other potential cases
that could not be incorporated into this analysis.

An Operational Definition for Intergovernmental Agreements
The literature review of the preceding chapter indicated that intergovernmental
agreements are understudied in many national contexts and virtually neglected in a
comparative setting. This discussion also built on the foundation of existing scholarship
to ground this investigation in an institutional paradigm. While defining the study of
intergovernmental agreements as an investigation of intergovernmental institutions is a
necessary step in crafting hypotheses and establishing the theoretical basis of this work, it
provides limited guidance in clarifying exactly the type of data that must be gathered. As
intergovernmental agreements cover a broad range of structures from informal contact
between two government officials, such as a telephone conversation, all the way to
national constitutional amendments, a specific definition is a necessary step for any
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investigation. Unfortunately, there are few models to draw upon in order to craft an
operational definition for intergovernmental agreements that can be used as a starting
point for this research. As such, this comparative inquiry will propose its own definition
and parameters for the study of agreements, rather than attempt to rely on any existing
notions.
This study will define an intergovernmental agreement as a single policy project
that is formal, written and national in scope. By being a single policy project, this
restricts an agreement to a single topic, but not necessarily a single document. This is
best illustrated by an example: over the last decade, the Canadian federal government has
signed a series of bilateral immigration agreements with each of the ten provincial
administrations. While there are ten separate documents, they are all part of a single
federal effort to coordinate immigration responsibilities with the provinces. Under this
definition, such a project would be counted as a single agreement, rather than ten.86 This
stipulation also excludes renewals of the same agreement. The requirement that
agreements must be formal and written simply means that they must be publically
accessible and have an agreed-upon text.87 This is a methodological necessity rather than
a dismissal of informal instances of intergovernmental agreements. It is possible to
identify and study public, written agreements and compare them among a number of
federations; it would be difficult, if not impossible to effectively assemble anything
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This approach also avoids "agreement inflation" for federations that have a larger number of states or
provinces or those which use a "hub and spoke" model to national agreements, with the federal government
signing similar - if not quite identical - agreements with each subnational government rather than
participating with all units in a single document.
87
Note: this definition of agreements makes no distinction between agreements based on their legal status.
Agreements that can be enforced via a judicial process are as valid as those which cannot be, provided they
meet all of the criteria.
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approaching a complete database of informal connections and accords in a single country,
let alone several.88
The reason for studying national intergovernmental agreements - as opposed to all
formal accords, regardless of the number of participants - is two-fold. First, as described
in the theory discussion, national agreements represent changes made to an entire
federation and thus, are interesting elements of a federal system's evolution. This is true
whether agreements are formed solely among the constituent units or when the national
government is involved (state-state agreements and federal-state agreements). Two - and
more germane to this methodology chapter - studying all intergovernmental agreements,
even bilateral ones, across multiple federations would be exceedingly difficult. For those
federations for which there is not a pre-existing and accessible database of all agreements
(i.e. almost all of them) a federation's complete listing of agreements could only be
constructed by obtaining complete records from every subnational government within a
country. The likelihood that every province, state, canton or länder in a federation
possesses a complete and publically accessible record of all agreements is highly unlikely
for even one country, let alone seven.89 For methodological as much as theoretical
reasons, the focus of this comparative inquiry is on national agreements only.
Because of these considerations, only agreements which include more than 90%
of a federation's subnational governments will be counted in this study. This threshold
was selected to ensure that all the agreements included in this analysis had an
overwhelming majority and fully-national participation rate without discounting large
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As an example of the difficulty, consider Zimmerman's description of informal agreements in the United
States, where "thousands" of these have been created. Zimmerman, Interstate Cooperation, 163-165.
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This assumption was only confirmed by this research. In only one case, the United Kingdom, was there
anything approaching a complete record of agreements for each of the constituent units.

60

agreements because they did not achieve strict unanimity. For example, an agreement in
the United States that had been signed by forty-nine states could certainly be described as
"national", but if the threshold of this study was unanimity, it would be disqualified based
on the actions of one government in fifty.
The final parameter that must be established is the time frame for this comparative
inquiry. The general time period that will be studied begins in 1945, at the end of the
Second World War, and concludes in 2008. This is the "general" time period because
only a handful of federal systems have existed since 1945. Even a federation as
paradigmatic as Germany has not functioned as a federal system for the entire period, to
say nothing of newer examples such as South Africa or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Because of
the potential differences in time periods between the federations in this comparison, a
yearly average (by country) will feature in this analysis in addition to the consideration of
the complete records of national agreement formation. This average of agreements
created per year will serve as the principle means of comparing the number of agreements
found in each federation and ranking them relative to the other cases in this study.
Using these definitions and parameters, records of national intergovernmental
agreements were found for the following seven federations: Australia, Canada, Germany,
South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The
final section of this chapter will discuss the selection of these cases, the sources of the
data, and the other cases for which sufficient information could not be found.

Studying Intergovernmental Agreements: Quantitative versus Qualitative
Measurements
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The principal goal of this investigation is to increase our understanding of
intergovernmental agreements and attempt to determine how a federation's institutional
characteristics affect the frequency of their creation. This will be accomplished by
analyzing a federation's record of agreement formation - the number of agreements,
potential patterns in the frequency of their creation, and, where possible, the policy areas
they occupy - and comparing this against the seven institutional features hypothesized to
affect agreement formation. This approach should not be mistaken for a form of
quantitative methodology that would rely on statistical methods to determine correlations.
With only seven federations, there are simply not enough data to examine the statistical
relationship between the number of agreements and various institutional features.90 Even
if the data set was large enough, a purely quantitative approach would not be desirable
because features such as the constitutional division of powers are better addressed
through a qualitative methodology which can adequately explore and compare the various
nuances of federal constitutional arrangements.
Although this is not a statistical analysis, the central measurement of
intergovernmental agreements is numerical as opposed to a more qualitative approach.
The measurement of the frequency of agreement formation was chosen instead of another
measurement, such as the importance of an agreement (in monetary or constitutional
terms) or the longevity of certain agreements for two reasons. First, the data required to
list an agreement's title, the date it was agreed upon, and its signatories are the most basic,
and thus the most accessible, information that could be sought regarding agreements. The
intention behind this decision was that this approach would allow data to be gathered for
90

Seven federations still represents more than a quarter of the approximately twenty-five federal countries
that currently exist (plus or minus three, depending on the definitions used). Yet, even if 80% of these
federations could be included, the data would still be too limited for proper statistical analysis.
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a much larger number of federations than might be possible using a method which
required greater detail.91 Second, focusing on the number of agreements removes the
need to establish some kind of qualitative measurement that might privilege certain types
of agreements over others. For example, rather than examine intergovernmental
institutionalization by analyzing the number of agreements, one might instead examine
the proportion of funds which are dependent upon agreements or perhaps the number of
laws, federal or state, which arise from an agreement. Even assuming that such
information could be found, it might produce a perspective on institutionalization that is
more applicable to some federations than to others. If one federation's welfare programs
are governed by a series of agreements, but a second federation has the same for its
criminal justice system, is the first federation necessarily more institutionalized if money
is used as a unit of measurement? Counting the number of institutions, while by no
means perfect, avoids this difficulty.92 Each agreement made is a decision point political actors in a country can choose to institutionalize or not. The quantitative data
provide a benchmark for comparison among countries. They also permit systematic study
of the relationship between agreement formation and the measurable (or estimable)
position of the federation on the independent variables. Thus, the frequency of
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Given the difficulty in finding even basic information regarding agreements in several countries, this
proved to be a prescient concern. See the last section of this chapter for more details regarding the search
for agreements.
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While there is not enough information to conclusively demonstrate this, there seems to be some
correlation between the frequency of agreement formation and their importance. Looking at the federations'
records of agreements (found in the appendices) and the types of agreements formed suggests that those
countries which form the most agreements, also seem to be forming agreements that are "larger" in terms of
money spent and legal/constitutional consequences. At least among these cases, there is not a good
example - with the possible exception of the nascent federal system in the UK - of a federation with a small
number of agreements that exclusively address highly significant (defined in legal or monetary terms)
policy matters.
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agreements serves as the best and least ambiguous method of evaluating
intergovernmental agreements and the institutional environment of a particular federation.

Testing the Hypotheses: Sources of Data for the Seven Variables
Chapter Two provided an explanation of seven factors that may have an effect on
a federation's propensity to form national intergovernmental agreements. While this
discussion provided reasons why these variables would affect agreement formation, it left
the question of how they will be operationalized largely unanswered. In the best case
scenario, consistent and unambiguous measurements would exist across all seven
federations which would aid in the analysis and comparison of the cases. Although this
may be possible in the consideration of certain variables such as the number of
subnational governments, it is not sufficient, possible or even desirable for all of them.
For instance, it would be difficult to fully summarize and explain the nuances of
decentralization in a federation only through the use of a single numerical variable. Thus,
a comprehensive approach relying on multiple sources, instead of simply one "silver
bullet", provides a broader foundation for considering these factors.
For all seven of the variables, secondary sources provide a large proportion of the
information used in the analysis. While intergovernmental agreements may be
understudied, there have been a number of works on other features of federalism such as
the constitutional division of powers, second chambers and intergovernmental relations
that provide useful insight into these variables. This investigation will utilize both
comparative works on federalism as well as country-specific studies. Where possible,
quantitative measurements - of factors such as government spending - have been used to
provide an additional metric that can apply similarly in all cases. Each variable will be
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investigated separately at first, before considering some of the relationships between these
features in Chapter Eleven (Comparative Analysis).

1. The Degree of Constitutional Overlap
In addition to the other secondary sources, the analysis of the effect of
constitutional overlap also utilized one comparative measurement. In Comparing Federal
Systems, Ronald Watts includes an appendix comparing "the distribution of powers and
functions in selected federations".93 This chart lists more than fifty different common
policy areas and it notes which order of government, federal or state (subnational), has
jurisdiction, as well as whether jurisdiction is shared.94 While this is not a perfect
comparison - several powers, such as nuclear energy, must be inferred from other
enumerated powers - it allows for standardized evaluations of several federal
constitutions. With respect to overlap, this comparison allows for a universal
measurement of how many policy areas (in both raw totals and percentages) in each
federation involve the activities of more than one order of government. Again, this
information requires further explanation and context from other sources, but provides at
least one means of simplifying and generalizing a topic that is normally difficult to
quantify and compare.
Aside from an over-reliance upon this measurement, the one notable difficulty is
the limited number of federations included in Watts' original appendix: while five of the
seven federations studied here are included, South Africa and the United Kingdom are
not. An attempt was made to replicate Watts' exercise using the division of powers found
93

Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 3rd ed., 193-198.
Watts' comparison distinguishes two types of shared jurisdiction: "concurrent" and "separate, but
overlapping" responsibilities of both orders of government.
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in those two countries in order to provide the data for a full comparison among all seven
federations.95 While this may have created some slight inaccuracies (for example, Watts'
original work seems to have relied more upon inferring powers from broad authority), the
results are both unambiguous (both South Africa and the United Kingdom have a clear
predisposition to either overlap or centralize) and consistent with the other five cases in
terms of the total policy areas enumerated. In this way, it was possible to incorporate the
two missing cases into this comparison, allowing it to serve as a common measurement of
constitutional overlap.

2. The Degree of Centralization in the Constitutional Division of Powers
As with overlap, the centralization variable relies on Watts' comparison of federal
constitutions and their divisions of powers. The process is effectively the same, with the
sole difference that while overlap is concerned with shared jurisdiction, evaluating the
degree of centralization puts the focus on areas of exclusive jurisdiction. While it is not a
definitive measurement, a federation with a large number of policy areas held exclusively
by the national government, and fewer by the subnational governments, is likely trending
towards centralization. Again, this is measured by both considering the raw totals of the
jurisdictions as well as the percentages of the total policy areas. This observation is even
more salient when studying intergovernmental agreements: the more policy areas in
which the federal government can act upon unilaterally, the fewer areas which may
require some form of intergovernmental coordination, including agreements.
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As the United Kingdom has no single, written constitution, the division of powers found in the
Devolution Acts of each national administration were used. Please see the chapter on the UK for more
information.
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3. The Size and Status of the Federal Spending Power
As one of the two variables with an explicit financial element, the size and status
of the federal spending power lends itself to comparative quantification. Specifically, the
size of the spending power can be measured by determining how reliant subnational
governments are upon federal transfers. As the volume of these transfer payments
increase, the opportunities for intergovernmental collaboration will do so as well. The
primary measurement of this was the data gathered from the International Monetary
Fund's (IMF) World Financial Yearbook. This annual publication lists a category
measuring the percentage of subnational revenue that is received from federal grants.
This source provided data for six of the seven cases - as the United Kingdom is not
officially a federation, information regarding transfers between London and the devolved
administrations was not included. Fortunately, the data on the UK`s transfers were
available within the budgets of the governments of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.
Although this may not be measured by exactly the same criteria that the IMF used, it
provides some basis for comparison. Additional sources, notably Ronald Watt's extensive
discussion of federal transfers, were used to bolster and confirm this data.96
While the size of the spending power was easily quantifiable and comparable, the
status of this power - its usage, legal standing and role in intergovernmental relations - is
equally important and requires a more nuanced approach. Secondary sources and federal
constitutions provided the information necessary to understand the workings of the
spending power in each case.

4. The Size and Scope of the Welfare State
96

See: Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 3rd ed., 104-112.
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Much like the size of the federal spending power, any evaluation of the welfare
state requires some kind of comparable quantification. Although no attempt is made to
try to determine a precise relationship between each additional dollar spent on welfare
and the likelihood of more agreements - such an effort would be quixotic at best - the
relative levels of spending do provide a clear and comparable measurement, if not a
complete one.
Surprisingly, it was difficult to find a consistent measurement of welfare state
spending that included all seven federations studied here. Because of this, two different,
and thus not entirely consistent, measurements were utilized, in addition to countryspecific secondary sources. The first set of data comes from the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) "Social Expenditure Database",
which is available online.97 This provides a measurement of welfare spending as a
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). While this database provides a useful
comparable indicator between the cases, it does not include South Africa. Although a
similar figure (spending as a percentage of GDP) could be found for South Africa,
different methods of measurement make this a less-than-perfect comparison.98
The IMF's World Financial Yearbook provides an alternative measurement of
welfare spending that does include results from South Africa. Measuring welfare state
expenditures as a percentage of total government spending, the IMF provides data on all
seven federations from the early 1970s until the present (albeit with a few missing years
in which countries did not report all their necessary information). While these data do not
97

The original data table is available from the OECD at:
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=SOCX_AGG.
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It is fortunate that, by any measurement, South African welfare spending as a percentage of GDP remains
the lowest of the seven cases. Thus, even though data for South Africa is not from the same source as the
other federations, this does not seriously impede analysis and comparison. See Chapter Seven (South
Africa) for more information.
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match up precisely with the OECD's findings, in terms of the cases' relative rankings, it
provides a second common measurement of welfare spending that allows for the
comparison and evaluation of the cases.99

5. The Existence of Lasting Forums for Intergovernmental Relations
Evaluating and comparing the institutional arrangements for intergovernmental
relations is an exercise similar to determining the degree of intrastate federalism: no
single, quantifiable measurement may exist but such comparisons are neither difficult nor
complicated. The basic criteria for evaluating the bodies devoted to intergovernmental
relations are straightforward and include questions such as: is there a peak institution for
intergovernmental relations? Does a federation have separate forums for ministers or
specific policy areas? How often do such bodies meet? Are meetings organized and
supported by staff or some formal secretariat? How long have these forums been in
operation? In all federations, the answers to these questions were readily available
through secondary sources and government documents as well as the publications issued
by many of these forums.

6. The Number of Subnational Governments at the State/Provincial Level
This variable was, by far, the easiest to quantify and compare but only once clear
definitions were established. As was noted earlier in this chapter, a national
intergovernmental agreement is any formal, written accord which is approved by 90% or
more of a federation's subnational governments. When attempting to determine the
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It should not be unexpected that two different measurements will return potentially divergent results.
Where these occur, they are noted in the individual country chapters.
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number of subnational governments, a couple of criteria are necessary. First, the
governments in question must be of the state, provincial, cantonal or länder "order". As
federations develop and local government takes on a more prominent position, these
administrations may take a more active role in intergovernmental relations; however this
study is concerned only with the provincial/state level.100 Second, the only governments
that are counted are those which possess the full powers of states and provinces. This is
to exclude territories and possessions such as the Northern Territory in Australia,
Nunavut in Canada or Guam in the United States. While the governments of these
territories have taken an increasing role in intergovernmental relations - and even
agreements - their unequal status and sometimes heavy reliance upon their respective
national governments make it difficult to evaluate the nature of their involvement in any
accord. With these parameters, determining the number of eligible subnational
governments in each federation was a simple task. Further information from secondary
sources provided context in each federation, where necessary.

7. The Existence of Intrastate Federalism
The key to considering intrastate federalism and its relationship with
intergovernmental agreements is evaluating to what degree it exists in a particular
federation. As the previous chapter explained, there are three potential states of intrastate
federalism: none, partial and full, each of which could have a different effect on
agreement formation. Because this was a novel distinction, building upon the existing
100

The exclusion of local governments is not merely for clarity's sake but also due to the vast difference in
local government regimes amongst federations. For example, while South Africa possesses a fairly
developed system of municipal involvement in intergovernmental relations, as well as in constitutional
provisions, municipal governments, in Canada, local governments are, constitutionally speaking, creatures
of the provinces.
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concept of intrastate federalism, there was no source for this information akin to Watts'
comparison of constitutions.101 Thus, information on federal second chambers was
gathered from existing secondary sources, constitutions, and data available through the
websites of these legislative bodies in order to classify each federal second chamber in the
appropriate category.

Case Selection
In addition to the basic requirement that each case must have an accessible record
of national intergovernmental agreements, there are several other criteria that were
considered in the selection of the federations for this comparison. An optimal collection
of cases would provide a diverse range of values for each of the seven variables, which
would allow for the full consideration of the hypotheses. For instance, such a sample
would include federations with a large number of subnational governments as well as
others with only a few provinces or states in order for the sixth hypothesis to be fully
explored. Beyond the consideration of these variables, a secondary goal was to include
further diversity among the cases to improve the generalizability of the results,
incorporating differences in size (in terms of both geography and population), location,
language, level of economic development and age (how old the federal system is, not
necessarily the country itself).
Using these criteria, the goal of case selection in this study was to assemble a
large body of data from the greatest number of federations possible. This effort was
balanced against three primary impediments. First, the upper limit in any study of
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Existing scholarship on intrastate federalism was generally framed in a binary fashion - it either was
present or it wasn't. Allowing for the effects of elected representatives on intergovernmental agreements is
not predicted by existing works, such as Smiley, "Federal-Provincial Conflict in Canada,"1974.
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comparative federalism is relatively low; Watts, in the latest edition of Comparing
Federal Systems, counts only twenty-five federations world-wide, while also
acknowledging a number of other confederations, federacies and unitary states with some
federal features.102 The Forum of Federations, in its 2005 Handbook of Federal Systems
also lists twenty-five.103 This sets an absolute maximum to the number of cases even
before other considerations are accounted for.104
The second restriction was one of resources. Extensive travel to many of these
countries would have proven cost-prohibitive. This is especially true as such travel would
have come without any guarantee of success. This limitation meant that data on
intergovernmental agreements would have to come in one of the following formats: an
online database, an easily accessible public record (held by a library or similar body), a
previous scholarly study or a successful request for information to a government agency
or official.105 Language considerations were also governed by the limits of scarce
resources. Although eleven of the twenty-five identified federations use English as an
official or primary language, language barriers made accessing data in certain countries
much more difficult. Once Germany was identified as an important case (see below),
funds were used to hire a German-speaking student, Anja Cebotareva, to assist with this
102

Watts’ list of twenty-five federations might be pared down even further by excluding such dubious
entries as Pakistan and Russia, if one desired to insist on a stricter definition, such as that of K.C. Wheare.
The complete list includes: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belau, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil,
Canada, Comoros, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Micronesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, St.
Kitts and Nevis, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates and the United States of America.
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The list found in the Handbook of Federal Countries, 2005 is nearly identical to Watts' list, though it
includes Serbia and Montenegro and forgoes Belau Serbia and Montenegro have since split apart into
separate, unitary countries. See: Griffiths and Nerenberg.
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As mentioned previously, the actual limit could be considered even lower. In order to avoid
overwhelming the sample with very centralized federations or even mostly unitary structures, countries like
Pakistan, Russia and Venezuela were excluded.
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Fortunately, there did not seem to be any situation in which it was clear that investing in a research trip
to a particular country would be likely to produce data when other methods were unsuccessful. While India
and Malaysia might have physical records held by their central governments and/or parliaments, this could
not be confirmed, making such a trip an expensive risk that was unlikely to pay off.
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research and translate any records.106 This proved to be very helpful with research on
Austria, Germany and Switzerland.
Finally, time itself was an important consideration. This research needed to be
completed in a relatively timely fashion (between two to three years from conception to
completion). The consequence of this was that there was not an unlimited period of time
to gather data for every potential federation.
Despite these restrictions, the sample of cases for this study is more than sufficient
for this analysis and compares favourably with other works of comparative federalism.
As the country analyses will demonstrate, these seven federations provide more than
enough breadth in the independent variables to fully consider their effects on the
formation of intergovernmental agreements. With seven cases, approximately 25% of all
federal systems are represented by this study - a sizeable sample. This makes this study
the largest comparative study of intergovernmental agreements in federal systems.107 It is
also in keeping with comparative works on federalism outside the topic of
intergovernmental agreements such as Watts' New Federations(six cases), Taylor's
Characterisation in Federations (six cases), Hueglin and Fenna's Comparative
Federalism (four cases) and Riker's Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, (8
cases).
Thus, with these aspirations and constraints in mind, the comparative logic behind
the case selection for this study is straightforward. The objective was to gather together a
group of countries which would provide a representative sample of federal systems as a
whole. This is in contrast to other common selection criteria such as a most-similar or
106

Funds were made available by the Canada Research Chair in Multilevel Governance.
The only other serious comparison is Bolleyer's study, Intergovernmental Cooperation, which includes
three cases.
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most-different systems case design.108 Using a most-similar systems design could not
produce results generalizable to all federations as the cases would have to be restricted to
only certain types of federations, such as established, economically-developed ones.
Likewise, a strict most-different systems approach would be problematic given the
significant differences in the number of intergovernmental agreements formed by
federation (the dependent variable).
Because this investigation tests a set of institutional variables for their effects on
the formation of intergovernmental agreements, the cases must adequately reflect the
diversity of institutional characteristics in federations in order to be representative. A
brief examination of the seven cases indicates that they fulfill the goal of providing a
varied sample representative of the diversity of federal systems. As Appendix H
indicates, these seven cases provide a range of examples of federal divisions of powers,
whether decentralized (as in the United States), highly centralized (the United Kingdom)
or exhibiting a high degree of concurrency and overlap (Germany). Moreover, this
sample manages to include examples of all forms of intrastate federalism (full, partial and
none) even though partial intrastate federalism is by far the most common.109
The representative quality of this sample of federal systems is even more apparent
when the more quantifiable variables are considered. The seven cases include examples
of economically developing federal countries (South Africa), industrialized countries with
smaller welfare states (such as the United States, which ranks in the bottom five of the
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A most-similar systems design selects cases with many similarities in order to highlight and study their
select differences. A most different-systems approach seeks a heterogeneous case selection in order to
identify common variables. See: Donatella della Porta, "Comparative analysis: case-oriented versus
variable-oriented research," in Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist
Perspective, ed. Donatella della Porta and Michael Keating, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008), 214-217, for a more complete summary of these approaches.
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OECD's Social Expenditure Database) and highly developed welfare regimes (such as
Germany, which ranks in the top five in spending according to the OECD).110 This
diversity is further corroborated by Watts' findings on the spending power. Measured by
state/provincial dependence on federal transfers, this study includes the federal system
with the highest dependency (South Africa), with further variation included among the
other five cases.111 Finally, this group of countries manages to fully represent small,
medium and large federations, both geographically and in terms of the number of
subnational governments.112 Overall, these seven federal systems not only provide a
diverse set of cases to analyze and test the hypotheses on but also a sample that can claim
to be representative of federal systems as a whole.
What follows here are two sets of countries: the first includes the seven cases for
which useful data were found and the second includes the federations that were
investigated, but which could not be included because a record of national
intergovernmental agreements could not be obtained. Both lists include descriptions of
the steps taken to find data, the individuals and agencies contacted and, when successful,
the sources for the agreements used for the rest of this investigation. As a final general
comment, acquiring this information proved to be much more difficult than expected: it is
only with the generous assistance of many other scholars from around the world that such
a project could be successfully undertaken.
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Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. "Social Expenditure Database."
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=SOCX_AGG (accessed September 20, 2011).
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Federations Included in this Study
These seven federations are the focus of this comparative investigation into
intergovernmental agreements. While the goal was to obtain a record of all national
intergovernmental agreements between 1945 (or the earliest possible date for younger
federations) and 2008, in most cases, complete and unified records were not available.113
What follows is a description of the various data sources used to create the agreement
records found in the appendices.

Australia
While Australia does not have a readily accessible database for all
intergovernmental agreements between 1945 and 2009, it does have a number of other
reliable sources that, when combined, can produce a complete record. The lack of a
single database was confirmed by Professor Cheryl Saunders of the University of
Melbourne who also noted that each state may have its own tracking systems.114
Fortunately, a combination of three sources has served as a reasonable replacement for
the lack of a single government source.
The first source of agreement data came from the Council of Australian
Governments (COAG). As the peak intergovernmental institution since 1992, the COAG
keeps a listing of some of the national agreements formed since 1995 in a section of its
website entitled "Intergovernmental Agreements"115 This does not seem to be a complete
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list of national agreements during this period because further searching revealed that
combing the meeting outcomes, minutes and other records produced more agreements
than found in the basic listing.116 This provided a more complete record of agreements
concluded at the national level since 1992.
Alone, this source would provide only a portion of the total sample sought for
Australia. Further research, specifically internet and inter-library catalogue searches,
revealed the existence of a publication entitled The Compendium of intergovernmental
Agreements. Published in 1986 by the Advisory Council for Inter-governmental
Relations, this book collected national, multilateral and bilateral agreements formed in
Australia between the 1920s and 1986, after which the project was discontinued. This
comprehensive listing of agreements is the source for Australian agreements between
1945 and 1986 in the appendix.
In a final attempt to fill in the remaining gap between 1986 and 1992, I sent an
email request for data to Ron Perry, an advisor in the Department of the Prime Minister
and Cabinet specializing in intergovernmental relations and the COAG. A colleague of
his, Leah Bach, was kind enough to send me a record of all the agreements signed
between 1990 and 2006.117 This listing filled half of the 1986-92 gap in the data, while
providing additional agreements that were not listed in the COAG records. Together,
these three sources were combined to create a near-complete record of national

Canberra: Council of Australian Governments. http://www.coag.gov.au/intergov_agreements/index.cfm
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intergovernmental agreements in Australia between 1945 and 2009, with the exception of
the period between 1986 and 1989. 118

Canada
Canada proved to be one of the more difficult federations to find data concerning
intergovernmental agreements. The initial literature review suggested that a complete
record of agreements might be easily accessible: a 2004 chapter by Johanne Poirier of the
Université Libre de Bruxelles indicated that the Privy Council Office (PCO) in Ottawa
had a complete repository of agreements that she was able to review.119 A general inquiry
in June 2008 to the PCO yielded no results, nor did further inquiries in the fall of 2008 to
officials in the Office by myself or Professor Young. In spite of the fact that Professor
Poirier was able to access this database only a few years earlier, we were told that the
federal government no longer keeps any kind of central record of agreements and that the
records Poirier accessed were merely an "aborted project" from years past.120
Without a single, centralized depository of agreements, Canada's record of
national intergovernmental agreements had to be assembled from a variety of sources.
While the federal government proved unable or unwilling to assist with this research, a
number of other sources and individuals were much more accommodating. During my
difficulties with the PCO, I contacted Johanne Poirier to see if she could provide me with
more information as to how she had been able to access their information. She was very
helpful in providing me with advice and ultimately, a copy of her dissertation, which
118
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included an appendix with several Canadian intergovernmental agreements. While not
the complete listing, this was a useful start in the search for more data.121 This source
was supplemented by a Canadian government study, Fiscal Federalism in Canada.122
This report by the Parliamentary Task Force on Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements
was published in 1981 and contains a listing of all federal-provincial agreements prior to
that year. Unfortunately, the report did not include the dates of the agreements or the
participants and thus, could only be used to cross-reference with data from other sources.
In a final effort to find data from a central agency, I contacted the Canadian
Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat (CICS) in early 2009. The CICS is responsible
for providing institutional support to the conduct of intergovernmental relations in
Canada.123 Although Poirier's work had found that the CICS did not maintain a central
registry of agreements, they did provide annual reports and other resources that
sometimes made mention of intergovernmental agreements. Although a visit in March
2009 yielded no registry of agreements, the Secretary, André McArdle, was kind enough
to meet with me to provide further information regarding Canadian intergovernmental
relations as well as advice for my search. One of the staff members, Jane Dubé, was also
able to provide me with additional resources on intergovernmental conferences helped
contribute to the chapter on Canada.
While the federal government provided limited resources in the search for
Canadian intergovernmental agreements, the provinces were much more helpful. The
province of Quebec maintains an online listing of every agreement signed by the province
121
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from 1922 until the present.124 While no participants are recorded in this database (aside
from Quebec and any others indicated in the title), they are recorded by date, allowing for
easier cross-referencing. While all provincial websites were searched for a similar online
database during the summer and fall of 2008, Quebec was the only province that seemed
to have invested in this particular, public format.125 Fortunately, this was not the end of
the publically available provincial data on intergovernmental agreements. While they
possessed no central registry - at least no public one - Alberta did keep track of every
accord the province entered into and listed these in the annual reports of the Ministry of
Intergovernmental Affairs.126 Although each year's registry was formatted differently, all
entries included the title and year, often the department involved (or policy area) and
sometimes (especially in recent reports) a listing of all signatories. Reports from the last
twelve years were available from the Ministry's website, while hard copies of earlier
entries were held by the D.B. Weldon Library at the University of Western Ontario.127
Finally, an email inquiry to Newfoundland's Intergovernmental Affairs Secretariat also
yielded results. Sean Dutton, the Deputy Minister, was gracious enough to reply to my
emails and speak with me via telephone in April 2009. According to Mr. Dutton,
Newfoundland had begun to maintain a central repository of agreements, but this had just
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begun and records only went back to 2006; he kindly sent me these records for use in my
study.
Without a single, definitive source for intergovernmental agreements, the final
record of national agreements had to be assembled from the various elements. The
different data sources were referenced against each other in order to determine which
agreements were national and which merely bilateral. While this method ensures that this
list can only be a very close approximation of the true number of agreements, the wealth
of data from these disparate sources provides a reasonably comprehensive basis for
identifying national agreements in Canada.

Germany
Initially, Germany was not one of the proposed cases, given the language barrier
that needed to be overcome. However, at the proposal stage, it was suggested that
Germany represented a crucial case in such a comparative work because of its unique
system of cooperative federalism.128 The assistance of Anja Cebotareva, the Germanspeaking student who was hired, made it possible to directly search German government
and political science material. This work, combined with the assistance of several
experts on German federalism, made it possible to identify the types of intergovernmental
agreements in Germany and to locate a database of at least some of them.
The first and most important step was to determine the German name for
intergovernmental agreements in order to be able to search for them. Through her web
searches of German government websites, Ms. Cebotareva was able to identify the two
main types of formal agreements: intraföderale staatsverträge, which are effectively legal
128
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treaties between the länder and verwaltungsabkommen, which are administrative
agreements between governments. These terms were later confirmed to be accurate by
Professors Wolfgang Renzsch of the Otto-Von-Guericke University of Magdeburg and
Christoph Vedder of Augsburg University (separately).129 Unfortunately, searching with
these terms did not lead to any kind of online database that would have simplified the
hunt for German agreements.
Armed with this information, I contacted several experts on German federalism,
beginning with a conversation with Professor Jurgen von Hagen who was briefly visiting
the University of Western Ontario at the beginning of 2009. He directed me to Professor
Jonathan Rodden of Stanford who then sent me onto Professors Renzsch and Uwe
Leonardy.130 While they were not able to direct me to a database for agreements, they
were able to confirm that staatsverträge and verwaltungsabkommen were indeed formal
agreements and to provide other sources for the study of German federalism.131
Fortunately, Ms. Cebotareva's internet searches using the correct German
terminology were able to yield some results. A common result in these searches was a
1996 book by Professor Christoph Vedder, titled Intraföderale Staatsverträge:
Instrumente der Rechtsetzung im Bundesstaat. I requested the book through the interlibrary loan service and asked Anja to review it to see what information could be found.
She found that Vedder had included a listing of all staatsverträge between 1950 and
1996, including the dates and participants. This allowed us to construct a database (in
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English) of all available national staatsverträge during this period. While this was a
significant success given the earlier difficulties, the list was only half of the necessary
data (it did not include verwaltungsabkommen) and was not up-to-date.
I contacted Professor Vedder seeking further clarification and possibly a new lead
in the search for more data concerning German agreements. He was generous enough
with his time to discuss the matter with me over several emails between June 2009 and
January 2010, elucidating and clarifying several important elements of German
federalism and intergovernmental agreements. First, Vedder confirmed that both
staatsverträge and verwaltungsabkommen are formal, written intergovernmental
agreements and thus, both types qualify under the definition of agreements in this study.
Second, he reported that there was no existing database for either of these types of
agreements (beyond his own research) that could update the records of staatsverträge or
provide a listing of verwaltungsabkommen. While staatsverträge could be updated by
perusing German legal gazettes - these agreements are written into law - this method
would not be possible for verwaltungsabkommen, making a complete list difficult. Third
and perhaps most importantly, Vedder made clear that there were a "very large number"
of omnilateral verwaltungsabkommen, making them at least as numerous as
staatsverträge.132
The end result of this process is that some information is available for Germany,
but not a complete set. Thanks to the work of Ms. Cebotareva and the information
provided by Professor Vedder, however, Germany can clearly be categorized as a
federation that produces a large number of national intergovernmental agreements. While
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the specifics of every agreement cannot be known, this reasonable characterization allows
the inclusion of this important federation in this comparison.

South Africa
South Africa was an interesting and important case to include. Although a
younger federation, South Africa is a good example of an economically developing and
African federal system. This case also presented an interesting reversal of the normal
exercise of searching for intergovernmental agreements. Early contacts with scholars of
federalism in South Africa and searches of government materials made it clear that
agreements were rarely or perhaps never used. Thus, rather than seek the existence of a
database with the required information, it became clear that the goal with South Africa
would be to demonstrate that few, if any, formal, national agreements exist. This process
was easier for South Africa, as opposed to some of the unsuccessful cases which had little
evidence of agreements, due to the assistance of a local expert and the reasonably welldeveloped state of the South African government's online resources.
I was fortunate enough to be able to draw on the expertise of Jaap de Visser, a
Professor of Law at the University of Western Cape and an expert on South African
federalism and multilevel governance. In a series of emails over the summer of 2008, he
informed me that it was not until recently (2005) that South Africa adopted a formal
framework for intergovernmental agreements.133 Known as "implementation protocols",
Professor de Visser mentioned that these agreements were, in large part, a reaction to the
growing role of local governments since the federal and provincial governments already
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interact closely within executive intergovernmental relations bodies.134 He knew of no
examples of this process being used at the national level.
Building upon this foundation, I searched secondary sources as well as the South
African government's online resources. The Department of Provincial and Local
Government's (DPLG) website provides a wealth of documents concerning South African
federalism and intergovernmental relations and was a valuable asset in this search.135
While copies of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (2005) and numerous
reports and guides for intergovernmental relations were found - including a blank
template for forming new implementation protocols - there was no information indicating
that these had been used between governments. Although this was not confirmed by the
Department - emailed requests for information were not answered - no evidence could be
found in their resources, or in general web searches, that South Africa had ever formed a
formal, national intergovernmental agreement. For every other federation included in this
study, as well as several others for which a complete record of agreements could not be
found, there was some evidence of agreements that had been concluded between at least
two states or provinces. This evidence was not present in South Africa, despite the
relatively well developed system of intergovernmental relations that clearly exists in the
country. This extensive search, combined by the information provided by Professor de
Visser, provided sufficient evidence to include South Africa in this comparative study as
an important example of an economically developing federation as well as one that has
formed no national agreements.
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Switzerland
Acquiring a record of intergovernmental agreements for Switzerland proved to be
the easiest amongst the seven successful cases thanks to the assistance of Professor
Thomas Fleiner and the substantial online resources at the University of Fribourg's
Institute for Federalism. On the advice of Professor Young, I contacted Professor Fleiner
for suggestions regarding where to begin a search for Swiss intergovernmental
agreements. In a novel development (compared to similar attempts made with other
federations), he was able to direct me to a pre-existing online database assembled by the
University of Fribourg.136
A general search of this database produced a list of more than one thousand
entries for agreements, ranging from bilateral accords to national concordats. For each
entry, the date was provided and also often the cantons which participated in the
agreement.137 The large number of agreements was, in part, due to repetition: a single
agreement usually had multiple entries, often one for each signatory.138 In order to
determine which concordats qualified as national agreements, the number of entries for a
single agreement were totalled up. While this was time-consuming process, it did allow
for a listing of national agreements between 1945 and 2005 to be assembled.139 The
agreements were translated into English from French and German by myself (aided by
Google Translate) as well as Anja Cebotareva for select German-language agreements.140
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United Kingdom
The United Kingdom is an interesting case to include in this comparison as it is
not formally a federation.141 However, the process of devolution has transformed the
formally unitary UK into a nascent federation, complete with autonomous subnational
governments, a quasi-constitution and division of powers, and a developing system of
intergovernmental relations. Despite the evolving nature of devolution, the UK already
meets four of Watts' six characteristics of federations142 and the devolution has been
described as a federal system, if not a federation.143 Including the United Kingdom as a
case in this investigation provided the opportunity to study an emerging federal system
and the role that intergovernmental agreements might play in this development. The UK
turned out to be an interesting and useful addition, as a number of resources on
intergovernmental agreements were available.
I began the search for agreements by contacting Professor Robert Hazell of
University College London and Alan Trench of the University of Edinburgh, scholars
who have written on devolution in the UK. They provided suggestions for a number of
resources on devolution and intergovernmental relations, including Alan Trench's edited
141
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volume Devolution and Power in the United Kingdom, a book which directly addresses
agreements, known as concordats. They were also able to provide links to government
websites which included information on existing agreements at the Ministry of Justice, in
their Constitution Unit.144
Although these were good resources, the information with the UK government
seemed to focus only on the original framework agreements for devolution. While it was
possible that this was the extent of all agreements in the UK, I explored other avenues to
confirm or refute this possibility. A brief research note by Paul Bowers of the House of
Commons Library indicated that the governments of Wales and Scotland also kept online
records of the concordats that they had reached with the national government.145 Thanks
to these complete and accessible records, constructing a registry of national agreements in
the UK simply required a comparison of these two lists (as well as the Ministry of
Justice's records, where possible) and including those concordats that had been formed
with both administrations. Due to the intermittent nature of its government, Northern
Ireland was not included in this analysis (see Chapter Nine on the United Kingdom for
more details).

United States of America
One of the significant advantages to be found in searching for information
concerning American federalism is the wealth of secondary sources available.
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Intergovernmental agreements in the United States have already been the subject of much
scholarly inquiry, notably in the works of Joseph Zimmerman.146 This existing research
provided the basis for most of the findings on the United States, in three important ways.
First, like Germany, the US has two different types of agreements: interstate compacts
and administrative (or sometimes, executive) agreements.147 Interstate compacts are
formal, legal treaties between states, as set out in Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution.
Administrative agreements, in contrast, are a more ambiguous category, including
everything from informal contacts between officials to signed accords between governors.
For the purposes of this study, all national compacts as well as any national, written
administrative agreements would qualify for inclusion. The second contribution found in
the literature was that data and scholarly work on interstate compacts was readily
available. The Council of State Governments, an American lobbying and research group
devoted to state issues and intergovernmental relations, runs a small institute for
compacts known as the National Center for Interstate Compacts (NCIC).148 The NCIC
possesses numerous resources, including a complete database of all compacts that have
been formed, and data for this type of agreement comes from this source. The third and
final revelation found in existing research was that information regarding administrative
agreements is much harder to find. In Interstate Cooperation: Compacts and
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Administrative Agreements, Zimmerman concludes that there are "thousands" of
administrative agreements, though most of these are informal and unwritten. He also
noted that there is no database of these agreements, a fact that he confirmed to me via
email in October, 2008.149 However, in this work he was able to list several of the written
agreements that involve a large number of states and these were included in this study.
While this was by no means a complete registry, it provided further data for the
construction of a database of national agreements.
The remainder of my search for information on American intergovernmental
agreements was to supplement these findings and specifically, discover any written,
national administrative agreements. Aside from general internet searching, I reviewed the
records of several of the major intergovernmental bodies, including the Council of State
Governments, the National Conference of State Legislators, the National Governors'
Association and the National Association of Attorneys General. I also submitted a
question via email to the reference librarians at the Library of Congress in the hopes that
their research staff might have better information. While Shameema Rahman was kind
enough to reply to my request in April 2008, the response suggested sources that were
already known or legal sources that were helpful for compacts, but not administrative
agreements. While these avenues provided very limited results in the search for national
accords, they did strengthen the conclusion that formal and national administrative
agreements are probably as rare as national interstate compacts. This means that the final
number of American national agreements may be slightly underestimated, but this does
not greatly affect its final ranking relative to the other federations.
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Unsuccessful Cases
The following is a list of federations for which a usable record of
intergovernmental agreements could not be obtained. Inclusion here should not be taken
as confirmation that no data on intergovernmental agreements exists for these federations
- though in some cases that is surely true - but rather that the required information could
not be obtained for this project. A greater focus on some of these cases may produce
useful information in the future. These cases are discussed here to serve as an
explanation for why certain cases were not included and so they might be of use to other
scholars.

Austria
As most of the resources on Austria were in German, the primary research had to
be left in the capable hands of Anja Cebotareva, though acquiring data on Germany was
prioritized. Austria's Constitution allows for the possibility of agreements between the
federal and länder governments under Section 15(1-3). These agreements are known as
"Vereinbarung gemäß Art. 15a B-VG", which roughly translates to an "Agreement
pursuant to Article 15a of the Constitution" and at least some of these are included in an
online version of Austria's legal registry, the Bundegesetzblatt.150 Included within this
database was at least a few national agreements, such as an accord on healthcare and
another on the environment.151 While this conclusively demonstrated the existence of
formal, written and national intergovernmental agreements, what could not be ascertained
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is whether or not all agreements included "Vereinbarung gemäß Art. 15a B-VG" in their
title and whether the law gazette recorded all agreements made. Unfortunately, requests
for information from the Austrian government and a couple of Austrian academics
received no response.
Given this information, it might be possible for a future study to incorporate
results from Austria, (especially for an author fluent in German). What is needed is a
confirmation of the search terminology as well as a database of those agreements. If it
could be ascertained that all agreements are published in the law gazette, careful
searching of this registry could serve the same purpose. Unfortunately, this information
could not be determined by this study.

Brazil
Along with Mexico, Brazil was a late potential addition to this study; it was only
considered after the search for Indian intergovernmental agreements proved to be a dead
end in the hopes of securing another example of a newer, economically developing
federation While Mexico offered some potential of producing useful data, Brazil
presented a number of difficulties. First, while Brazil has existed as an independent
country for the entire period that is being studied (1945-2008), there was a long period of
military rule, only ending in 1985, with a new democratic constitution ratified in 1988.
Assuming useful data could be found, this would add Brazil to the growing category of
"new" federations for which the record of agreements would be much smaller than in
more established federal systems. Second, as a Portuguese-speaking country, the term or
terms used for "intergovernmental agreement" had to be determined. Unfortunately, no
sources for this information were identified. Third, online searches for information on
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Brazilian intergovernmental relations and specifically agreements of any kind uncovered
only limited results. While some evidence was found that intergovernmental agreements
are formed in Brazil - a mention of federal-state agreements for transfer payments
appeared in an online document - this proved to be the high point of relevant
information.152 Without the appropriate terminology and lacking sufficient sources for
information, there was not enough evidence available to secure a record of agreements for
Brazil.

India
India was an ideal case for this comparative study. As a large federation, both in
terms of geography and population, India would be a good contrast to the United States.
As a country with an emerging economy, it would provide another example of a
developing federation to go along with South Africa. Finally, despite including a hugely
diverse mixture of languages, cultures and religions, India has also maintained English as
a national language, enabling me to study the country without the need for translation
assistance. With so many potential advantages to including India as a case, a great deal of
effort was put into the attempt to find a record of intergovernmental agreements before
ultimately concluding that such a feat could not be accomplished.
Early results for India were promising as Professor Young put me in contact with
Professor K.C. Sivaramakrishnan, an expert on Indian government and federalism. While
he could not confirm the existence of a database of agreements, he did confirm that they
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existed and there was material on the subject.153 He directed me to the Inter-State
Council as well as to review information on the Commission on Centre-State Relations
and the Sarkaria Commission, an earlier attempt to reform Indian federalism. Both of the
Commissions provided useful information on Indian federalism, but offered no evidence
of a record of intergovernmental agreements. The Inter-State Council had greater
potential however. The Council was set up as a means to coordinate "inter-state matters"
and has a permanent Secretariat which maintains a website.154 While the documentation
available online was minimal, if any organization in India was likely to possess a registry
of intergovernmental agreements - or at least, know whether one exists - then the InterState Council Secretariat would have such information. Thus, beginning in June of 2008,
I attempted to contact the staff of the Secretariat by emailing one of their officers. When
I received no response, I emailed several other members of the staff, both junior and
senior, including the Secretary. After every email was returned due to a delivery error or
left unanswered, I attempted to call the staff at the Secretariat, but the phone was never
answered (I did account for the time difference and attempted to contact them at several
times throughout the Indian workday).
After spending the fall of 2008 attempting, unsuccessfully, to contact members of
the Inter-State Council Secretariat, I contacted Professor Sivaramakrishnan once more
seeking guidance. He kindly offered to look into the matter of intergovernmental
agreements in India further on my behalf.155 A few weeks later, he emailed me with
information he had gathered from the Central Water Commission, a body which had an
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Interstate Matters Directorate.156 While this body did have several written agreements,
these were specific to this policy area and did not seem to be national in scope. He also
confirmed the difficulty in obtaining any information from the government, even for an
established and well-connected Indian professor like himself!
Following this setback, the search for an agreement database for India was put on
the backburner for a couple months. In April 2009, Professor Ronald Watts suggested
that I attempt to contact two other researchers with knowledge of Indian
intergovernmental relations: Professors Mahendra Singh of the West Bengal National
University of Juridical Sciences and Rekha Saxena of the University of Delhi. Professor
Singh graciously offered to use his contacts within the national government, which I
gratefully accepted. While he was able to uncover a number of sources for agreements,
including a group of Memorandums of Understanding that the Health Ministry had
formed, he was not able to locate a single database.157 Likewise, Professor Saxena
provided me with a great deal of information on Indian intergovernmental relations helpfully juxtaposed with Canada, which she had studied previously - but did not have
knowledge of any means of securing a complete list of Indian agreements.158
Despite the generous assistance of several leading Indian academics and their
contacts in government, no database of Indian agreements could be found. Again, the
search for Indian agreements was put on hiatus for the summer of 2009 only to be revived
one final time in September 2009 when a final decision had to be made regarding the
inclusion of India as a case. I attempted one last time to contact the Inter-State Council
Secretariat and once again, received no response. Thanks to the many sources suggested
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by Sivaramakrishnan, Singh and Saxena however, I broadened my search to other central
agencies, including the National Planning Council. Naseem Ahmad, an officer of the
NPC, was kind enough to reply to my inquiry - the first such reply from an Indian official
that I had contacted directly.159 He confirmed my existing suspicion that agreements
between the national government and the states are held by the relevant ministry, meaning
no central repository exists. Based on my experience with seeking information from the
Indian government, as well as that of my contacts, assembling a database of agreements
from each of the ministries would be a Herculean task for a well-connected Indian scholar
and an impossible task for a Ph.D. candidate from Canada. This provided a definitive
conclusion to my search for Indian intergovernmental agreements and the unfortunate
removal of India as a case study in this comparative investigation.

Malaysia
Malaysia was originally considered as a possible case: a centralized and
developing Asian federation would have made an interesting contrast to a group of
countries that included a number of European and North American examples. Initial
searches of Malaysian government websites made it abundantly clear that there was not a
large amount of information that could be accessed electronically. Only one potential
lead indicated that information on federalism might be found in the Parliament of
Malaysia's Resource Centre, but this would have required a trip to Kuala Lumpur, with
little hope of success. After failing to locate any evidence of intergovernmental
agreements, let alone a database or registry of these, Malaysia was excluded as a case for
this investigation.
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Mexico
As previously mentioned, Mexico was a late addition to the list of potential cases
and like Brazil, it was intended to be a possible substitute for India. A closer look at the
federation proved that a search for information on intergovernmental relations and
agreements could return significant results. Initial internet and secondary source searches
yielded promising results. An OECD policy paper indicated that Mexican states did form
formal agreements with federal agencies, suggesting that there was at least the potential
for data to be found.160 Through these preliminary searches, I also found two important
intergovernmental bodies: the National Conference of Governors (Conferencia Nacional
de Gobernadores) and the Executive Commission for the Negotiation and Establishment
of Agreements (la Comisión Ejecutiva para la Neociación de Acuerdos or CENCA).161
While neither of these bodies seemed to maintain an online registry of agreements, they
did clarify the Spanish terms for agreements in Mexico; reference was made either to
"convenio" or "acuerdo" for the most part.
Unfortunately, this proved to be the upper limit to the research on Mexico. Even
using these terms in searches of applicable websites, nothing resembling a database of
agreements was found (though there was further confirmation of the existence of
agreements in Mexico). Attempts to contact government officials and relevant academics
160
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proved to be unsuccessful and so no further guidance could be obtained. Moreover, while
the ever-improving Google Translate function allowed for some surprisingly successful
navigation through Mexican websites, this is not yet a perfect substitute for having actual
knowledge of another language. Thus, while Mexico returned some promising results,
further research was not able to advance beyond these additional gains. As no evidence
of a single listing or central repository of agreements could be found and no guidance was
forthcoming from officials, Mexico had to be excluded as a potential case for this study.

Nigeria
As another developing, English-speaking and African federation, Nigeria was
briefly considered for inclusion within this comparison. This dalliance was short,
however, as Nigeria had a couple of significant issues which limited its utility as an
appropriate case. Most significantly, initial searches of online resources and secondary
sources produced no results. Unlike South Africa, this was not simply a matter of finding
no evidence of agreements among a significant body of information on federalism and
intergovernmental relations; rather, Nigeria seemed to possess very few avenues of
information that might conceivably provide evidence of agreements. Exacerbating this
difficulty was the unstable history of the Nigerian federation: Nigeria was under military
rule from 1966 until 1979 and again from 1983 to 1999. As Nigeria gained its
independence in 1960, this leaves a very small period that would be eligible to study.
Given these obstacles, Nigeria was deemed to be a poor case to pursue for this research.

Spain
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Spain was initially considered as a potential case for this investigation. Early
reviews of secondary sources made it clear that intergovernmental agreements do exist
within Spanish federalism, making it a potential candidate for this research.162 Attempts
to search for more information from Spanish web sources were made difficult by the
language barrier. Ultimately, emphasis was placed on securing data for the United
Kingdom (another example of a newer federal system where power has been devolved
from the centre) and with an additional two examples of European federations (Germany
and Switzerland), this continent was already strongly represented in the case selection.

St. Kitts-Nevis
The federation of St. Kitts and Nevis was briefly considered for inclusion in this
study as an example of a small country with the minimum number of subnational
governments. With only two constituent units however, federal law could effectively
serve as a means of formal coordination between the two governments, and thus,
significant results were not expected. A brief search of secondary sources and online
resources during the fall of 2008 uncovered no examples of intergovernmental
agreements let alone any evidence of some kind of agreement database. With no results
to speak of, St. Kitts and Nevis was dropped as a possible case in favour of devoting more
time towards other, more promising possibilities.

Conclusion
This chapter has built upon the theoretical discussion of Chapter Two to define
intergovernmental agreements in specific, observable terms. It also explained the
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operational definitions for the seven independent variables as well as sources of data for
these institutional features. Finally, the bulk of this chapter was devoted to describing the
process of gathering data for the records of intergovernmental agreements that are used in
this analysis. While there were several federations for which data could not be found, the
seven cases that are included provide the basis for an interesting comparison.
The next chapters (Four through Ten) will present the individual country case
studies for each of the seven federal systems. Table 3.1 (below) previews the data on
intergovernmental agreements found for each country as well as its ranking, relative to
the other cases in this study. More information about the data and the frequency of
agreements will be available in each of the country chapters, while the relative rankings
will be discussed in greater detail in the comparative analysis of Chapter Eleven.

Table 3.1:Summary of Intergovernmental Agreements in Federal Systems
Time Period
No. of IGAs Average Ranking
Australia
1945 - 1987; 1990 - 2008
76
1.27
3rd
Canada
1945 - 2008
92
1.46
2nd
Germany
1950 - 1995
40 (80)
0.89 (1.78)
1st
South Africa
1996 - 2008
0
0
7th
Switzerland
1945 - 2005
15
0.25
5th
United Kingdom
1999 - 2010
11
0.92
4th
United States
1945 - 2008
8
0.13
6th
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Chapter Four: Australia

Source: CIA World Factbook

Formal Name: Commonwealth of Australia
Capital: Canberra, Australian Capital Territory
Subnational Governments: There are six states, New South Wales, Queensland, South
Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia, joined by two territories, the
Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory.
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Introduction:
As “the continent that is a country”, Australia is one of several large federations to
emerge from the British Empire, along with Canada, India and the United States. The
world’s sixth largest country, spanning over 7.7 million square kilometres, Australia’s
federal system was a compromise between the goals of autonomy and unity of the six
existing British colonies. Drawing inspiration from Canada and the United States,
Australia fused American-style federalism with its familiar traditions of British
parliamentary government in one of the longest enduring federations.
Australia is an interesting case to include in this comparative study given its
relatively long experience with federalism and the fact that it is smaller - in terms of
population - than the United States and more homogenous - at least in terms of its
political history - than Canada or Switzerland, its nearest contemporaries. As such,
Australia serves as a good example of an archetypal modern, industrial federation.

History
Australia has been inhabited by a significant aboriginal population for more than
50,000 years, a length of time that makes the recent, European-dominated history seem
insignificant. Despite this legacy, the political history of the modern Australian state
truly begins in earnest with the British colonization of Australia in the latter half of the
18th century. Following Captain James Cook’s famous voyage to discover and map
Australia’s eastern coast in 1770, the first permanent British settlers arrived on January
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26, 1788.163 Captain Arthur Phillip led a fleet of eleven convict ships which founded the
New South Wales penal colony at what would become Sydney cove. Between 1788 and
1829, Australia continued to be settled by the British, beginning with the addition of
further penal colonies, but also with the development of “free” colonies. By 1850,
distinct, self-governing colonies were emerging, seeking to move beyond their status as
prison colonies for the British Empire.164
From 1851 to 1891, the British settlements organized into “six separate selfgoverning colonies... each with a constitution and institutions of government of its
own.”165 Though they were individual colonies, they shared many common features. The
vast majority of the colonists were of British origin, keeping the same cultural traditions
and political institutions.166 The one significant cultural or religious minority, Irish
Roman Catholics, were dispersed among the colonies in a way that did not form any large
concentrations in any one colony, as compared to the situation in Britain’s Canadian
colonies.167 Finally, as colonists, the people of the six colonies and their governments
shared common concerns vis a vis the Imperial government in London.168
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Despite these common characteristics that might have served to encourage unity,
geography and economics helped to keep them apart. The economic factors were
particularly divisive, as Norris explains:
In this way political and economic rivalry and jealousy developed. Colonial
politicians paid regard to their own colonies in the interests of themselves and
their electors, to whom they were required to make periodic appeals for support.
They therefore enacted legislation to foster their primary and secondary industries.
These measures, which directly or indirectly hit at neighbouring colonies,
increased suspicion and hostility. The colonies fought and feuded over such
things as the awarding of the P. and O. mail contract, and the capture of British
capital and honours. Rivalry exceeded the bounds of healthy competition.169

This economic competition helped to enforce an independent identity among each of the
colonies for several decades, rather than promoting a pan-Australian cause.
By the late 1880s however, the common ties of the Australian colonies were
increasingly more powerful than the divisions, especially as economic concerns became
widespread.170 The difficulties of unrestrained economic competition were making the
status quo untenable. As the nationalist movement gained momentum, Australians
focused on balancing unity and autonomy, both externally and internally. Externally, the
new Australian nation would maintain a close relationship within the British Empire as a
Commonwealth.171 Internally, a federal system was deemed necessary to bridge the
divisions between the colonies while still allowing them to reap the benefits of a common
economy and polity. Indeed, the assertiveness of the individual colonies led them to be
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inspired by American, as opposed to Canadian, federalism as it was thought that it would
provide a more decentralized federation.172

Government and Political Structure
Australian political institutions for the new state and Commonwealth governments
grew out of the constitutional and federation debates of the 1890s, which in turn were
directly inspired by the development of colonial self-government in the 1850s.173 This
meant a tradition of responsible government in the British parliamentary tradition, with a
few specific Australian alterations, including: the use of a written constitution with
judicial review, some experimentation with referendums and direct democracy, and a
strong tradition of bicameralism, with powerful upper chambers.174
The Commonwealth government incorporated these elements in a national
parliament with two chambers: the lower chamber, the House of Representatives, would
be the body for popular representation, while the upper chamber, the Senate, would have
its seats allocated equally amongst the six states. The House of Representatives evolved
directly from the British tradition of responsible government. The House has 150
representatives, elected in single member constituencies, and is the seat of the
Government, which is led by the Prime Minister and must maintain support from a
majority of the members. The constituencies are allocated, at least nominally, by state
and territory, with the largest receiving the greatest representation; New South Wales
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currently has 48 seats in the House while Tasmania, only 5.175 These members are
elected via a preferential ballot (a.k.a. the alternative vote), as opposed to the more
historic “first-past-the-post”, plurality system.
The Senate was created to serve a dual purpose: the representation of state
interests, especially for the benefit of the smaller colonies, and to serve as a check on
potential excesses of the House of Representatives, a common responsibility for colonial
upper chambers.176 The Senate possesses the same powers as the House of
Representatives, with two primary exceptions: it does not have authority to introduce
supply (money) bills and the Cabinet is not dependent upon the Senate for confidence
votes. While there was debate between the larger and smaller colonies as to the allocation
of seats, state equality in the Senate was adopted in Section 7 of the Constitution.177 The
other contentious issue concerned the selection method of Senators, but it was eventually
decided that they should be directly elected.
The political institutions in the states are very similar to those of the
Commonwealth and are defined in state constitutions. With the exception of Queensland,
all state legislatures are bicameral, retaining the legislative councils of their colonial
past.178 No longer an elitist check on popular representation, all state upper chambers are
now elected and some now have no authority over money bills.179 The lower houses of

175

Both the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory are each represented by 2 members.
Section 26 of the Constitution spelled out the initial distribution of seats for the House of Representatives,
with 5 being the state minimum. Only Tasmania has not increased from this amount in the last century.
176
Sharman and Moon, "Introduction," in Australian Politics and Government, 3.
177
In 1901, each state was granted 6 Senators, this was then increased to 10 in 1948 and 12 in 1984. The
two territories were also granted 2 each in 1975, bringing the current total to 76.
178
Cheryl Saunders and Katy Le Roy, "Commonwealth of Australia," in Legislative, Executive, and
Judicial Governance in Federal Countries, ed. Katy, Le Roy, Cheryl Saunders and John Kincaid, (Montreal
& Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 54.
179
Ibid. In four of the five states which still maintain a second chamber, some form of proportional
representation is used to select members.

106

the state legislatures keep close to the Westminster parliamentary model, with the
exception of their electoral systems, which use a preferential ballot. Just as with the
Commonwealth government, the executive of each state, led by the Premier, is
responsible to the Assembly (lower chamber) and must maintain the confidence of a
majority of members.180
One final, important element in the development of Australian government at both
the national and state level was the use of direct democracy. Referenda were held in the
colonies to determine whether the new constitution had popular support and to encourage
colonist participation. According to Sharman and Moon, this was an innovative inclusion:
While used in the Swiss federation, such a measure was alien to the British
parliamentary tradition and had not been used to provide popular legitimacy or an
amendment procedure for either the United States or the Canadian federations. 181

Combined with the election of delegates for the constitutional conventions, the
development of the Australian federation had a greater degree of public participation than
the federal states that preceded it.182 In this way, Australia combined the age-old
institutions of parliamentary government with American-style federalism and
constitutionalism, along with their own domestic political developments, notably an
increased use of direct democracy and elections of all representatives.183
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Intergovernmental Agreements in Australia
Australian intergovernmental agreements are generally known by that name, both
to practitioners and scholars, though individual documents may be entitled accords,
concordats, memoranda of understanding, and (joint) "schemes". There are limited
provisions in the Constitution for general intergovernmental agreements, as they have
evolved out of Australian intergovernmental relations.184 The small exception to this is
that Section 105A of the Constitution authorizes the Commonwealth and state
governments to enter into agreements concerning state debt.185 Although this type of
agreement is legally binding, this section of the constitution does not seem to apply to
agreements on other topics. The High Court ruled in 1962 that agreements were
instruments of politics, rather than law, and therefore, are not enforceable by the courts.186
The exception to this is when agreements are incorporated into law via a statute, but this
is a rare and infrequent occurrence.187
The data for Australian intergovernmental agreements were collected from three
sources. First, a volume known as The Compendium of Intergovernmental Agreements,
compiled by the Advisory Council for Inter-government Relations, collected national,
multilateral and bilateral agreements in Australia from the 1920s until 1986, when the
project was discontinued. Second, The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in
the Commonwealth Government was able to provide a listing of recent agreements (since
1990) after a request was made to Ron Perry, an official responsible for
intergovernmental relations. Third, the Council of Australian Governments, the peak
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intergovernmental institution for Australia, maintains a website that includes the majority
of national intergovernmental agreements concluded in the last twenty years. Together,
these sources have provided a reliable record of national intergovernmental agreements
between 1945 and 2008, with the exception of 1987-1989.188
The consistent trend among all three of these sources is that Australia produces a
large number of national intergovernmental agreements. Between 1945 and 2008, a total
of 76 agreements have been created, a rate of 1.27 per year.189 This places Australia as
the third-most prolific in the formation of agreements, behind Canada and Germany and
ahead of the United Kingdom. As part of a group that creates an average of more than
one national agreement per year, it is expected that Australia's institutional features are
highly conducive to the formation of agreements. The remainder of this chapter will
analyze these features and seek to determine which, if any, seem to be influencing the
creation of agreements in Australia.

1. The Degree of Overlap that Exists in the Constitution
It is somewhat surprising that a federation that was modelled after American-style
"dual federalism" would now be known for a significant degree of overlap and
interdependence. Yet, that is exactly the situation found in Australia, as a large number
of policy areas include a role for both the Commonwealth and state governments.190 The
evolution of the Australian federation towards a model of overlapping and coordinate, as
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opposed to watertight, jurisdictions, may help explain the large number of
intergovernmental agreements that have been created.
As they attempted to determine the nature of the Australian federation, the framers
of the Australian constitution had three existing models to draw inspiration from: the
United States, Switzerland and Canada. American and Canadian experiences with
federalism were particularly influential, given the common British cultural legacy shared
by the three countries.191 While the Canadian model was important for demonstrating
that parliamentary government could function in a system of divided sovereignty (as
opposed to the American republic), the American model of federalism would be more
clearly reflected in the final constitution. Many delegates to the constitutional conference
found the Canadian model too centralized, as Aroney records:
In the minds of these delegates, Canada was not an appropriate model of
federation because the Canadian provinces had not federated as ‘sovereign’ bodies
politic on the basis of absolute equality. As a consequence, the Canadian Senate
inadequately represented the provinces; the Dominion was given ‘general’ power
to legislate, subject to an elaborate ‘division’ of responsibilities between the
Dominion and the provinces (i.e. legislative power was not ‘delegated’ by the
provinces to the Dominion); provincial legislation could be disallowed; and the
provincial governments were apparently subordinated through centralized powers
of vice-regal appointment.192

This perspective on the Canadian experience with federalism clearly influenced the
construction of the Australian federation and the degree of centralization found in the
division of powers (this will be discussed in the following section). Beyond
centralization, it also had a substantial impact on the issue of constitutional overlap. As
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the framers of the Australian constitution were influenced by the American model for
federalism, they sought to carve out jurisdictions by enumerating federal powers, while
reserving all other powers to the states.193 This created a system in which the states were
seen to have broad powers over everything that was not reserved to the Commonwealth,
granting them significant autonomy.194 In practice however, this distribution of
competencies allowed for development of significant overlap between the
Commonwealth and the states. This overlap has two primary sources.
The first way in which this overlap has developed is through the enumerated
powers of the Commonwealth. Section 51 and 52 list the powers over which the
Commonwealth has jurisdiction. While Section 51 includes a large number of
competencies, including power over taxation, economic regulation, criminal and civil law
and foreign relations, it is only the limited responsibilities of Section 52 which are
exclusively reserved to the national government. These powers are much more limited,
including authority concerning the seat of government, the public service and any other
matters that might be included by other sections (such as the organization and functioning
of Parliament).195 Moreover, Section 107 vests the States with any powers the
Constitution has not explicitly reserved from them, granting them broad and overlapping
powers.. This essentially opened up the scope of Commonwealth powers to some level of
concurrency, something acknowledged specifically in some of the enumerated powers
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such as banking (S. 51, xiii), insurance (S. 51, xix) and railways (S. 51, xxxiii).196
Although Section 109 gives the Commonwealth primacy in the case of conflicting
legislation and the courts have attempted to clarify the powers of both orders of
government, this has not diminished the "operative concurrency of Australian
federalism".197
The second source of overlap in Australia has come from the evolution of these
same enumerated Commonwealth powers. Although the initial intentions of the framers
seem to have been to limit the reach of the federal government, the evolution of the
Constitution since 1901 complicated, if not entirely impeded, this goal. The initial
restraint used by the courts and the federal government in interpreting the breadth of
enumerated powers lasted only a couple of decades and Commonwealth powers
increasingly expanded beyond their original scope.198 Saunders identifies
Commonwealth powers over “taxation, corporations and external affairs” as granting
much of the increased authority.199 For example, the Commonwealth has been able to use
its power to enter international treaties as a means to influence environmental and
industrial policies in the states, as was the case in 1983 when the federal government
prevented the construction of a dam in Tasmania.200 As these Commonwealth
competencies were interpreted more broadly, this avenue of overlap was enabled and
exacerbated by the financial powers of the Commonwealth government, which proved to
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be much greater than the states’.201 Thus, while the scope of state authority remained
significant, the growth in federal authority has increased the number of areas in which
both orders of government are active, beyond the existing overlap found in the division of
powers.
These two means of overlap have created an increasingly concurrent constitutional
environment in Australia. Watts’ comparison of powers and functions across federations
gives a good indication of just how substantial this degree of overlap is (see Appendix H).
Australia has the second highest percentage of overlapping jurisdictions – areas where
either both governments are competent or explicitly concurrent – with both governments
operating in 70% of enumerated areas; only Germany’s 75% overlap is higher.
Australia’s constitutional environment is one in which both spheres of government have
some stake in the vast majority of government activities, creating a need for some form of
coordination, such as intergovernmental agreements.
The record of intergovernmental agreement formation is consistent with the
contention that a high degree of constitutional overlap provides fertile ground for such
accords. With a relatively large number of national intergovernmental agreements,
Australian governments clearly make frequent use of this device in order to coordinate
their activities. Beyond the raw number of agreements, looking more closely at the
record of agreement formation indicates the further impact of the wide degree of overlap
(Appendix A includes the list of agreements and their policy areas). National
intergovernmental agreements in Australia are widely distributed across a number of
policy fields; they exist in areas allocated to the Commonwealth in the enumerated
powers - such as National Security - as well as those that fall under reserved state
201
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authority, such as health and education202. Had these agreements been specifically
concentrated in one or two areas, it might be easier to conclude that the breadth of overlap
is not significant to the formation of agreements.
The overlapping areas of jurisdiction create the need for coordination in order to
allow for coherent policy to be developed across both orders governments. Australian
governments seem to have chosen to address this need for coordination, at least in part,
through the formation of numerous national intergovernmental agreements.

2. The Degree of Centralization in the Constitutional Division of Powers
The question of how centralized Australia is in its constitutional division of
powers does not have a simple answer. Williams and Macintyre see that the
Commonwealth “has come to dominate the federal landscape”, especially as it has added
new responsibilities for economic regulation and the welfare state.203 Watts seems to
agree with this assessment, finding Australia to be “relatively centralized”, more so than
Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the United States, though much of this categorization
stems from Australia’s high degree of financial centralization.204 In contrast, Saunders
argues that “it is difficult to characterize the Australian federation as either centralized or
decentralized” as it is not intrinsically “inclined toward either unity or diversity.”205
What is less controversial are the intentions of the framers of the Australian
Constitution and their desire to build a federation that left a great deal of autonomy to the
states. While the six colonies saw advantages in closer ties, notably a common market
202

Elazar, Federal Systems of the World, 21-22.
Williams and MacIntyre, "Commonwealth of Australia," 13-14.
204
Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 177.
205
Cheryl Saunders, "Commonwealth of Australia," in Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in
Federal Countries, ed. John Kincaid and G. Alan Tarr, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 2005), 21.
203

114

and defence policy, all were used to a significant degree of autonomy as self-governing
parliamentary democracies.206 Moreover, as was discussed in the last section, the
Australians were keenly aware of the experience of other federations, Canada,
Switzerland and the United States. The American idea that a federation was formed by
independent states coming together for common purposes and delegating powers to a
central government proved to be persuasive to early Australian politicians. This was in
direct contrast to what Australians perceived as the Canadian model of federalism - a
powerful central government with weak provinces.207 These sentiments led Australia to
adopt an American model of the division of powers: only the federal powers are
enumerated, with the remainder reserved to the states. The logic behind this
constitutional division of powers was that it would confine the federal government to
narrow areas of responsibility, while leaving much broader and flexible authority to the
governments of the constituent units.
A constitution, however, tends to be a dynamic document in both its environment
and how it is interpreted. A number of developments have taken place since 1901 which
have moved Australia from its original, decentralized vision to a federation with a
stronger central government. The first, and potentially most centralizing factor, has been
the financial power of the Commonwealth government. While the growth of the
Commonwealth’s spending power will be discussed in detail later in this chapter, the
centralizing effect of federal financial resources must be acknowledged here. World War
II was a turning point, as the Commonwealth gained full control over income tax and
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thus, the bulk of government revenues. 208 Even before this watershed event, the national
government exercised substantial financial power through significant tariff revenue. 209
Constitutionally, much of this centralizing authority can be traced to the enumerated
powers over trade and commerce (S. 51, i), taxation (ii), borrowing (iv) and the ability of
the federal Parliament to provide grants to states in any ways it sees fit (S. 96), the
relevance of which has increased over time.210 Occupying a hegemonic position in
Australian public finances, the Commonwealth government was able to expand the scope
of its jurisdiction.
Moving beyond the financial pressures contributing to centralization, a shift in
judicial interpretation had an important role to play. For the first twenty years following
the creation of the federation, the state governments, supported by the courts, took a
restrictive view of Commonwealth powers akin to the views held during the constitutional
debates of the 1890s.211

That is, they felt that federal powers should be restrained within

only their explicitly enumerated jurisdictions while state powers should be interpreted
broadly. This was not to last as the High Court began to shift its interpretation towards a
broader reading of federal powers notably in the 1920 case of Amalgamated Society of
Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd. This change in the jurisprudence established
the High Court’s opinion that Commonwealth’s powers could be read more broadly,
“unconstrained by assumptions about the nature of the federation.”212 In addition to the
oft-discussed financial powers, this interpretation also enhanced the centralizing ability of
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the Commonwealth’s authority over corporations and external affairs. Specifically, the
case of Commonwealth v. Tasmania found that the national government’s power over
corporations (S.51, xx) and foreign affairs (S. 51, xxix) may allow it to make laws beyond
its explicit jurisdiction, in order to implement treaties or international policies.213 This
also invoked Section 109 - which declares that when laws of the states and the
Commonwealth are inconsistent, the Commonwealth law is valid - a potent and
centralizing, if seldom invoked, clause in the Constitution. While the degree to which
Commonwealth competencies can extend has waxed and waned (and continues to be
debated), the interpretation that the Commonwealth is restricted to narrow policy areas
has not recovered.214
Given this, it is clear that Australia has not maintained the decentralized model on
which it was founded as the Commonwealth has increased the scope of their powers.
However, this does not demonstrate that the Australian division of powers is particularly
centralized compared to other federations, especially if we postpone questions of financial
centralization. Turning back to Watts' comparison of competencies in federations
(Appendix H), the federal government possesses exclusive jurisdiction in only 6 policy
areas (13%) while the states have sole jurisdiction in 8 (17%). Out of seven federations
in this study, Australia has the fewest areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction, as
overlapping authority is the norm for most policy fields. This reading of the Australian
division of powers is consistent with the record of agreement formation. With an
overlapping, and even "cooperative" system of federalism, the Commonwealth is not in
the position to provide an overriding central authority that might stymie agreement
213
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formation.215 If the Commonwealth’s powers had become predominant, we would expect
to see fewer agreements in lieu of broad, federal legislation that could pre-empt state
jurisdiction utilizing the legislative supremacy clause of Section 109. Instead,
Commonwealth authority has broadened to exist concurrently with the already expansive
state authority. Thus, while Commonwealth powers have surely increased, they are still
subject to clear limitations, as Painter argues:
It must be pointed out, however, that this growth in Commonwealth jurisdiction
and powers has not resulted in as dramatic a degree of centralisation as a literal
reading might suggest. The political and administrative restraints on
Commonwealth power consequent upon the existence of effective, active,
democratically elected state governments remain significant.216
As these two sections have indicated, the Constitution of Australia has promoted a system
of overlapping jurisdiction, where governments must coordinate in order to make
effective policy – an environment that has suitably produced a large number of national,
intergovernmental agreements.

3. The Size and Status of the Federal Spending Power

Throughout the discussion of constitutional overlap and the division of powers,
reference was made to the fact that while Australia is constitutionally a system of
cooperative and overlapping federalism, financially, it is very centralized. Examined on
the basis of financial criteria, Ronald Watts finds Australia to be the fourth-most
centralized in his study (out of fifteen federations), behind only Malaysia, Brazil and

215
216

Williams and MacIntyre, "Commonwealth of Australia," 24-25.
Painter, Collaborative Federalism, 17.

118

Nigeria, while ranking ahead of countries such as South Africa and Russia, regimes that
are widely regarded as highly centralized.217
Before examining the extent of the federal spending power in Australia, it is
worthwhile to identify the constitutional basis for it. Unlike federations such as Canada
or Switzerland, in which the question of spending power is not specifically addressed by
the constitution, Section 96 of the Australia Constitution provides a legal foundation:
During a period of ten years after the establishment of the Commonwealth and
thereafter until Parliament otherwise provides, the Parliament may grant financial
assistance to any State on such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit.
This Section was included in the Constitution to provide financial compensation to the
states for the lost tariff revenue after federation because this form of taxation had been
transferred to the Commonwealth.218 This clause is notable in establishing the
Commonwealth’s spending power since it not only establishes the federal government’s
prerogative in transferring funds as it sees fit, but it also enables them to utilize
conditional transfers, which can be more controversial and divisive.219
If the spending power can be said to have at least some legal foundation, the
financial basis is certainly as strong. The strength of the federal spending power begins
with the Commonwealth’s control of the majority of government revenue. As was the
case with many federations, the Commonwealth government took full control of income
tax during the Second World War; however, Australia diverged from other countries
when the Labor government managed to establish a federal monopoly over this important
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revenue source in the post-war years.220 In addition to the income tax, the federal
government is responsible for the collection and administration of international taxes and
tariffs, sales tax, the Goods and Services Tax (GST) and the enterprise (corporate) tax.221
In terms of revenue, Thorlakson’s comparison of six federations found that Australia’s
federal government held 79% of total government revenues in 1974, 74% in 1984% and
68% in 1994.222 This was the highest percentage, among the federations studied, in 1974
and 1984, while being surpassed only by Austria (at 73%) in 1994. Watts found similar
results for Australia as the federal government’s revenues made up 74.4% of the total in
1986, 69.1% in 1996 and 74.8% between 2000 and 2004.223 This percentage was greater
than most of the federations in his study, including Canada, Germany, Switzerland and
the United States.224 By controlling the collection and allocation of a majority of
government revenues, the Commonwealth government has a strong financial basis for
providing grants and transfers to the states. These revenues often outpace the needs of the
federal government spending on their own priorities.225
Table 4.1: Percentage of Subnational Revenue from Federal Grants (Australia)226
1972 1975
Australia 52.90 57.27

220

1980 1985
57.02 56.19

1990 1995
44.66 40.94

2000
37.23

2005
46.62

2007 AVG
45.16 48.67

Rank
3
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As much of government revenues are placed, at least initially, under the purview
of the Commonwealth government, it should not be surprising that Australia’s state
governments are more reliant on federal transfers than many other countries in this study
(see Table 4.1). Ranking third among the seven cases might not seem particularly
notable, until one examines the numbers more closely. Australia ranks behind only
highly centralized South Africa and the nascent federation that is the United Kingdom
which is still in the process of devolving its historically unitary financial powers.
Moreover, Australia ranks well ahead of the fourth place federation in this comparison, as
Switzerland’s cantons are only dependent upon federal transfers for 28.83% of their
budgets, on average.
Combined with the overlapping constitutional environment, the financial status of
Australia’s governments creates a situation that has stimulated the growth of
intergovernmental agreements. The overlapping nature of the Constitution means that the
Commonwealth government is already active within most policy areas in some form, but
cannot simply administer its agenda independently. The significant financial powers of
the federal government allow for the transfer of a great deal of money to state
governments, while not being completely dominant and coercive, as in the South African
case. Agreements are often joined with federal spending as a means of ensuring state
input and control, while giving the federal government a means of directing funds to
specific purposes.227 As Watts observes, Australia resorts to executive federalism and
intergovernmental institutions and forums in order to coordinate between governments
(including matters of the spending power).228 The large record of agreements, covering
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numerous policy areas, including health, education and government financial
arrangements (such as the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Reform of
Commonwealth-State Fiscal Relations in 1999 and the 2008 Intergovernmental
Agreement on Federal Financial Relations) confirm that, at least in the case of Australia,
the spending power has helped to encourage the formation of national intergovernmental
agreements.

4. The Size and Scope of the Welfare State
Over the last sixty years, the growth of the welfare state in OECD countries has
been a consistent trend observed by political scientists and Australia has certainly
contributed to this pattern. The development and expansion of the Australian state during
the Second World War and the post-war reconstruction saw the introduction of many of
Australia’s modern social policies. Between 1943-1949, Labor governments introduced
“child allowances, unemployment benefits, sick pay, and health care benefits for the first
time at the federal level” while also taking steps to improve existing programs for
pensions and maternity allowances.229 With the defeat of Labor in 1949, the development
of the welfare state was not the primary focus of governments, as managing the post-war
economic recovery became the priority for the next couple of decades.230 Increasing
economic challenges, both domestically and internationally, as well as a resurgent Labor
party, put welfare policies back on the agenda by the late 1960s. First as a vigorous
opposition and then as government following the 1972 election, Labor proposed to
229
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strengthen the welfare state, most notably through the introduction of universal medical
insurance (Medibank).231 Though some of these initiatives would be delayed or somewhat
rolled back by the Liberal government that emerged from the crisis and deadlock of 197375, the welfare state continued to grow, especially following the re-election of Labor in
1983.232
Table 4.2: Australian Welfare Spending as a Percentage of GDP233

Australia

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 AVG Rank
10.6 12.5 13.6 16.6 17.8 17.1 14.7
5

The political conflict which led to the slow development of the welfare state in
Australia is clearly indicated by the figures above. At 10.6% of GDP in 1980, Australia’s
welfare spending ranked behind all other OECD federations in this study (the exception
being non-OECD South Africa). By 2000, Australia’s ranking increased to fourth, ahead
of both Canada and the United States, a function of “catching up” in the development of
the welfare state. Overall, Australia ranks only fifth in terms of welfare spending as a
percentage of GDP with an average of 14.7%, well behind leaders Germany (24.6%) and
the United Kingdom (19.03%).
Table 4.3: Australian Welfare Spending as a Percentage of Total Federal Spending234

Australia

231

1972
N/A

1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 AVG Rank
50.10 48.70 47.61 51.98 51.98 56.88 60.10 65.75 64.68
3
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The second table (Table 4.3) provides further evidence of the slow start to the
Australian welfare state, with major increases in the proportion of federal spending
coming as late as 2000. As welfare programs expanded, they began to consume everlarger portions of the federal budget, especially as overall spending did not increase as
quickly as during the 1980s.235
This information demonstrating increases in welfare state spending does provide a
potential explanation for the increasing frequency of intergovernmental agreements in
Australia. There have been almost as many national agreements in the last ten years (36)
as were formed between 1945 and 1999 (40). There are many potential explanations for
this increase – the rise in executive federalism via permanent forums, increased
familiarity with agreements as a tool for intergovernmental relations – however, this rise
in agreements does correlate somewhat with a growth in welfare spending. Returning to
Table 4.2, the largest single increase in welfare spending as a percentage of GDP occurs
between 1990 and 1995, before reaching its peak in 2000. While this precedes the most
active period of national agreement formation, it is plausible that this increase in spending
may have produced new areas in which intergovernmental coordination could be
addressed via an agreement. As the size and scope of government institutions increased
to sustain a larger welfare state, so too did the number of agreements. Examining welfare
spending as a percentage of total federal spending (Table 4.3) demonstrates a closer
correlation, as significant increases in spending occur first between 1995 and 2000, and
then again between 2000 and 2005. The types of agreements being formed during this
period also lends some credence to this relationship. Between 2000-2008, seven new
agreements were created in either the health or welfare policy areas whereas between
235
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1990-1999, none of these types of accords were formed (See Appendix A for the
agreement listing). Though this alone does not entirely explain the difference between
the number of agreements between these periods (17 during 1990-1999 and 36 from
2000-2008), it does account for more than a third of the increase. While it is impossible
to determine a threshold at which welfare spending produces an increased number of
intergovernmental agreements, the correlation between the highest periods of spending
and agreement formation indicates a possible relationship.

5. The Existence of Lasting Forums for Intergovernmental Relations
Australia has had a long history of active intergovernmental relations via formal
bodies. The origins of permanent forums for intergovernmental relations date back to
1927 and the first written, national agreement: the Financial Agreement.236 This
established the Australian Loan Council, the first formal and permanent
intergovernmental body, and these factors made it a unique institution for some years.237
It contrasted greatly with the informal and more secretive Premier’s Conferences, which
acted as the general forum for executive federalism in Australia.238 Australian
policymakers would not confine themselves to only two intergovernmental forums
however, and the first ministerial councils began to be established. The first, the
Australian Agricultural Council, was formed in 1934, with the Australian Education
Council following in 1936.239 These were the precursors to dozens of bodies for
intergovernmental interaction specific to a policy field, as a study in 1993 found that there
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were forty-five such bodies active in Australia.240 Painter describes these as forums for
communication and expertise, while Leach identifies their greatest contribution as
facilitating the personal contacts which are formed.241 While many of these bodies were
known for “informality, adhockery and secrecy”, they still demonstrate the common
practice of Australians conducting intergovernmental relations through an
institutionalized setting, even if a weak one.242
More recently, Australian governments have moved to institutionalize their
intergovernmental relations, especially at the executive level. Seeking to increase
cooperation and ensure more effective intergovernmental relations – to reduce duplication
and deliver services more efficiently, among other goals – Prime Minister Bob Hawke
and the Premiers moved to develop a stronger institution for executive federalism.243
This led to the formation of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in 1992 at a
Heads of Government meeting creating a formal institution for “peak intergovernmental
relations”.244 A secretariat was formed to run this new permanent body and to provide
resources to not only first ministers, but also for other government ministers and
bureaucrats. At the First Ministers level, the COAG has met at least once every year
since its creation, with meetings becoming even more frequent since 2005 (two meetings
each between 2005-07, with four each in the last two years).245 The COAG also helped to
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provide structure to the existing plethora of Australian intergovernmental forums, by
building connections with existing ministerial councils.246
Painter describes the COAG as an important “framework for negotiation,
commitment building, and public affirmation of final settlements” which has “facilitated
the signing of agreements”.247 An examination of the COAG’s records indicates that this
assessment is an accurate one. The COAG website lists 15 agreements (and 3
amendments) since 1997 which have been concluded, in some part, through the
COAG.248 Moreover, a detailed examination of the “Meeting Outcomes” section
indicates at least 10 other national agreements which have been concluded through
negotiation through the COAG.
With at least 25 distinct national agreements having been formed via
intergovernmental relations through the Council of Australian Governments, it is clear
that this body has had an impact on the formation of agreements. The rapid increase in
the number of agreements in the last fifteen years nicely corresponds with the
establishment of the COAG, and the body’s record of agreement formation clearly
indicates a direct and sizeable effect on the number of national agreements.

6. The Number of Subnational Governments at the State/Provincial Level
Australia has six states, all of which regularly participate in intergovernmental
relations in Australia. In addition to the states, Australia also has two territories: Northern
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Territory and the Australian Capital Territory. While they do not possess the same power
as the states, both have been increasingly involved in intergovernmental relations and are
the signatories to virtually all intergovernmental agreements in the period beginning in
2000.
Given the extensive records of national intergovernmental agreements, the number
of subnational governments does not provide an impediment to formation of these
institutions. The Compendium of Intergovernmental Agreements indicates that national
agreements - as opposed to bilateral or multilateral ones - seem to be the norm, as it
identifies only six agreements with more than three state participants, but less than five,
as compared to twenty-three national ones.249 Moreover, as the previous section will
discussed, Australia possesses a multitude of bodies for intergovernmental relations,
virtually all of which encourage relations among all subnational governments, as opposed
to smaller regional groups. This includes the Council of Australian Governments which
provides a permanent institution that meets frequently for the conduct of national
intergovernmental relations. Thus, there is no evidence available which would indicate
that six subnational governments is any barrier to the formation of national
intergovernmental agreements in Australia.

7. The Existence of a Body for Intrastate Federalism
When evaluating whether a federation possesses a legislative body that can serve
as a forum for intrastate federalism, the key consideration is the role of the subnational
governments. For intrastate federalism to exist, members or representatives of
249
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subnational governments must be active within the national legislative institutions (almost
exclusively through a second or upper chamber).250 This alone is not enough for a
functioning body of intrastate federalism. The chamber must also include equal - or at
least disproportionate - representation for the subnational governments, otherwise the
largest units will dominate in a situation similar to a lower or popular chamber. It must
also have tangible authority within the federal legislature to allow the subnational
governments to contribute to the legislative process and divert business away from other
processes of intergovernmental relations. While the Australian Senate meets two of these
criteria, the fact that it is popularly elected means that it acts as only a partial body for
intrastate federalism. Thus, according to the theory, the Australian Senate should provide
only a limited alternative - at most - to the creation of agreements as a means of
intergovernmental coordination.
The Australian Senate found its roots in the bicameralism of the individual
colonies. All six colonies possessed Legislative Councils, whose primary purpose was to
“check the excesses of (the) popular assembly”.251 This familiarity, combined with the
bicameral examples of existing federations, made the inclusion of a federal upper
chamber a natural fit for Australia. Drawing inspiration from Switzerland and the United
States, the framers decided that the Senate would serve the dual purposes of acting as a
check on government power and as a body for federalism and state representation.252
Although New South Wales and Victoria – the most populous colonies – attempted to
propose a system of disproportionate, rather than equal, representation, the smaller
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colonies held firm on their insistence that the distribution of Senate seats be equal.253 The
original Senate of 1901 held to this principle of equality with six Senators per state, with
the number increasing to ten in 1948 and twelve in 1984. The one exception to this
system of equal representation is the two territories, which each gained two
representatives in 1975.
A second criterion of intrastate federalism, that the body must have tangible
authority within the federal Parliament, is also met by the Australian Senate. Again, the
Australian experience with bicameralism in their colonial governments directly
contributed to the design of the Senate. The Senate has “almost co-equal powers with the
House”, but they differ in a couple of key respects.254 First, the Senate is unable to
introduce or amend supply bills, as enshrined in Section 53 of the Constitution. However,
the Australian Senate is not impotent where supply bills are concerned, as compared to
the British House of Lords (at least, post-1911).255 Drawing on the “Connecticut
Compromise” from the United States, the Australian Senate may return a supply bill to
the House of Commons with a request for amendments; the Senate may also refuse to
pass a supply bill entirely.256 While these powers have occasionally led to deadlock and
conflict with the House of Representatives, most notably during several political crises of
the 1970s, the Senate still possesses significant, if somewhat restricted, legislative
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powers.257 The second difference in Senatorial powers stems from the issue of supply
bills: that is, the Government is not directly responsible to the Senate. The Prime
Minister and Cabinet are only technically responsible for maintaining the confidence of
the House of Representatives in order to stay in power. This does not mean the
Government can afford to ignore or avoid the Senate however, as the upper chamber can
make governing difficult, and in some cases impossible.258

As with supply bills

however, the difference between the two is less than in other parliamentary democracies
such as Canada and the United Kingdom. Although it was a unique series of events, the
deadlocked Parliament of 1975 demonstrated that a determined opposition majority in the
Senate can challenge a sitting government and even cause it to fall.259
While the Australian Senate clearly meets the intrastate federalism criteria for
representation and power, it clearly fails in the category of representing the interests of
state governments. Much of this can be attributed to the fact that Senators are directly
elected by the people, the practice of four of the six colonial upper chambers during the
federation debates of the 1890s.260 Some debate did occur as to whether Australia should
follow the American and Swiss examples of placing the selection of representatives in the

257

The political crises of the Australian Parliament in the 1970s stemmed in great part from a split in party
control of the two houses. The House of Representatives, and thus the Government, were controlled by the
Australian Labor Party, which had secured its majority based on support in the more populous states. The
Senate, however, was controlled by a coalition between the Australian Liberal and National Country
Parties. Under their leadership, the Senate refused to pass much of the Government’s legislation, including
supply bills. While it is impossible to fully describe this fascinating period of Australian political history
here, this period did indicate one other inequality between the House of Representatives and the Senate. In
cases of true deadlock, the Governor General can call a joint sitting of the House and the Senate to resolve
it (this occurred for the first and only time in August of 1974). With approximately double the membership,
the House gains an advantage over the Senate in these circumstances.
258
Saunders and Le Roy, "Commonwealth of Australia," 44-45.
259
Technically, the Government was not defeated by the Senate, but the insurmountable deadlock led the
Governor-General to dissolve both houses of Parliament and call new elections.
260
Only New South Wales and Queensland did not hold elections for their Legislative Councils, Swenden,
Federalism and Second Chambers, 72-73.

131

hands of the state governments.261 However, Alfred Deakin’s argument that the state’s
interests could not be separated from that of the people eventually was accepted, leading
to the popular election of Senators.262 As the state governments do not directly take part
in the selection of these Senators, the Senate cannot function as a body in which these
governments can negotiate with each other. Though Senators could, in theory, represent
many of the same interests as their state governments, in practice it is party affiliation that
seems to be the most powerful influence in the Senate.263 This has been exacerbated by
the use of proportional representation in state-wide constituencies as the means of
selecting Senators, meaning that issues in the Australian Senate often break down along
party lines, limiting some of the freedom of representatives to speak directly for their
state.264 Where state interests are realized, it is through the advancement of a party’s
agenda, and not from a state Senator individually advancing their own interests.
The Senate of Australia remains an important and influential body in Australian
politics, even when that serves a federal purpose of empowering smaller states. However,
with directly elected Senators voting along party lines, it cannot be said to act as a body
for full intrastate federalism. As such, the business of the Senate does not seem to take
the place of intergovernmental relations via executive federalism, which might impede
the formation of national intergovernmental agreements. The large number of agreements
in Australia demonstrates that the Senate is not an active limitation to agreements.
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Australia is one of the most prolific federations when it comes to creating national
agreements, with 76 formed between 1945 and 2009 a rate of 1.27 per year.265 This
places Australia in the group of the most active agreement-forming federations, along
with Canada and Germany, all of which average at least one national accord per year. As
such, it would be expected that Australia should exhibit strong features conducive to
intergovernmental coordination, with limited inhibitors and alternatives - something this
chapter has demonstrated.
In many ways, Australia operates as a model federal environment for the
formation of intergovernmental agreements. Constitutionally, it is not so centralized as to
impede the autonomy of the states to form agreements. Instead, constitutional overlap is
the most significant feature, with both the Commonwealth and State governments active
in most areas of public policy. This extensive concurrency creates numerous areas where
the formation of agreements can coordinate government activity. The use of the federal
spending power by the Commonwealth government has only served to increase the
number of potential areas for collaboration between governments, encouraging the
formation of agreements in order to control the use of these funds. Finally, the small
number of subnational governments means that Australia’s agreement formation is not
impeded or inhibited by basic coordination problems. Moreover, relations between the
states and the Commonwealth cannot be conducted through the Senate, as it does not
possess a full degree of intrastate federalism.
While Australia has a fairly active record of agreement formation (at least,
comparatively), the explosion in the rate of agreement formation in the last fifteen years
seems to correspond with two of the variables. First, there has been a significant growth
265
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in welfare spending since 1990, potentially increasing the number of programs and
initiatives which can be coordinated via an agreement. Second, the formation of the
Council of Australian Governments in 1992 has provided a permanent and
institutionalized body for intergovernmental relations – one that has been important in the
negotiation of intergovernmental agreements. These developments provide Australia
with one of the most fertile environment for the formation of national intergovernmental
agreements, as the factors that encourage agreements are all present, while those that
would discourage them are almost entirely absent.
With no significant inhibitors or alternatives, the strong factors conducive to
coordination create an environment with a high likelihood of intergovernmental
agreements. This can be expressed using the summary formula in the following terms:
CON (Strong) – INH (None) – ALT (Weak-none) = High IGA Formation
With a large number of agreements, the finding that Australia has a high potential for
these intergovernmental institutions is fully consistent with the hypothesis. In Australia,
at least, the institutional environment provides a sound explanation for the formation of
intergovernmental agreements.
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Chapter Five: Canada

Source: CIA World Factbook

Formal Name: Canada
Capital: Ottawa, Ontario
Subnational Governments: There are ten provinces, which possess full constitutional
authority: Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and
Labrador, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec and Saskatchewan. There
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are also three territories that possess more limited authority: Northwest Territories,
Nunavut and Yukon Territory.

Introduction:
Canada, the second largest country in the world, has relied on its federal system to
help manage the challenges of multiple geographic, economic and social cleavages.
Canada’s complex geography and history has spurred the development of a diverse
economy across its many regions, as different industries – energy, manufacturing, mining,
finance and agriculture, to name but a few – have been concentrated in different areas of
the country. This has led to the development of regional political cultures. Most
notably, Canada’s federal arrangements have been marked by conflict and cooperation
between the province of Quebec – the homeland of most of the country’s Francophone
minority – and the rest of Canada, which is primarily English-speaking. Yet, in spite of
these potential cleavages (or perhaps because of them), Canada is one of the oldest
federations in the world and the largest by geographic size.266 While Canada continues to
face challenges, it provides a fascinating case of a large and dynamic federation.

History:
Much like Australia and the United States, the land that would become Canada
was inhabited by Aboriginal groups for thousands of years prior to the arrival of
Europeans. European explorers and immigrants began to arrive throughout North
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America during the 16th century, with Great Britain founding a number of settlements,
notably the Thirteen Colonies of America, and the French establishing a collection of
colonies along the St. Lawrence River known as “New France”.267 This sizeable French
colony would distinguish the development of Canadian politics and federalism from the
American and Australian experiences by forcing two different linguistic and cultural
groups to (eventually) reach an accommodation. A series of global wars between
European colonial powers beginning in 1701 would entwine the fates of these British and
French colonies.268 Culminating in the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) and the Battle of
the Plains of Abraham, the British defeated the French forces in Canada and annexed all
their colonies. From this point forward, British authorities in North America would have
to grapple with the challenges of dealing with a large French population under their rule,
a people that would be a majority in Canada until the 1850s and a significant minority
thereafter. Colonial leadership vacillated between attempts at accommodation – the
Quebec Act of 1774 – and assimilation - Lord Durham’s Report and the 1840 Act of
Union –all while a surge of Loyalist immigrants from the newly independent United
States boosted the English population of all the colonies of British North America.269
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By the mid-19th century, pressures were building towards increased autonomy
from Great Britain, if not outright independence. The two rebellions of 1837 in York
(modern-day Greater Toronto Area) and Montreal may have been small in terms of
participants and casualties, but they emphasized a growing demand for responsible
government for the colonists. Yet the first attempt at a parliamentary government for a
newly united province of Canada resulted in political deadlock and a lack of effective
governance, leaving the desire for self-government unfulfilled.270 Added to this were the
interests of powerful businessmen and politicians from Canada, as well as the Maritime
colonies, who saw potential economic gains from closer trade relationships. Meanwhile,
the Imperial Government in London was increasingly weary of the cost of supporting and
defending their North American possessions, while still wary of American aggression.271
Separately, the colony of Canada and the Maritime colonies began to move
towards autonomous federations. Individually, these efforts met with some obstacles,
notably in Canada where the issue of deadlock remained unresolved. However, a meeting
on Maritime union scheduled for 1864 in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island provided
the perfect opportunity to find a joint solution to these challenges, and representatives
from the united province of Canada joined their Maritime counterparts in negotiations.
Agreeing in principle to some form of federal union, the leaders left the details of this
new bargain to be decided in a two week conference in Quebec City in 1865.
The proceedings of the Quebec Conference of 1865 provided the framework for
Canada’s federal system and the British North America Act 1867, Canada’s original
270
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constitution. Perhaps the most vigorous debates concerned the power and scope of the
new national government. A federal system was seen as a necessity because the French
Canadian population of Quebec sought a jurisdiction where they could manage language
and cultural affairs as the majority, while the smaller Maritime provinces were wary of
being ignored politically if all power was exercised by the centre.272 However, the
American Civil War (1861-65) was only just concluding as the conference began and this
gave the delegates a clear view of the potential dark side of federalism and the price of
failure. The American experience, combined with the British tradition of unitary
government helped to forge a group of delegates opposed to federalism, or at least,
opposed to a decentralized federation. After much debate and compromise, delegates
eventually agreed on a set of resolutions which would reserve to the provinces power over
“local matters” (including education, charitable and religious matters, healthcare,
municipal governments, business licensing and public lands) while centralizing power
over foreign relations, defence and the economy (via authority over monetary and fiscal
policy, as well as broader taxation power) to the federal government.273 Both English and
French were recognized as official languages. In 1867, the Parliament at Westminster in
London passed the British North America Act, founding the new Dominion of Canada as
a new federation of four provinces: Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec and Ontario.274
Over the next forty years, Canada experienced rapid territorial expansion, as the four
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original provinces were soon joined by other British colonies as well as new jurisdictions
carved out of other British possessions on the Canadian prairies.275
Since Confederation, Canada has not only grown geographically, but culturally,
economically, demographically and politically. Traditional sources of immigration from
the United Kingdom were soon supplemented by new waves of newcomers from central
and eastern Europe, as well as east Asia. Since the Second World War, immigration to
Canada has diversified further, leading to the enshrinement of multiculturalism both as a
policy and a part of the country’s identity.276 Despite this increasing ethno-cultural
diversity, the early tensions between the English and French persisted, and were even
exacerbated. A decade long process of cultural change in Quebec known as the “Quiet
Revolution” saw the rise of a more confident and assertive Francophone political culture
in Canada’s second-largest province.277 Sovereigntist movements developed in the
province after some of Quebec’s demands were not realized, leading to referendums on
sovereignty in 1980 and 1995, the latter of which only just failed.278 The federal and
provincial governments of Canada today continue to try to strike a balance between
managing this traditional cleavage and coping with the realities of a large, sparsely
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populated territory, different economic interests and the emerging issues of a
multicultural population.

Government and Political Structure:
While Canada’s history may be rooted in the struggles and successes of the British
and French cultures, its government and political structure draw almost exclusively from
the English tradition. Canada’s parliamentary government is a near-carbon copy of the
Westminster Parliamentary system, even to the point of sharing the same head of state.
Moreover, unlike Australia – which has experience with more direct democratic measures
and strong upper houses – Canada has kept close to British traditions in the operation of
its political institutions.
Canada’s federal Parliament is composed of two bodies: the popular (sometimes
called “lower”) chamber known as the House of Commons and the appointed (or upper)
chamber known as the Senate. These chambers are organized along the same lines as
their British predecessors with the Commons elected by the people and the Senate
appointed by the monarch (or more specifically, the Crown in Canada, represented by the
Governor-General), on the advice of the government.279 Members of the House of
Commons, known by the generic title “Member of Parliament” (MP), are elected in single
member constituencies by a plurality of the vote. There are currently 308 MPs in the
House of Commons, but unlike other countries, there is no upper limit set by the
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Constitution and the number may be increased via federal legislation.280 Seats are
allocated by province roughly in accordance with their share of the population; however,
Canada does not adhere too closely to the principle of “representation by population”.281
The Canadian Senate is primarily drawn from the British example, with at least a
token influence from the American experience. The 105 Senators that sit in the upper
chamber are appointed by the Governor-General based upon the recommendations of the
Prime Minister, who, in practice, makes the selection. Much like the House of Lords, the
Senate was expected by the Fathers of Confederation to serve as a body for “sober second
thought” and to curb any potential “excesses” of the House of Commons.282 The
diversity of the country and the needs of the federal system added an additional role to
these traditional functions: regional representation. During the Confederation debates, it
was decided that seats in the Senate would be allocated equally by regions in order to
provide greater representation for small provinces; these regions (Atlantic Canada,
Ontario, Quebec and, eventually Western Canada) each received 24 Senators.283
However, much like representation by population in the House of Commons, Canada’s
commitment to this principle has not been absolute, as Newfoundland’s entry into
Confederation in 1949 upset this balance.284 Along with the undemocratic selection
method, the Senate has been the focus of a great deal of criticism for its problems with
regional and provincial representation. There is no formal provincial role, either de jure
280
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or de facto, in appointments.285 Whatever the controversy pertaining to the type and
selection of representatives, Canadian Senators are still entrusted with substantial powers.
The Senate possesses legislative powers similar to the House of Commons, including the
ability to introduce legislation – with the exception of bills concerning financial matters –
and the prerogative to unilaterally amend or defeat legislation.286
The government of Canada essentially is the federal Cabinet, led by the Prime
Minister. As with other parliamentary systems, the government must maintain the
confidence of the legislature in order to wield power. In Canada, only the House of
Commons is able to defeat the government in a confidence vote and virtually all members
of the Cabinet are drawn from the Commons.287 The prevalence of single-party majority
governments in Canadian politics means that such defeats occur only during periods of
minority government.288 This security, along with strong traditions of party discipline,
has invested the Cabinet, and specifically the Prime Minister, with a great deal of
authority and control.289 This is particularly interesting given that the Constitution
provides very few specifics on Government of Canada, failing to mention the workings of
Cabinet and completely omitting the role of the Prime Minister.
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Canada’s provincial governments are structured along the same lines as the
national Parliament, with the notable difference that they are now unicameral. Each
province is led by a Premier, who draws a cabinet from members of the legislature.
Elections to provincial legislatures are the same as in national contests, and there are
frequent single-party majorities dominated by the Premier and central party leadership.290
This creates a system that endows the Premiers with substantial authority, and makes the
executive powerful and primordial in intergovernmental relations (as will be explored in
greater detail in section seven, concerning forums for intergovernmental relations).

Intergovernmental Agreements in Canada:
Agreements between governments in Canada are generally referred to as
“intergovernmental agreements” in academic literature, a term that applies to concords of
both a federal-provincial or interprovincial nature. This categorization brings some
uniformity to a field that would otherwise be dominated by a chaotic lexicon of terms for
formal partnerships, including “memorandum of understanding”, “accord”, “co-operative
action framework”, “provincial-territorial protocol”, “national program” and many more.
As of 2002, there were at least 39 different terms for intergovernmental agreements in
English and another 36 in French.291 This semantic diversity also suggests a lack of
consistency in the style, format and effect of intergovernmental agreements in Canada.
Unlike South Africa, which has issued an actual template for agreements, the United
Kingdom, which has produced guidelines and briefings for concordats, and the United
States, which has one type of agreement enshrined in the Constitution, Canada has no
290
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guiding format or law governing the use of agreements. Thus, intergovernmental
agreements in Canada can be formal or informal, take a variety of formats and deal with
virtually any area of government policy.
This breadth – and in some senses, ambiguity – is reinforced by the lack of a clear
legal definition for intergovernmental agreements. Neither the Constitution nor a single
framework agreement have established the legality of agreements, a vacuum which
finally led to a court challenge in 1991. In the Reference re: Canada Assistance Plan
case, provincial authorities challenged the federal government’s unilateral abrogation of
an existing intergovernmental agreement.292 The Court held, however, that the federal
government was not constrained by the agreement and was within its constitutional right
to make changes unilaterally. While this ruling did not eliminate the possibility that
certain agreements could be justiciable, it did establish that written agreements between
governments were not intrinsically legal matters, but rather political ones.293
These uncertainties have certainly proved to be no limitation to the formation of
intergovernmental agreements in Canada. Agreements between provincial governments
or between Ottawa and some of the provinces are common, with Poirier estimating that
more than 1000 have been concluded overall.294 National intergovernmental agreements
– the focus of this study – have been numerous as well, with approximately 92 having
been concluded between 1945 and 2008, a rate of 1.46 per year (see Appendix B).
Unfortunately, this number can only be a very close approximation as there was no
central registry to gather data from. Instead, records of agreements were drawn from a
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number of sources, including complete listings from the provincial governments of
Alberta and Quebec, a partial listing from Newfoundland, a listing of federal agreements
concluded before 1981 in a report by the Senate entitled Fiscal Federalism in Canada and
records from Johanne Poirier, who recorded some of the agreements in a central federal
registry in 2000 before it was made inaccessible (see the chapter on methodology for
more details).
This is one of the highest levels of national agreement formation found in this
study, placing Canada second and in a group with Germany and Australia as countries
that are very active.295 The remainder of this chapter will assess this large number of
agreements and determine whether it is consistent with the seven variables that may affect
agreement formation.

1. The Degree of Overlap that Exists in the Constitution
When designing the Canadian Constitution, the Fathers of Confederation defined
what they believed to be clear areas of authority for the federal and provincial
governments. Unlike their American predecessors, the Canadian constitutional framers
explicitly listed the competencies for both the federal and provincial orders of
government, rather than simply defining one and leaving the other the undefined residual
power. Furthermore – and contrary to the future tradition of many European federations
– Canada’s framers limited the areas of explicit concurrency to only two: agriculture and
immigration (authority of pensions was added to this group through a constitutional
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amendment in 1951).296 In theory, this leaves Canada with a Constitution that clearly
defines jurisdictions for the federal and provincial governments, with a very small
number of areas where both are competent, and thus, a low level of constitutional overlap.
Of course, explicitly concurrent jurisdictions are not the only measure of overlap
in a constitution. The other source is de facto overlap that develops from both orders of
government having authority in a single policy area based on different exclusive powers;
this is the primary type of overlap found in the Canadian Constitution. There are a
number of examples of this occurring in Canada, as both the federal and provincial
governments have authority in areas such as transportation, law enforcement,
environmental policy and language and culture. Combined with existing concurrent
jurisdictions of agriculture, immigration and taxation, this represents a not inconsiderable
number of areas in which jurisdictions overlap.
Ronald Watts’ study of federal constitutions can assist in quantifying the extent of
overlap as well as providing a basis for comparison with other federations. According to
his analysis of 48 policy areas, only 3 (6%) are explicitly concurrent; however, there are
another 19 areas in which both the federal and provincial governments have overlapping
jurisdiction, for a total of 22 of 48 or 46% (See Appendix H for more information).
Compared to other federations, this level of constitutional overlap is in the lower range,
though not at the extreme end. Canada ranks 5th, in the same area as 6th-placed
Switzerland (43%), but not close to the lowest level of concurrent and shared jurisdictions
found in the United Kingdom (22%). This level of overlap is much lower than the
leaders, Germany (75%) or Australia (70%).
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It is also worth noting that unlike federations such as Germany and Switzerland,
there is a unity of legislative and executive authority in the Canadian division of powers.
The order of government that is able to legislate in a matter is fully capable of
implementing legislation and both the federal and provincial governments possess fully
developed and autonomous bureaucracies. This eliminates the possibility of overlap
emerging from the division of the legislative and executive processes.
Canada’s low level of constitutional overlap creates something of an inconsistency
between it and the two other federations that formed a large number of national
intergovernmental agreements, Australia and Germany. While the simple explanation for
this is simply that other factors have been more important to the formation of agreements
in Canada, a closer examination of the agreements themselves does demonstrate that it
would be unwise to completely reject overlap in the Canadian case. Approximately 25%
of all national agreements in Canada pertain to some element of agriculture or food
management, one of the few areas of strict concurrency. Moreover, another 20% fall into
categories of clearly overlapping jurisdiction such as environmental regulation, justice
and law enforcement, immigration and pensions. Thus, even if Canada does not have a
high degree of constitutional overlap, those policy areas that involve both the federal and
provincial orders of government have produced a significant number of agreements.
Even with this important caveat, it is probably unwise to try to stretch this
explanation for Canada’s record of agreement formation too far. Canada’s overall levels
of constitutional overlap remain on the lower end of this comparison and even though
some concurrent and shared areas of jurisdiction have produced a large number of
agreements, there are also numerous agreements in areas such as education, which have
more “watertight” properties.
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2. The Degree of Centralization in the Constitutional Division of Powers
It might come as a surprise to certain provincial politicians, but comparatively,
Canada exhibits a greater degree of decentralization in its constitutional division of
powers than most other federations (at least those included in this comparative study).
Canada’s Constitution establishes significant areas of jurisdiction for the provinces, and
these have generally held up against federal encroachment over time. Additionally – and
unlike other federations in this analysis – Canada’s federal government lacks effective
constitutional override provisions such as broad legislative oversight, expansive
emergency powers or special instruments or mandates that would allow it to change
subnational legislation or direct it to specific tasks.
This relatively decentralized system might also surprise many of the Fathers of
Confederation, as Canada’s Constitution was not deliberately designed in this fashion. As
mentioned earlier in this chapter, Canada’s constitutional authors felt they were designing
a highly centralized federation, free from the substantial subnational powers that they felt
helped to destabilize their American neighbours.297 Instead, Canada’s current
constitutional trends came about through an extended period of political evolution and
judicial interpretation which began shortly after 1867. This saw the expansion of
provincial powers, limitations placed on federal jurisdiction and an effective elimination
of the federal government’s special prerogatives of reservation and disallowance.298
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One of the curiosities of Canada’s constitutional history is the reliance upon the
United Kingdom for legal doctrine and judicial interpretation. Until 1949, the highest
court of appeal in Canada was not the Supreme Court, but rather the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council (JCPC), a group of legal experts and judges in the British House of
Lords. Thus, all disputes concerning the division of powers were ultimately decided not
by the federally appointed Supreme Court, but by the distant, imperial JCPC. This may
account for the completely opposite path in Canadian jurisprudence compared to their
American neighbours. In the United States, a more decentralized constitution was pulled
in the opposite direction by a Supreme Court that expanded the scope of federal powers,
while in Canada, the reverse was true.299
The period of 19th century jurisprudence was particularly influential in defining
the division of powers in Canada and its relatively decentralized outcome. Macdonald
and many of his supporters believed that they had endowed the federal government with
sufficient powers to remain dominant. Specifically, federal authority over trade and
commerce (Section 91(2)) was seen as a centralizing federal power, (akin to the Interstate
Commerce clause in the United States).300 Perhaps understanding that this general
economic power might not be enough, the Canadian Constitution also allocated to the
federal government general residual power and the ability “to make laws for the Peace,
Order and good Government of Canada”.301 This so-called “POGG” clause was meant to
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provide federal authority for any matter that was not explicitly under provincial
jurisdiction and encourage federal dominance in any disputes.
It seems the JCPC had another perspective on how these powers should work in
practice. Between 1880 and 1896, the most active period of judicial appeals concerning
the division of powers, 18 cases were heard by the high court. Of these, 75% (15) were
decided in favour of the provinces.302 In a series of important decisions, the JCPC
generally curtailed the reach of both the trade and commerce power and the POGG
clause, while at the same time affirming provincial authority over property rights and civil
law.303 The JCPC also eroded the semi-colonial status of the provinces by declaring that
they were as entitled to the prerogatives of the Crown as the federal government,
reinforcing the concept of divided sovereignty in Canadian federalism.
These rulings may have occurred decades prior to the period that is being
analyzed but they form the basis for understanding the modern Canadian Constitution.
While more recent domestic courts have not been quite so one-sided in their rulings, the
initial interpretations by the JCPC formed the basis for modern Canada’s relatively
decentralized Constitution.304 Provincial governments, generally eager to maximize their
power, have been keen to protect their jurisdiction, whatever its origins. The
consequence of this is that, unlike in some other federations, federal encroachment into
provincial or even shared jurisdiction must be negotiated rather than simply asserted
under the auspices of a general constitutional principle. Intergovernmental conflict and
legal challenges are often the result when the federal government tries to intrude over

302

Russell, Constitutional Odyssey, 42.
Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union, 48-51.
304
Donald. V. Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism in the Seventies, 2nd ed., (Toronto: McGraw-Hill
Ryerson, 1976), 23-24.
303

151

provincial objections. Moreover, despite the opportunity afforded them by Section 94 of
the Constitution, no Canadian provinces have delegated any constitutional responsibilities
to the federal government.305
The decline in the use of the federal instruments of reservation and disallowance
has paralleled and reinforced this trend of decentralization. Both of these involved the
use of Crown powers by the Lieutenant Governor of a province, technically a
representative of the monarch, but in practice, appointed on the advice of the federal
government. Reservation allowed a bill passed by a province to be held back for up to a
year (by the Lieutenant Governor refusing it royal assent) to allow the federal government
to consider the matter. Disallowance was the outright refusal of a Lieutenant Governor to
sign a provincial bill into law. Both of these powers were exercised at the discretion of
the federal government, mimicking two of the methods that imperial Britain used to
control local legislatures when Canada was a collection of colonies.
Early Canadian history saw a widespread use of both of these powers, allowing
the federal government to strike down provincial legislation that it found undesirable.
Between 1867 and 1896, the federal government used these powers to disallow 65
provincial acts, an average of just over two per year.306 This proved to be the peak for
reservation and disallowance however, as the 20th century saw a marked reduction in their
usage. Since 1911 disallowance has only been used 17 times, with the most recent
occurrence in 1943. Reservation has been used more recently (1961), but it has not led to
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the rejection of legislation since before 1945, the starting point of this study.307 This
erosion of these special override clauses stands in contrast to other federations, but
especially the United States where the national government commonly uses coercive tools
such as “mandates” in intergovernmental relations.308
The consequence of the growth of provincial power through judicial interpretation
and the erosion of reservation and disallowance is a more decentralized federation
compared to both Canada’s past and other federal countries. As Simeon and Papillon put
it:
The result is a high degree of autonomy for the provincial governments combined
with a high degree of interdependence among them. Intergovernmental
cooperation and coordination is necessary if the needs of citizens are to be met
effectively.309

This is consistent with the high level of intergovernmental agreement formation found in
Canada – indeed it encourages them! Strong provincial powers, defined by early court
decisions and defended by assertive Premiers, combined with a lack of coercive federal
override clauses have created an environment in which most federal initiatives must be
negotiated with the provinces, rather than simply imposed (a result seen in the more
centralized federations in this study). Moreover, provinces must negotiate with each
other to deal with inter-jurisdictional issues. This creates more opportunities for
intergovernmental agreements to be made, which helps explain their frequency in
Canada.

3. The Size and Status of the Federal Spending Power
307
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When considering how the federal spending power affects the formation of
intergovernmental agreements in Canada, it is important to reiterate that there are two
components to this variable. The first is a quantifiable measurement of how much the
federal government spends by transferring money, both conditionally and
unconditionally, to the provinces while the second is a more complicated question of the
legitimacy, scope and use of this type of spending.
Much like the constitutional division of powers, Canadians might be surprised
with the level of financial decentralization that exists, especially when placed in a
comparative context. When Canada’s original constitutional document – the British
North America Act – was brought into law in 1867, excise taxes and duties were the sole
responsibility of the federal government, something that guaranteed the financial
supremacy of Ottawa.310 Direct sources of taxation – sales taxes, personal and corporate
income taxes – were equally available to both the federal and provincial governments, but
at the time, these were inconsequential, reserved only for emergencies. The same could
be said about natural resources and licensing fees, revenue streams primarily reserved to
the provinces. However, in the postwar era of this analysis, the tables have turned.
Tariffs are increasingly limited as a source of government revenue, especially after the
passage of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States in 1989. Instead, personal
and corporate income taxes, as well as sales taxes have become the most important
revenue sources and they are accessible to both orders of government.311 Moreover, the
growth of Canada’s natural resource industries, especially the highly lucrative oil and gas
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sector, has left the provinces with near-exclusive jurisdiction over one of the most
valuable sources of funds. This contrasts with other federations such as Australia and the
United States, where the federal government has significant claim over resource revenues.
This is all to say that it should not be surprising that Canada’s provinces are
among the least dependent upon federal funds in this study. The table below illustrates
the relatively low percentage of provincial revenue that is dependent upon federal
transfers in Canada.
Table 5.1: Percentage of Subnational Revenue from Federal Grants (Canada)312
1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 AVG Rank
Canada 25.99 24.24 20.66 20.42 18.20 17.48 14.44 18.07 18.94 19.83
6

Canada’s sixth-place ranking is ahead of only Germany in this measure of financial
decentralization, and clearly behind fifth- place America (26.56% average). More
recently, the provinces’ reliance on federal revenues may be even smaller. Using a
different calculation, Watts’ review of the distribution of finances in federations found
that, between 2000 and 2004, Canadian provinces relied on federal transfers for only
12.9% of revenues, placing them last of 16 countries (including Germany).313
Additionally, the significant role of an unconditional equalization program and the very
general conditions of the health and social spending transfers mean that only a small
proportion of provincial revenue is dependent upon transfers with specific conditions.314
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This finding would seem to be contradictory with the large number of
intergovernmental agreements that Canada has made. According to the hypothesis, as the
federal spending power grows in size and as subnational governments are more reliant
upon it, transfer payments and grants should encourage agreement formation. In Canada,
however, agreement formation has remained high, even as provincial reliance on federal
funds has decreased.
If there is a means to reconcile this seeming contradiction it lies not in the size of
the federal spending power, but in how it is used. The spending power has long been a
contested concept in Canada. The Constitution does not directly define the scope of
federal government spending, whether to declare it unlimited or to place it strictly within
the boundaries of Ottawa’s jurisdiction. The courts have, thus far, upheld – or at least
failed to overturn – the spending power, but adding to the controversy, the Supreme Court
of Canada has not brought forth a definitive ruling.315 As such, the exercise of the
spending power has been left up to the interpretation of the federal government, which
has generally viewed it as an unlimited ability to spend money in provincial jurisdiction,
usually through both conditional and unconditional transfer payments.316
However, unlike in other federations, the federal government of Canada lacks a
clear method to determine how the money is spent. By contrast, the American federal
government is able to invoke special override powers to ensure the conditions for their
funding are met. Germany and Switzerland both have constitutions that invest broad
legislative powers with the federal government, while South Africa and the United
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Kingdom have provinces that are so reliant on federal government for their funding that
the spending power is a more coercive tool. In Canada (and Australia) however, it is
impossible for the federal government to ensure that federal funds will be spent as desired
without some kind of negotiation. This opens the door for intergovernmental
coordination and potentially, national intergovernmental agreements. Nowhere is this
phenomenon more apparent than in the 1950s and 60s as Canada was beginning to build
its welfare state. The Constitution granted the provinces jurisdiction over most issues of
health, education and welfare policy, but the federal government possessed the funding to
develop government programs in these areas. A number of important agreements were
struck, with the provincial governments agreeing to certain federal conditions in order to
receive funding of social assistance, pensions and government health insurance.317 More
recently, the use of the spending power has contributed to the development of more recent
agreements on the social union and childcare and early learning.318
Without the use of its spending power, the federal government would have a
much-reduced ability to influence important policy areas such as healthcare, education
and welfare. Without federal funding, the provinces would be unable to create extensive
social programs (at least without some kind of significant tax transfer). Finally, without a
federal override power or the ability for provinces to unilaterally clear tax room, both
parties must negotiate with each other in order to realize their goals. Though the size of

317

Among the agreements which were formed on the basis of national standards are the Disabled Persons’
Allowance (1955), the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Act Agreement (1958), the Agriculture and Rural
Development Act Agreement (1962) and the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Fund Agreement (1964).
This is only a selection of the agreements, but unfortunately is impossible to truly determine which
agreements were specifically results of the spending power without complete access to the texts of all
accords. However, the examples illustrate at least the role that the spending power has played in agreement
formation, even if it is not possible to truly quantify the extent.
318
Social Union Framework Agreement (1999) and Federal-Provincial-Territorial Multilateral Framework
on Early Learning and Child Care (2003).

157

the federal spending power is (comparatively) small, it is clear that its role within
Canadian federalism allows it to disproportionately encourage the formation of national
intergovernmental agreements. This concept of disproportionality will be revisited in the
comparative chapter as it provides an unexpected dynamic to the relationship of the
spending power and agreement formation.

4. The Size and Scope of the Welfare State
For an intergovernmental agreement to be created there must be some policy or
policy area that crosses jurisdictional lines (constitutional or territorial), either between
subnational units or between the national government and subnational units. The larger a
government is and the more policy areas it occupies, the more opportunities there are for
these inter-jurisdictional matters to develop. In this regard, Canada represents a good
“median” case: there is a significant welfare state in Canada, but it clearly ranks behind
the European federations in size and scope.
Table 5.2: Canadian Welfare Spending as a Percentage of GDP319

Canada

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 AVG Rank
13.7 17.0 18.1 18.9 16.5 16.5 16.78
3

According to the OECD’s data, Canada has seen welfare spending rise as a share
of the total economy over 25 years from 13.7% to 16.5%. This trend is consistent with all
other federations as each one of them has seen an increase in welfare spending between
1980 and 2005. However, comparing Canada to the other six countries does present a
couple of unique features that are worth noting. First, Canada’s comparative ranking in
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welfare spending has fallen during this period, even as spending as a percentage of GDP
has actually increased. In 1980, Canada ranked third in welfare spending and again in
1985 before peaking in second place in 1990, behind only Germany. By the time data
were gathered in 2000, however, Canada had fallen to fifth place, where it would remain.
Thus, even though spending has been increasing overall, it has not kept pace with the
other federations considered here. This fluctuation in ranking hints at the second unique
feature: Canada’s highest years of welfare spending were not 2000-2005. Instead,
welfare spending peaked between 1990 and 1995, before dropping by 2.4% of GDP. This
is in contrast to almost all other countries, which had their highest spending years in 2005
(the small exception is Australia, which peaked in 2000 with a modest reduction of 0.7%
by 2005). This early peak is consistent with Canada’s deficit problems in the mid-1990s,
which led to a significant cutback in federal transfer payments for healthcare, postsecondary education and welfare in 1996.320
If national intergovernmental agreements were perfectly correlated with welfare
spending, we would expect to see the trend of agreement formation follow the rise and
fall of spending. This, however, does not seem to be the case. In the period between
1985 and 1994, 20 national intergovernmental agreements were formed in Canada; if
agreements coincide with welfare spending as a percentage of GDP, this should be the
peak period between 1980 and 2005. However, between 1995 and 2004, there were also
20 national agreements, despite the shrinking size of the state.
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Table 5.3: Canadian Welfare Spending as a Percentage of Total Federal Spending321

Canada

1972 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 AVG Rank
50.62 48.82 46.43 45.17 45.18 53.77 51.14 68.24 68.79 53.13
4

Another measure of welfare spending (Table 5-3) can offer a slightly different
perspective. By this measurement, welfare spending as a portion of the federal
government budget didn’t peak until the last year of the data (2007). In fact, from 1972
until 2000, Canadian welfare spending remained between 45.17% (1985) and 53.77%
(1995) of the federal budget; this is a relatively narrow range compared to the increase of
over 17% by 2005. However, as with the OECD’s measurement, the various fluctuations,
including the large increase between 2000 and 2005, do not seem to produce appreciable
differences in agreement formation.
Canada seems to lack a decisive trend in either welfare spending or its relationship
to the number of national intergovernmental agreements formed. Spending has ranked in
the middle of the pack of the seven federations considered and fluctuations in spending
relative to both GDP and total government expenditure have not yielded noticeable
changes in agreement formation. And yet, it would be erroneous to suggest that that the
size and scope of government spending in Canada has no relationship to
intergovernmental agreements. At the very least, the welfare state provides the
opportunity for governments to coordinate policy and possibly form agreements, even if
each additional dollar does not seem to increase the number of agreements. Agreements
pertaining to areas such as health, education and welfare make up more than a quarter of
all agreements formed. This does suggest that the growth of the welfare state in Canada
at least provides some opportunity for agreement formation.
321
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The role of the welfare state is more apparent when considered in concert with the
federal spending power and the Canadian division of powers. Although Canada’s
provinces have access to more financial resources than the subnational governments in
many other federations, they are also responsible for very large and expensive policy
areas such as health and education. By contrast, the federal government possesses greater
financial resources, but fewer commitments, allowing it to have a surplus which can fund
transfer payments. This so-called “vertical fiscal imbalance” provides the impetus for
intergovernmental coordination while Canada’s considerable welfare state provides ample
opportunities for agreements, even if overall spending is not the very highest.

5. The Existence of Lasting Forums for Intergovernmental Relations
The Canadian political system has been criticized in the past for centralizing
power in the hands of the executive and reducing the ability of legislatures to check the
power of the Premiers and the Prime Minister. One consequence of strong executives
however, is that it has empowered the process of executive federalism, placing it as the
main intergovernmental mechanism of Canadian federalism.322 Lacking any serious
forum for intrastate federalism and without a strong tradition of inter-legislative relations,
virtually all intergovernmental business must run through the institutions of executive
federalism.
To address this need, Canada has dozens of intergovernmental bodies, ranging
from peak meetings of first ministers to groupings of senior bureaucrats which come
together more than once a year. Since 1973, the Canadian Intergovernmental Conference
Secretariat (CICS) has acted as the organizing body and secretariat for meetings.
322
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Between 1973 and 1997, they were responsible for providing services and support to
1,832 conferences at the first minister, minister and deputy minister levels.323 If 1973-74
is excluded (CICS’s first year), then there have been an average of 79 senior
intergovernmental meetings each year in Canada.324 These meetings have become even
more frequent in recent years, with another 1256 occurring since 1997, an average of over
96 gatherings per year.325 These meetings cover a wide variety of policy areas. Among
the most common are: aboriginal affairs, agriculture, education, the environment, finance
and the economy, health, human resources and social services, industry,
intergovernmental relations, law and justice, natural resources, trade and transportation.326
Moreover, a number of these meetings, particularly at the ministerial level, have become
increasingly institutionalized, establishing regular schedules for meetings, decisionmaking rules and including bureaucratic support for participants.327
Thus, Canada has a significant number of intergovernmental councils and
meetings at the ministerial and deputy ministerial levels – but what of the peak
institutions? Here, it is something of a “tale of two meetings” as the First Ministers’
Meetings (FMM) and the Annual Premiers’ Conferences (APC) have taken divergent

323

See: Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat, Report to Governments 1996-1997, (Ottawa:
Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat, 1997), http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/CE31-11997E.pdf (accessed October 2, 2011), Appendix C. This is not to say that this is the total of all
intergovernmental meetings in Canada. The CICS organizes and attends a large majority of these meetings,
but by no means all of them. Moreover, the Secretariat is primarily responsible for serving meetings at the
highest levels and thus, gatherings of officials below the deputy minister level are not included.
324
The Lowest total is found in 1974-75 with 42 meetings, while the highest occurred in 1985-86, when
there were 130 such gatherings.
325
Data taken from Annual Reports found on the CICS website, available at:
http://www.scics.gc.ca/menu_e.html .
326
Ibid.
327
Julie Simmons, “Securing the Threads of Cooperation in the Tapestry of Intergovernmental Relations:
Does the Institutionalization of Ministerial Conferences Matter?” in Reconsidering the Institutions of
Canadian Federalism, ed. J. Peter Meekison, Hamish Telford, Harvey Lazar, (Montreal & Kingston:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 291.

162

paths.328 The APC has become an increasingly frequent and institutionalized body,
especially when compared to its FMM counterpart. Between 1960 - when the practice of
holding annual meetings between the Premiers arose – and 2002, at least one APC was
held each year. In contrast, during the same period there were eight years in which no
FMM was held.329 Recent data confirms the increasing disparity in regularity: between
2000 and 2010, only 12 official FMM were held, while there more than 43 Premiers’
meetings.330 This is at least in part due to how these meetings are organized. APC are
called by the agreement of the Premiers to discuss common interests, with a rotating chair
which spreads the burden of organization and agenda-setting. In contrast, FMMs are
scheduled solely based on the invitation of the Prime Minister. If the federal government
does not have any pressing business that it wants to address in a national – and highly
publicized forum – then it can choose to simply not schedule a meeting. This reflects
reluctance by Ottawa to give the provinces “a national platform from which their political
status can be enhanced to bring pressure on the federal government.”331 While these
meetings do tend to become more frequent at times – generally during rounds of megaconstitutional negotiations – their “ad hoc” status means that they do not have the same
degree of institutionalization as a forum like the Council of Australian Governments.
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If First Ministers’ Meetings have been less institutionalized, the Premiers have
charted the opposite course. The Premiers meet like clockwork each year, with at least
one formal APC and usually a few other meetings, sometimes concerning specific policy
areas. More recently, Quebec Premier Jean Charest has led the charge towards even
greater institutionalization and permanence through the establishment of the Council of
the Federation. Since 2003, the Council has served as the peak institution for
interprovincial and territorial relations, replacing the APC. It has regular meetings (at
least twice a year), its own secretariat and a mission to encourage closer relations between
the provinces.
Taken as a whole, Canada’s system of intergovernmental forums and meetings is
large, active and essential to intergovernmental policy making. At the ministerial and
deputy-ministerial level, there are a number of bodies and dozens of meetings per year.
At the level of peak intergovernmental institutions, there are two major bodies, the First
Ministers’ Meetings and the Annual Premiers’ Conferences/Council of the Federation.
While the FMM may be less institutionalized than its solely-provincial counterpart, it is
clear that both of these forums, as well as ministerial councils, are important contributors
to intergovernmental agreements. They provide numerous opportunities every year for
the discussion of mutual concerns and the ability to engage in coordination of
intergovernmental relations, sometimes through national agreements. Even the FMM are
frequent enough to have a clear impact on intergovernmental relations as a number of
them end with the formation of a formal agreement.332 As such, Canada’s large web of
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intergovernmental forums provides ample opportunities for the formation of national
agreements and the large numbers of agreements seem to confirm this.

6. The Number of Subnational Governments at the State/Provincial Level
Canada has ten subnational units known as provinces along with another three
jurisdictions known as territories. While the territories elect their own legislatures and
have their own Premiers to represent them in intergovernmental relations, they are not
endowed with the full constitutional powers that provinces possess. Territorial
governments only have access to powers devolved to them by the federal government and
rely upon federal transfers for nearly all of their funding.333 While they have become
increasingly active in Canadian intergovernmental relations, including consenting to some
agreements, their reliance upon the federal government for jurisdiction and financing put
them in a much different position than the provinces. Because of this, they have been
excluded from the count of subnational governments.
With ten provinces, Canada ranks exactly in the middle of this analysis (fourth).
Given the frequency of intergovernmental meetings (as discussed in the previous section)
and the large number of national agreements, it is clear that this number of subnational
governments is not a sizeable impediment to agreement formation. Moreover, as thirdplace Germany has sixteen subnational governments and a large number of agreements, it
is clear that any threshold at which significant coordination problems might set in is
higher than the ten provincial governments in Canada.
One other element worth discussing under the heading of subnational
governments is the role of Quebec in intergovernmental agreement formation. The
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examples of the United Kingdom and Switzerland demonstrate that having subnational
governments which represent a particular linguistic or cultural minority may exacerbate
the coordination dilemma based on the number of governments. Given the extensive
record of national agreement formation in Canada, this is clearly not the case. This is
likely due to a number of important considerations regarding Canada and Quebec, as
compared to other federations. Unlike either the UK or Switzerland, Quebec’s French
population is the only major cultural or linguistic cleavage between Canada’s
provinces.334 In the UK, each subnational government represents a different nationality,
while in Switzerland, not only are there linguistic distinctions between the French,
German and Italian-speaking cantons, but also a long standing religious division between
Protestants and Roman Catholics. In Canada, Quebec’s unique character provides a
single, clear cultural and linguistic cleavage to be managed, as opposed to the multiple
differences found in other federations.
Quebec’s distinct interests could affect the formation of national
intergovernmental agreements in one of two ways. In the first, Quebec could discourage
agreements by pursuing an agenda different from the rest of Canada. This can cause
Quebec to opt-out of an otherwise national consensus (as was the case with the Social
Union Framework Agreement) or pursue a separate, parallel arrangement (such as the
Quebec Pension Plan).335 The second way Quebec potentially affects agreement
formation is by encouraging them. Given Quebec’s sometimes rocky relationship with
the federal government and even other provinces, intergovernmental agreements have
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been seen by Quebec as creating institutionalization and certainty within Canadian
intergovernmental relations. Quebec has long complained about sudden shifts in federal
arrangements, leading to a desire for more permanence and predictability. The formation
of the Council of the Federation in 2003 – the institutionalization of the Annual Premiers’
Conference – is a recent example of how Quebec can lead the charge for
intergovernmental institutionalization. Although it is impossible to determine every
agreement where this has occurred, it provides a possibility for at least some instances of
agreement formation.
Given that this study uses a 90% threshold for determining national-level
intergovernmental agreements, Quebec’s role in discouraging these accords has not been
measured, while any agreements in which it is an impetus have been included. For the
purpose of this study, given the threshold, Quebec’s distinct cultural and linguistic
character has the effect of encouraging national agreement formation, as opposed to
discouraging it.

7. The Existence of a Body for Intrastate Federalism
If it were not for the United Kingdom, Canada would be the best of example of a
federation with a total lack of intrastate federalism. Given that Canada’s Senate was
modeled on the British House of Lords and has gone without significant reform since
Confederation (although the Conservative government under Prime Minister Stephen
Harper has made it a stated policy to introduce elections for Senators)336, it should not be
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surprising that it fails to serve as a useful forum for the representation of provincial
interests at the centre.
The Senate’s key departure from the example of the House of Lords was the
allocation of seats based upon regional equality. As was discussed in the section on
Canada’s government, this was a necessary concession to the Maritime colonies, as they
felt they would be overwhelmed by the influence of Ontario and Quebec in a system that
was purely based on representation by population. Despite these intentions, this regional
distribution did not prove to be the basis for the effective representation of provincial
viewpoints within federal political institutions. This lack of intrastate federalism is a
direct consequence of another decision reached at Confederation: the selection method for
Senators.
While the smaller provinces may have won concessions in the distribution of
Senators, they lost ground when it was decided that the Governor General should select
them, on the advice of the federal cabinet. This has put the selection of Senators into the
portfolio of the Prime Minister, who is under no obligation to consider the wishes of the
provinces in this process. Instead, Prime Ministers have used this opportunity to fill the
Senate with long serving party members or to honour private citizens. This prerogative
even allows the Prime Minister to appoint members of his own party to the Senate as
representatives of provinces where the federally governing party has little to no support.
Although it would be inaccurate to claim that this produces a chamber of party drones
who simply follow the wishes of party leaders in the House of Commons – the
appointment of Senators until age 75 grants them significant latitude – it eliminates most
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possibilities for the representation of the provincial governments and arguably, provincial
interests.
The crucial element in defining intrastate federalism is in the selection method. If
some of the processes of intergovernmental relations are going to be resolved through
federal political institutions, then representatives must be able to speak on behalf of
subnational governments (full intrastate federalism) or at least represent the interests and
politics of their constituent unit (partial intrastate federalism). Clearly, Canada’s Senate
embodies neither of these possibilities. Until this or some other reform is implemented
however, Canada’s lack of intrastate federalism will continue to force provincial interests
and intergovernmental collaboration to be addressed outside the institutions of the federal
government. This is consistent with the large number of national intergovernmental
agreements found in Canada and the pivotal role that executive federalism plays in
Canadian intergovernmental relations. Without a stronger role for the provinces, the
Senate will continue to serve as chamber for sober second thought, but not one that
reduces the formation of intergovernmental agreements.

Conclusion
Canada is among the most active federations in forming intergovernmental
agreements in this comparative analysis, forming 92 national accords between 1945 and
2009, an average of 1.46 per year. This makes Canada the second-most prolific in terms
of agreement creation and in a group with Australia and Germany as the most active in
forming new intergovernmental institutions. Thus, Canada's institutional context should
possess a significant number of factors conducive to agreement formation and limited
inhibitors and alternatives.
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The Canadian federation's institutional features provide ample encouragement for
intergovernmental collaboration, and thus, agreements. With its strong provinces, Canada
is the most decentralized of any of the seven cases compared. This leaves many areas and
tasks outside of the unilateral control of the federal government and increases the
importance of intergovernmental coordination. Further opportunities are presented by the
prominent role played by the federal spending power. While one of the smallest in strict
quantitative terms, Canada’s federal government relies on its financial resources to open
up new avenues for national intergovernmental agreements that might otherwise be
unavailable. Much like Australia, the Canadian welfare state is not large by comparison to
some of the other cases, notably the European federations, yet it still serves as the basis
for a certain degree of intergovernmental coordination. All these conducive factors are
tied together and enhanced by a robust set of institutions devoted to the conduct of
intergovernmental relations, with meetings numbering in the dozens every year. Despite
little contribution from overlap, Canada has a strong set of factors which encourage
intergovernmental agreements.
If the features that are conducive to coordination between Canada’s governments
can be said to be amongst the strongest of the seven federations studied, the inhibitors and
alternatives are the exact opposite. While Canada’s ten provinces (and three territorial
governments) are more numerous than Australia’s and are the median case in this study,
this seems to provide no difficulties for coordination, judging by the frequency of
meetings between representatives. Moreover, Canada’s Senate provides no amount of
intrastate federalism and thus no substitute to the normal processes of intergovernmental
relations and the creation of agreements.
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With strongly conducive features, virtually no inhibitors and no alternatives to
intergovernmental agreements, Canada’s institutional framework provides a healthy
environment for agreement creation:
CON (Strong) – INH (Weak-none) – ALT (None) = High IGA Formation
As Canada’s formula is identical to Australia, it is not surprising that this federation is
also fully consistent with the predictions of the theory. Canada has a number of factors
which contribute to intergovernmental agreement formation. Even ones that initially
seem to support fewer agreements (overlap) are co-opted by a system of
intergovernmental relations which has encouraged the formation of intergovernmental
agreements for decades and relies on these institutions as an essential part of defining
pan-Canadian politics. Canada provides another example of a particular institutional
environment favourable to the production of national intergovernmental agreements.
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Chapter Six: Germany

Source: CIA World Factbook

Formal Name: Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland)
National Capital: Berlin
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Subnational Governments: 16 states known as Länder: Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria,
Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,
Niedersachsen, North Rhine-Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland, Sachsen, SachsenAnhalt, Schleswig-Holstein, Thueringen.337

Introduction:
While the history of the German people may be long, the modern incarnation of
the German state is relatively young. In 1949, the Federal Republic emerged from the
post-World War II wreckage of occupied Germany along with its communist counterpart,
the German Democratic Republic. Despite the threat of Soviet invasion and its recent
experience with the totalitarian Third Reich, the Federal Republic of Germany developed
an enduring system of cooperative federalism that emphasized coordination between
governments. This arrangement has even proven durable enough to allow for the
absorption of five East German länder into the existing structure of the Federal Republic
in 1990.
Today, Germany remains the most populous country in the European Union, with
the largest economy. Even with so much focus on Germany’s place in Europe today,
federalism remains an important consideration as evidenced by the recent reforms in
2006. Germany remains not only an interesting case for any study of federalism, but an
important model for emerging federations. 338
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History
Although the modern German federation is relatively new, Germany’s experience
with the concept of divided sovereignty is much more extensive. Throughout the last one
thousand years, the periods in which the German people have been subject to a single,
unified authority have been rare and short-lived; instead, various forms of multilevel
governance have been the norm. The longest lasting of these was the Holy Roman
Empire, which emerged from the empire of Charlemagne to reign over most of central
Europe and Northern Italy at its widest extent. Unlike its namesake, however, the Holy
Roman Empire was more of a loose confederation of hundreds of small states and
principalities than a centralized and unified state. Initially, the individual states did not
possess full sovereignty, although they did have a great deal of autonomy.339 By the 14th
century however, the constituent units of the Empire had grown in power: the Reichstag –
the Imperial Diet - had important authority to make laws and even set out a basic
constitution, while the Golden Bull of 1356 established that all future Emperors would be
chosen by the rulers of seven leading states, known as Electors.340 The divided
sovereignty of medieval Germany was further complicated by the prevalence of the
feudal system within most states as well as the emergence of “circles” – regional
groupings within the Empire.341
While the balance of power between the Emperor and the princes shifted
constantly, the Empire remained remarkably durable, even surviving the divisive Thirty
Years’ War (1618-48) which was fought mainly on Imperial territory, with the states as
339
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the principal belligerents. It was during this period that some of the stronger states
managed to expand their territories – a slow progression towards larger states that would
eventually provide the basis for the future länder.
The Peace of Westphalia 1648 proved to be the beginning of the end for the
Empire, especially for its role as a model for early federalism. The individual states were
recognized as sovereign while the power of the Emperor was increasingly confined to
what he could draw on from his own territories.342 In spite of this decline, the Holy
Roman Empire did not quickly break up. It was not officially dissolved until 1806 when
Napoleon Bonaparte defeated the last Emperor and forced his abdication. This led to
many of the former states forming the Rhine Confederation – effectively a puppet of
Napoleon’s France - and eventually the German Confederation (Deutscher Bund) in 1813,
following the defeat of Napoleon in Russia.343
The German propensity to adopt multilateral and confederal arrangements was
soon driven off course by the rise of Prussia. Throughout the twilight of the Holy Roman
Empire in the 18th century, Prussia rose from a small duchy in what is now Poland to
vying with Austria for the dominant position in Central Europe. The Austro-Prussian
War of 1866 concluded with Prussia gaining ascendancy in central Europe and Austria
losing most of its influence in Germany. This led to the formation of the new North
German Confederation with an expanded Prussia as the leading member – the foundation
for the unified German state which was formed in 1871.344
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The German Empire (also known as the Second German Reich), founded in 1871,
was neither fully democratic nor federal, by today`s standards, but it did perpetuate the
German tradition of enshrining federal elements in government. The Bundesrat continued
from the North German Confederation, allowing each of the 25 states a weighted vote on
national issues. The individual states maintained control of some important matters such
as religion, education and law enforcement, as well as the responsibility to administer and
implement much of national law.345
Given this continued commitment to federalism and multilevel governance in
Germany, it is interesting that the post-World War I Weimar Republic eroded many of
these institutions. The new republic was a constitutionally a federation, but it was
founded upon the principle of popular sovereignty, as opposed to an association of states,
and was founded with a more centralized constitution that would help aid
reconstruction.346 More legislative powers were concentrated at the centre and the new
Reichsrat (which replaced the Bundesrat) was granted only a suspensory veto.347 One
notable development for German federalism was the evolution of the German subnational
governments between 1919 and 1932. For the first time, they became known as länder
and were reduced in number from 25 to 17.348 This centralization was only a mild
precursor to the intense concentration of power that occurred following the rise of
National Socialism in 1933. Through the dual means of violence and intimidation, as
well as national legislative authority, the Nazis centralized power in Berlin and the party.
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The länder were eliminated as autonomous, democratic units, becoming only
administrative districts for Berlin.349
Following the destruction of World War II, the relatively short-lived existence of
a unitary Germany was ended, as the country was divided and occupied by the Allied
powers. The occupying powers used their authority not only to dismantle the centralized
infrastructure of the Third Reich, but also to restore and reorganize the länder.350 When it
became clear that the Soviet Union was developing its area of occupied Germany on an
independent path, the Western Allies (France, the United Kingdom and the United States)
called upon leaders from the länder governments to form a committee to draft a “basic
law” for a new federation.351 In 1949, after months of negotiations, it was decided that
this document would become the constitution for the new Federal Republic of Germany
(known colloquially as West Germany), while the Soviet-occupied east formed a
communist state known as the German Democratic Republic. Initially federal and
democratic in character, the GDR quickly revealed its autocratic nature by effectively
eliminating the East German länder in 1952.352
Famously, this division was not permanent. The collapse of European
communism and the Soviet bloc was dramatically signalled by the fall of the Berlin Wall
in 1989. The GDR restored the five länder governments of the East and entered into
negotiations with representatives from the Federal Republic. A reunification treaty was
349
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signed in August 1990 and ratified by both the West and East German legislatures in
September of that year. On October 3, 1990, German reunification was finally realized.
It is important to remember (for the continuity of this analysis), that the unification of the
Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic did not create a third, new country.
Rather, the five länder of East Germany were granted entry into the existing Federal
Republic. Thus, the existing constitutional and international order was maintained (with
alterations to allow for the representation of the new länder in federal institutions); in
technical terms, reunification saw the Federal Republic of Germany expand, rather than
the formation of a new country.353

Government and Political Structure
The Basic Law enshrines Germany as a parliamentary republic, with a bicameral
federal legislature. The principle of responsible government is central to this system,
similar to parliamentary democracies in the British tradition. Germany, however, departs
from the British model in a couple of notable ways. One, as a republic, Germany’s head
of state is the Federal President (Bundespräsident) as opposed to a monarch or their
representative. However, unlike France or the United States, Germany’s president plays a
symbolic role and rarely exercises power independently (much like the role of the
monarch in the United Kingdom). Two, Germany’s second chamber, the Bundesrat,
serves as a chamber for subnational representation and includes direct representatives of
the state governments. This structure causes the Bundesrat to play two roles in the
German parliament. One is as the customary "check and balance" against the decisions of
353
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popular representation in the lower house. The other is as a conduit for the interests of
the länder to be expressed within national politics and legislation. The effects of this
dynamic on intergovernmental agreements will be discussed as greater length later in this
chapter.
The lower house of the federal parliament, the Bundestag, serves as the chamber
for popular representation. Elections occur every four years and 598 members are elected
in a system of mixed proportional representation. Half of these are elected in local
constituencies, known as direct mandates, while the remaining 299 are drawn from party
lists and allocated proportionally based on popular vote totals.354 What is interesting
about this arrangement is that unlike some systems of proportional representation, it does
not simply add power to the national party organizations. The rules and organization for
candidates pursuing direct mandates are determined by the party organization in the
länder, while the party lists are determined by the national leadership. This gives both the
state and national arms of political parties an important role in elections to the Bundestag
and adds an element of federalism even to elections in the lower house.355
In contrast, the Bundesrat or Federal Council is explicitly a chamber for
federalism and the representation of subnational interests. Germany’s Bundesrat is often
held up as archetype for intrastate federalism as it allows for the direct participation of the
354
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länder governments in the federal legislative process. Delegates are chosen by the
government of each länd and are generally members of cabinet (senior bureaucrats will
often participate in committees, but cannot vote in the plenary sessions).356 As such, the
Bundesrat is a “continuous body” – members change as governments at the state level
change or choose to replace their representatives.357 Delegates to the Bundesrat are not
independent in any sense, possessing an imperative mandate: they are required to act only
on the instruction of their länd government and cast their votes as a block. In cases of
one-party majority government in the länder, this process is relatively straightforward.
However, in the frequent instances of coalition governments, there must be agreement
within the länder's delegation to the Bundesrat, even if multiple parties are represented.
When a consensus cannot be reached, delegations must abstain as they are not permitted
to split their vote. These abstentions are often given increased importance due to the rules
governing votes in the Bundesrat. In order to approve a bill or motion, there must be a
majority of the total number of votes in the Bundesrat, not simply a majority amongst
those casting a vote on any particular measure.358 Thus, abstaining from a bill is
essentially a “no vote”; causing bills to fail that might otherwise have passed under the
rules of other legislative bodies.
Unlike the American or Australian Senates, the German länder do not have equal
representation in the Bundesrat. Rather, each länd is guaranteed a minimum of three
votes, with additional votes granted for passing certain population thresholds: states with
more than two million citizens get four votes, those over six million get five and any over
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seven million receive six votes.359 Thus, while the Bundesrat is not a chamber that
attempts to achieve proportionate representation, it likewise does not enshrine an equal
voice for each of the länder.
The Bundesrat also departs from the example of other federal upper chambers in
its authority. Instead of consistent rules governing the Bundesrat’s role on all legislation,
its authority is dependent on the type of matter being considered. On “normal”
legislation, including the budget and central financial legislation, the Bundesrat has only a
suspensory veto which can be overturned by a vote in the Bundestag.360 This requires a
simple majority for most cases; however, if the Bundesrat’s objection was greater than a
two-thirds majority, the Bundestag’s override likewise requires a minimum two-thirds
majority.361 However, on matters pertaining to legislation affecting the länder’s powers
or administration of laws, the financial arrangements between the länder and the federal
government or constitutional provisions that concern the länder (known collectively as
Zustimmungsgesetze), the Bundesrat possesses an absolute veto. It is difficult to be more
specific (while retaining any brevity) regarding the extent of the Zustimmungsgesetze as
there is no single list that clearly defines which matters apply – instead, there are specific
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stipulations throughout the Basic Law.362 What is clear is that the Bundesrat has veto
powers over a great deal of legislation: beginning in the 1950s, at least 40% of all federal
legislation required Bundesrat approval, rising to 60% by the 1990s.363 One of the major
thrusts of the recent federalism reforms in 2006 was to reduce the percentage of
legislation that can be vetoed in the Bundesrat from this high point back to around 40% in
order to make it easier to pass bills.364
As a parliamentary system, the German federal executive is drawn from and
responsible to the Bundestag. Following an election, the first sitting of the Bundestag
elects the Chancellor from amongst its members. Because Germany’s system of
proportional representation almost never grants a majority to one party in the Bundestag,
the election results are determined by earlier negotiations between the parties when a
coalition is usually formed by the largest party and one or more smaller partners. Once
the Chancellor is selected, he or she nominates members of the federal cabinet for the
President to appoint – these are also determined in the coalition negotiations. Once
assembled, the Chancellor and the Federal cabinet are responsible for introducing
legislation, most notably the budget. While the Cabinet must maintain the confidence of
the Bundesrat, as an interesting change from classic parliamentary tradition, the
government cannot be defeated unless the Bundestag can agree on a replacement. Thus,
only in rare circumstances do German Bundestags last for less than a full term of four
years.365
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The governments of the länder are similar to the national parliament, with the
principle exception that they are all unicameral. Each of länd has its own state
constitution which stipulates the organization of their governments. Broadly speaking,
the sixteen länder have similar legislatures – all are parliamentary systems, elected by
some form of proportional representation, though some of these are pure PR systems and
some are mixed.366 Similar to the federal government, the legislature votes for a Prime
Minister who then appoints a cabinet. One notable difference between the legislatures in
the länder and the federal Bundestag is that at the state level, one-party majorities are a
possibility and this eliminates the needs for a coalition arrangement.367 Another
important difference is that the legislatures in the länder have fewer legislative duties,
while the administrations have more responsibilities; this is caused by the way in which
Germany’s Basic Law divides power between the orders of government (something
discussed at greater length in the section on overlap below).
On the whole, Germany’s political institutions have a number of shared
characteristics. The federal and länder legislatures are parliamentary, elected by a method
of proportional representation. This tends to produce coalition governments in order to
command a majority of members in the legislature. Moreover, at the national level, the
länder have a strong role through both the Bundesrat and the overlapping party system –
all elements that reflect the interdependent and federal character of Germany’s politics.
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Intergovernmental Agreements in Germany
Germany has two types of formal intergovernmental agreements, based upon how
they are concluded.368 Executive agreements, known as verwaltungsabkommen, are
negotiated between the Prime Ministers and Ministers of the länder and require no direct
involvement of the legislatures.369 Intergovernmental contracts or agreements, known as
intraföderale staatsverträge, are effectively treaties between the länder. Once negotiated,
they involve the passage of a law by all the signatories.370
The legal status of both verwaltungsabkommen and staatsverträge was debated in
the 1960s as the Basic Law stipulates only that there is federal law and länd law, with the
former taking primacy in a conflict. By the 1970s, it was generally concluded that both
agreements were formal; in particular, Vedder argues that staatsverträge occupy
something of a “third level” of law, above the level of the subnational governments, but
below federal law.371
With that in mind, how many written, national agreements can be found in
Germany? Unfortunately, there is not a perfect, current registry available for both
verwaltungsabkommen and staatsverträge. Thankfully, Christoph Vedder in his book
Intraföderale Staatsverträge compiled a list of all of these treaties from the founding of
the Federal Republic up until 1995. In the 45 years between 1950 and 1995, 40 national
staatsverträge have been created at a rate of 0.89 per year. While there is no
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corresponding database for verwaltungsabkommen available, Vedder notes that there are
at least as many of these executive agreements, and likely more.372
Looking only at the record of staatsverträge formation Germany would
effectively be tied for third with the United Kingdom and behind Canada and Australia.
However, if one makes the logical assumption (based on the available information) that
there are at least as many verwaltungsabkommen, then that total can be doubled to 80
national agreements in 45 years, or 1.78 agreements per year. Using this figure would
make Germany the leader in this study in the formation of intergovernmental agreements.
It is clear that formal, national intergovernmental agreements are an important and
prolific feature of German intergovernmental relations. The remainder of this chapter
will attempt to identify those factors of German federalism that help to encourage the
formation of such agreements.

1. The Degree of Overlap that Exists in the Constitution
If there is one element to German federalism that can be said to be unambiguous,
it is the high degree of overlap and shared responsibilities between the federal
government and the länder. Unlike the models of dual and classical federalism found in
countries such as Canada and the United States, the Federal Republic intentionally
adopted a system of cooperative federalism: rather than allocate legislative and
administrative powers over policy areas solely to one order of government, the German
Basic Law instead gives some responsibility for most tasks to both.373 Generally, the
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Basic Law gives legislative primacy to the federal government, while providing the
länder with the authority over the implementation of national and state laws; this is
sometimes referred to as “administrative federalism”374. As Kramer puts it: “the German
tradition... is characterized by mutual connections, interconnections, and overlapping of
the centralized and decentralized state units.”375
Watts’ comparison of constitutional competencies provides a clear indication of
the level of constitutional overlap produced by the German system of federalism. Of the
47 policy areas identified by Watts, 35 (75%) have some role for both the national and
subnational governments. This is the clear leader of all the federations in this
comparison, a full 5% percent ahead of second-place Australia (at 70%) and well ahead
of third-place South Africa (60%).376 With the exception of some of the federal
government’s international responsibilities, such as diplomatic relations and defence,
Germany’s Basic Law allows for both the national and subnational governments to have a
role in almost every policy area.
This overlap is deepened by Germany’s particular system of administrative
federalism. To use Canada as an example, constitutional overlap is primarily caused by a
broad interpretation of the division of powers. For example, while education has been
clearly established as a provincial responsibility, the federal government has justified its
involvement in post-secondary education funding partly through its authority over
training and the labour market, and partly through its concern with research and
development. Thus, while both orders of government may be active within a field (and
374
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may desire some means of coordination), they can technically act in parallel. For most
areas of overlap in Germany, however, coordination between governments is essential as
both orders are required to enact any policy.377 To use the same example of postsecondary education, the Federal Republic creates framework legislation for the funding
and regulation of colleges, universities and training programs, setting out funding,
curriculum and teaching guidelines, and targets for research and graduation rates. The
länder must then work within this legislation to provide education to students. Federal
lawmakers and planners must work with ministers and bureaucrats in the länder in order
to see their laws implemented, while these same state officials look to the national
government to provide oversight, coordination and funding. This interdependence
between the federal government and the länder is so complex and pervasive that it has
been criticized for delaying needed government action as well as making democratic
accountability nearly impossible.378 This became serious enough that in 2006, a “grand
coalition” was formed by Germany’s two leading parties: the Christian Democrats (CDU)
and the Social Democrats (SPD). The coalition introduced and passed the Federalism
Reform Act 2006, which attempted to clarify the roles of the federal government and the
länder, reduce the number of matters that the Bundesrat could veto and grant the länder
more autonomy in the implementation of federal programs.379 While it remains to be
seen how much of an effect this Act will have, the fact that it was deemed necessary at all
is testament to the intertwined nature of German national and subnational governments.
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To manage the existing overlap, some of the required coordination occurs through
national legislation and the negotiations between the federal government and the
Bundesrat, but this is clearly not sufficient to address the level of overlap that is found in
Germany. This is especially true in areas where there is overlap between governments,
but where federal legislation fails to create a national consensus, such as media and
telecommunications. In such instances, the länder have often worked amongst
themselves to form such a consensus using intergovernmental agreements.
This amounts to a federation in which the vast majority of government business
requires the direct involvement of the national and subnational governments to address
issues of both vertical and horizontal coordination. Moreover, this is not a case of
governments acting within the same policy field independently, but rather governments
that must work together in a coordinated manner to enact any policies. As such, even
though the federal government’s broad legislative powers provide it with the means to
coordinate governmental action through national laws, the level of overlap is so great as
to allow for other opportunities for coordination via intergovernmental agreements.

2. The Degree of Centralization in the Constitutional Division of Powers
Attempting to assess the degree of centralization in the German federation is not a
simple matter. When the Federal Republic was founded in 1949, the Western Allies that
sponsored the formation of this new state were very concerned that placing too much
power in the national government might assist in the rise of a new autocratic government.
The Constitution of the Weimar republic had centralized more authority in the federal
government than the pre-1918 German Empire, which some of the Allies felt was
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exploited during the rise of the National Socialists.380 The very process that was used to
create the Basic Law sought to correct this by building the state upon the foundation of
the existing länder, as opposed to a national popular assembly. This push for
decentralization was countered by the concern among many delegates that a weak central
state would not be able to effectively reconstruct the still-devastated country, create
effective national standards and government programs, or provide security in the face of
rising Cold War tensions.381
The end result of this tension was the lack of a clear victory for either side, at least
initially. Indeed, the Basic Law’s division of powers can be primarily characterized as
overlapping and interdependent, rather than centralized or decentralized. If the degree of
centralization is solely defined by the balance of exclusively-held jurisdictions between
the national and subnational government, Germany clearly could not be deemed very
centralized.
Of the 47 policy areas surveyed by Watts in his comparison of federal constitutions (see
Appendix H), only 10 (21%) are exclusive powers of the federal government. This the
second lowest total of the seven federations in this study, with only seventh-place
Australia (13%) having a smaller area of federal jurisdiction.382 Thus Germany’s central
government has fewer areas of exclusive constitutional jurisdiction than other federations
that have been considered “decentralized” by one measure or another, including Canada,
Switzerland and the United States.
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Despite this low level of federal exclusivity, Germany is still seen by some as a
more centralized federation, with Schneider going so far as to term it a “unitary federal
system”.383 While there are a number of arguments that might be made in support of this
contention, three have specific importance to the relationship between centralization and
the formation of national intergovernmental agreements. First, according to Watts’
comparison of constitutions, Germany, while lacking a high level of federal exclusivity,
has almost no state exclusivity at all. Only two areas (4%) were found to fall solely into
the länder’s jurisdiction: municipal affairs and primary and secondary education; only
South Africa has fewer areas of exclusive subnational jurisdiction. This amounts to a
very small area in which the länder would avoid coordination through national legislation
and thus, be more likely to rely upon formal agreements. As such, the division of powers
suggests that while Germany is not especially centralized, it is certainly not
decentralized.384
The lack of a large area of exclusive subnational jurisdiction is especially
important when examining the second element of centralization: the ability of federal
legislation to establish national standards in areas of concurrent jurisdiction. Article 31 of
the Basic Law stipulates that in all cases, “Federal law shall take precedence over Länd
law”. Given that 75% of enumerated and implied powers in Germany are held
concurrently by federal and state governments, this, in theory, gives the federal
government the final authority over 96% of all policy areas. According to Schneider, this
has led to an increasing degree of centralization – especially as the courts have deemed
383
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some disputes over concurrent jurisdictions to be political matters, and thus, not
justiciable.385
Lastly, it is also important to acknowledge that, unlike the Swiss case, German
administrative federalism grants less autonomy to the länder to interpret and enact federal
law. In the Swiss federation, federal law acts, in most instances, as a piece of framework
legislation – laying the foundation for a government program, but leaving great latitude to
the subnational governments to interpret and enact it.386 In contrast, administrative
federalism in Germany is not quite so flexible. Some federal legislation fulfills a role
similar to the Swiss model, establishing basic guidelines for a program and then leaving it
in the hands of the länder to administer. The Federal Republic, however, also possesses
the ability to stipulate more direct regulations and in the case of direct orders, even allow
for constant oversight and management of the länder in the execution of their
responsibilities.387 The greater amount of coordination and regulation achieved via
federal legislation, the fewer opportunities that arise for intergovernmental agreements to
fulfill the same role.
With such potential for centralization, it seems inconsistent that Germany would
be so prolific in forming national intergovernmental agreements. However, it is not so
much an inconsistency as an oversimplification – the three factors that encourage
centralization are checked by several caveats. First and foremost, the role of the
Bundesrat acts as a check on unfettered federal power. While the Bundesrat also serves a
partisan purpose, due to Germany's integrated party system, the länder's interests are
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represented. Federal legislation that directly affects the länder’s responsibilities must
have their approval to take effect. Second, the area in which the länder are competent is
quite large, even if most if it is held concurrently with the federal government. The Basic
Law grants the länder the reserve power while allocating only a small area exclusively to
the federal government. As such, the länder possess significant legislative room to
undertake their own agendas. Even if the federal government “crowds out” some of the
opportunities for agreements via national legislation, the länder have a large and flexible
jurisdiction that will present other possibilities for coordination. Finally, while
Germany’s version of administrative federalism may be more centralized than the Swiss
model, this is not to say it establishes a quasi-unitary system. In particular, matters with
particular local connotations such as education and culture exhibit a significant degree of
subnational autonomy.388 Moreover, the extensive size of the German government (as
will be discussed later) provides ample opportunities for all types of government action,
federal, state or concurrent.
Taken together, it is clear that Germany’s federal government possesses a great
deal of authority and has the ability to create national consensus through its legislative
authority. This is not, however, an unfettered authority as the länder possess some
control through the Bundesrat, broad residual powers and at least some flexibility through
their administrative responsibilities. On balance, it seems more accurate to define
Germany’s division of powers as overlapping and interdependent, as opposed to truly
centralized.

3. The Size and Status of the Federal Spending Power
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Much like the division of powers, the size and status of the spending power in the
Federal Republic of Germany is a complicated issue. The system of cooperative
federalism creates a complex web of fiscal federalism in which both the national and
subnational orders of government are intricately tied together in raising revenue, funding
government programs and developing infrastructure.389 There are very few whollyindependent revenue sources that either government can access, while most spending
must be coordinated as it involves outlays from both orders of government.
All other things being equal, such a complicated system of overlapping fiscal roles
might provide fertile ground for national intergovernmental agreements the way in which
overlapping legislative and administrative responsibilities do. However, the regulation of
most fiscal powers, including taxation, spending and borrowing, is governed by federal
law, with the states having input through the Bundesrat. In terms of raising revenue, the
main sources of taxation – personal and corporate income tax along with the value added
tax – are shared between the federal government and the länder.390 However, unlike other
federal countries in which the tax room is shared, but each order of government is free (in
theory) to adjust their own rates as appropriate, the taxes in Germany are collected
together and the rates, along with the respective shares of the revenue, are determined by
federal law.391 As this is a matter which affects the länder, it requires the approval of the
Bundesrat to pass, allowing for any negotiation to happen within that chamber.
Moreover, because revenues are split from a single source based upon formulas found in
federal law, this eliminates the need for many (but not all) of the vertical transfers found
389
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in other federations. This is demonstrated in Table 6.1, which shows the small percentage
of länder revenue that is reliant on direct federal transfers. It is the lowest amongst all
seven federations in this comparison.

Table 6.1: Percentage of Subnational Revenue from Federal Grants (Germany)392
1972 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 AVG Rank
Germany 18.25 20.20 17.75 15.51 16.09 17.05 16.56 15.98 14.85 16.92
7

Similarly, much of government spending is dependent upon federal legislation and
the länder responsibilities to enact laws. This can come in multiple forms, including
framework legislation that the länder can interpret, national programs which are funded
via joint revenues, specific grants or transfers, as well as projects with joint funding.393
This is to list only the most common types of government activities which involve both
the national and subnational governments. Again, most of this occurs through the
national legislative process.
One final element that helps to depress the effect of the spending power in
encouraging intergovernmental agreements is the lucrative equalization system that
underpins German fiscal federalism. The joint taxes are themselves distributed via a
complex formula, which then allows for a system of equalization between the länder.394
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This program brings all länder up to approximately 90% of the average fiscal capacity,
while a further set of grants from the federal government (with minimal conditions), raise
this to 97.5%.395 This mostly-automatic system of equalization leaves less room for
discretionary federal spending that might serve as the impetus for intergovernmental
agreement formation.
For the spending power to have a significant effect on the rate of
intergovernmental agreement formation, certain conditions must occur. The subnational
governments must have jurisdiction (exclusive or leading) in areas of national importance
while the federal government needs to possess enough revenues to enable financial
transfers. In Germany, however, there is a tangled web of funding and legislative
responsibilities. The national government does not have to “buy” entry into particular
policy fields – with rare exception, they already have access. Complex funding and
equalization arrangements, most of which are non-discretionary and governed by statutes,
further reduce the possibility of more grants. Thus, while it is not impossible that the
spending power might be the impetus for a few intergovernmental agreements, it appears
to be a poor explanation for Germany’s extensive record of agreement formation.

4. The Size and Scope of the Welfare State
While many of the other features of German federalism remain a complicated web
of overlapping jurisdiction and shared finances, one area in which it is unabashedly
straightforward is welfare spending and the size of government. Germany was the
originator of the modern welfare state under the Chancellorship of Otto von Bismarck and
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this policy leadership seems to have continued in the amount the Federal Republic spends
on government programs.

Table 6.2: German Welfare Spending as a Percentage of GDP396
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 AVG Rank
Germany 22.7 23.2 22.3 26.5 26.2 26.7 24.60
1

Table 6.2 demonstrates the growth of German welfare spending as a function of
GDP, rising from 22.7% in 1980 to 26.7% in 2005. This has earned Germany the
distinction of having the largest welfare state in this study, by a wide margin. Germany’s
average welfare spending, at 24.6% of GDP, represents a commitment of 5% more of its
GDP than second-place Britain. Furthermore, Germany has been consistent: while all
other countries changed positions at some point within this comparison, the Federal
Republic has been ranked first every year and by a wide margin. The smallest gap
between the first and second-place countries occurred in 1985 when Germany spent 3.4%
more of its GDP on welfare spending than the United Kingdom. This clear distinction
between Germany and the other countries should not be disregarded on the assumed basis
that the federations in question are simply low-spending welfare states. Germany ranks
fifth compared to thirty other OECD members when welfare spending is measured as a
percentage of GDP.397
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Table 6.3: German Welfare Spending as a Percentage of Total Federal Spending398
1972 1977 1980 1985 1990
Germany 67.40 71.07 69.98 70.04 67.68

1995
N/A

2000
N/A

2005 2007 AVG Rank
72.63 72.14 70.13
1

The same pattern is evident when welfare spending is considered as a percentage
of total federal spending. Once again, Germany is the clear first-place federation, ranking
first in every year, with the exception of 2007, when Switzerland exceeded Germany in
spending by 3%. Germany’s average however, is 3% higher than second-place
Switzerland and much higher than third place Australia (average 55.73%).
By any measure then, Germany has a large and developed welfare state. Although
the growth of welfare spending may have slowed in recent years, it still represents the
largest system of social programs among the seven federations compared here.399 While
many of the primary government programs are established via federal politics and
legislation, a high level of spending may help to create new areas in need of
coordination.400 For example, while primary control over post-secondary education
funding is found within federal legislation, several staatsverträge have been formed to
address related issues, such as the granting of degrees and the funding of future research.
Thus, even when new social programs or welfare spending do not directly lead to a
specific intergovernmental agreement, overall spending increases can create new
opportunities for collaboration. Of the 40 staatsverträge created between 1950 and 1995,
13 agreements pertain directly to healthcare or education alone. Since national legislation
can serve as an alternative to intergovernmental coordination concerning the welfare
398
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state, the large size of the German state still provides ample opportunities for agreements.
Given the large size of Germany’s welfare state, at least in comparison to the other cases,
it is consistent that there should also be a prolific record of intergovernmental agreement
formation.

5. The Existence of Lasting Forums for Intergovernmental Relations
It might be assumed that given the central place of the Bundesrat in German
politics, there would be a limited number of intergovernmental forums which would play
only a secondary role compared to the federal second chamber. This belief would be
mistaken. According to Kramer: “numerous forums and conferences have come into
existence to coordinate policy within the federation and among the Länder”.401 Although
the Basic Law makes no mention of these intergovernmental bodies this has not stopped
them from becoming an essential part of German intergovernmental relations.402
While the presence of the Bundesrat clearly has not precluded the formation of
intergovernmental forums and networks amongst Germany’s länder (both with and
without the federal government), what is surprising is the number of bodies, their level of
institutionalization and the frequency of their meetings. There are dozens of
intergovernmental forums in Germany, with at least twenty which bring together
ministers from amongst the länder – one for every major (and even minor) policy area.403
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This only covers intergovernmental bodies at the national level – they are further
supplemented by other regional forums.404 If these ministerial institutions were not
enough, Kramer has identified more than 950 “discussion and working groups” at the
administrative level, evidence of a vast network of intergovernmental ties among
bureaucrats and officials. Many of these are not recent developments either, but arose
early in the history of the Federal Republic. Three in particular – the Conferences of
Prime Ministers, Education and Cultural Ministers as well as Housing Ministers – were
founded before the Federal Republic even came into being (1947, 1948 and 1948
respectively).405
Virtually all meetings of these intergovernmental forums follow clear rules for
organization, scheduling, rules for meetings and decision making as well as funding.406
One body, the Conference of the Ministers for Cultural and Educational Affairs even has
an independent bureaucracy, employing 216 people in 2004. Meetings are also relatively
frequent, with ministerial councils coming together at least once or twice a year.407 In an
interesting contrast to North American federations, in Germany, the peak
intergovernmental forums (first ministers) meet more often than regular ministerial
bodies. The Conference of Prime Ministers, which includes only the leaders of the
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länder, meets at least four times per year, while the Chancellor also invites the first
ministers of the länder to several meetings each year.408
With so many long-standing and institutionalized forums for intergovernmental
relations, spanning virtually all areas of government policy, perhaps it should not be
surprising that Germany leads this comparison with the largest number of
intergovernmental agreements. Should any opportunity for national coordination arise, it
is unlikely to be missed by the vast network of intergovernmental bodies which meet like
clockwork throughout the year.

6. The Number of Subnational Governments at the State/Provincial Level
Germany is a unique case in this comparison in that the number of subnational
governments has changed a few times since 1945. When the Federal Republic was
founded in 1949, there were eleven länder formed out of the territories occupied by the
Western Allies.409 Some of these länder were based upon historical communities, while
others were effectively creations of the Allies. This latter was quickly apparent as
citizens and leaders in Baden, Württemburg-Baden and Württemburg-Hohenzollern
expressed dissatisfaction with the division. A referendum in 1951 found that a majority
of these territories favoured a merger and the creation of a Südwestaat (southwest
state).410 A year later, this mandate was realized with the creation of the new länd of
Baden-Württemburg. Thus, the total number of länder decreased from eleven to nine.
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This new total was short-lived however, as the situation regarding the Saarland
was resolved five years later. After having been annexed by France in 1945, the Saarland
was finally returned to Germany in 1957 and it joined the Federal Republic as a new
länd.411 This raised the total number of full subnational governments to ten; the number it
would remain at until reunification. West Berlin was often included in matters that
concerned the rest of the länder, but was not formally granted status as a full subnational
government until 1990.412
The most significant change to Germany’s subnational governments came in 1990
when the western and eastern parts of the country were unified under the Basic Law and
institutions of the Federal Republic. The ten West German länder were suddenly joined
by six new colleagues: five länder newly reconstituted from the former territory of the
communist German Democratic Republic and a sixth from the reunified city of Berlin,
which was formally granted full status. This raised the total number of subnational
governments to sixteen – the current total for the federal republic.
Whatever the number of the länder however, it is clear that it has not had a
significant impact on the formation of national intergovernmental agreements. During the
Cold War, the Federal Republic totalled only ten subnational governments, the same
number as Canada. Given the large number of agreements formed by both countries, it
seems safe to conclude that ten subnational governments is not a significant impediment
to the formation of national intergovernmental agreements. This was also confirmed by
the close and constant ties between the länder through the Bundesrat, as well as other
intergovernmental institutions, which was discussed in the previous section.
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The only question is whether the accession of six new länder to the Federal
Republic in 1990 might see Germany cross a threshold past which forming a national
consensus becomes more difficult. The available evidence indicates that this was not the
case. Between 1991 and 1995, nine new staatsverträge were formed between all the
länder, a faster rate than that under the original Federal Republic. The new East German
länder also joined existing staatsverträge that were negotiated before reunification.413
This was aided, in part, because Germany lacked the internal linguistic and cultural
divisions of Switzerland (the federation that ranks one spot higher in terms of the number
of subnational governments) to exacerbate the divisions between the länder. Clearly
though, whether Germany has eleven, nine, ten or even sixteen subnational governments,
these numbers have proven to be no obvious impediment to the formation of national
intergovernmental agreements.

7. The Existence of a Body for Intrastate Federalism
The very concept of intrastate federalism is intrinsically tied to Germany and its
Bundesrat. The Federal Republic has effectively become the modern model for the direct
participation of subnational governments within the federal legislature.414 In theory, this
should provide ample opportunity for the business of intergovernmental coordination to
occur within the federal legislature instead of through the formation of national
intergovernmental agreements. Given the large number of agreements that have been
formed, however, this hypothesis requires further scrutiny, at least in the German context.
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Asides from simply repudiating the hypothesis concerning intrastate federalism,
there are two explanations for Germany’s seeming contradiction. One, Germany’s
federal system is such fertile ground for intergovernmental agreements that any effect that
the Bundesrat has on agreements is not enough to completely impede their formation. In
this case, the effects of intrastate federalism could be seen as less powerful than the other
variables (at least in the German example). Two, while Germany may be a model for the
participation of subnational governments in the federal legislature, it may not be a perfect
match with qualities of intrastate federalism as defined by this analysis. While a
combination of the two may be the best explanation, the remainder of this section will
focus on the features of intrastate federalism, as the first explanation is impossible to
conclusively quantify.
According to the original hypothesis, a federal country with a full degree of
intrastate federalism should form fewer national intergovernmental agreements because
some of the business of intergovernmental coordination will take place within the national
legislature. In order for a federation’s second chamber to exhibit the full degree of
intrastate federalism, it must have three characteristics. First, state governments must
have direct representation within the chamber itself. While popular interests - as in the
current American and Australian Senates – may coincide with the programs of state
governments, they are not replacements. A representative of a state government will
necessarily have different interests than a popular delegate, such as a desire to protect
subnational jurisdiction. Second, full intrastate federalism requires equal, or at least
disproportionate, representation for the subnational governments. Weighted
representation for larger states in a federal second chamber creates incentives for smaller
ones to pursue the more “level” playing field of executive federalism. Third, the second
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chamber must have sufficient power to influence national matters that might otherwise be
addressed through intergovernmental relations.
By these criteria, Germany’s Bundesrat is a good, but not a perfect fit. Clearly,
the Bundesrat involves the direct participation of subnational governments. The länder
governments appoint ministers as representatives to the chamber and instruct them in how
to cast their votes (which may not be split). Additionally, the Bundesrat clearly has the
power to affect national matters, notably those issues that pertain directly to the länder.
Moreover, the broad reach of federal legislation allows matters addressed in the national
legislature to affect most areas of German government and society. While the Bundesrat
only possesses a suspensory veto over issues not related to the länder and federalism, this
distinction should have, at most, a small impact on the formation of intergovernmental
agreements.
The one dimension where Germany’s Bundesrat does not perfectly fulfill the ideal
of intrastate federalism is in the weighting of each länder’s delegation. As all länder are
guaranteed a minimum of three seats, the Bundesrat is still disproportionately weighted in
favour of the smaller states. Yet, the larger states are given a bigger say in the chamber,
with the largest receiving double the votes (6) of the smallest länder. Using the current
distribution of seats, this would allow the six largest länder, combined with only one other
länd (of any size), to secure a majority in the Bundesrat. On any issue that might divide
the large länder from the small, the smaller states may have an incentive to pursue some
kind of intergovernmental coordination outside the federal legislature, if possible. While
it is impossible to specify exactly how many potential agreements this has affected, it is
reasonable to consider that this may have had some small effect.
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On balance however, Germany’s Bundesrat is much closer to an ideal form of
intrastate federalism than the imperfect iterations found in federations such as Australia
and the United States. Given the large number of national agreements that have been
formed in Germany, it is clear that in the case of Germany – the factors encouraging
agreements seem to be much stronger than any reductive effect of the Bundesrat.

Conclusion
Germany’s system of cooperative federalism eschews neat divisions of legislative,
executive and financial power; instead, the Basic Law enshrines an arrangement in which
both orders of government have a clear role to play on most issues. For the purposes of
this analysis, it is clear that, on balance, Germany’s cooperative federalism has provided
fertile ground for the formation of national intergovernmental agreements. Between 1950
and 1996, the governments of the Federal Republic formed approximately 80 national
agreements or 1.77 per year, putting it in the same range as Australia and Canada.415
Despite a similar number of agreements, Germany is a very different federation from the
two previously discussed, making it an interesting contrast - a federation with institutional
differences but a similar number of agreements.
The five variables that represent the factors conducive to coordination in Germany
tend to exist at one extreme or the other. The ability of the spending power to produce
coordination is minimal, as transfers occur not only from the federal government to the
länder, but also from the länder to the federal government. Many of these transfers are
tied into non-discretionary programs such as equalization, which further limits the
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potential for agreements. The significant centralized authority, at least in terms of
legislative powers, granted to the federal government by the Basic Law also eliminates
this as a potential source of coordination (as well as providing the source for an
alternative to agreements).
Balanced against these limited avenues for coordination are three very strong
institutional features. First, Germany exhibits the greatest degree of overlap of any
federation in this comparison. While the federal government may have broad legislative
powers, the centre must work with the länder in order to actually implement an agenda.
Virtually all policy areas involve some form of coordination between the federal or länder
governments, or even just between the länder, as in the case of certain types of media
regulations. Second, Germany’s welfare state is the largest of all seven federations and
the scope of government regulation is broad. If Australia and Canada can form
agreements based on their much smaller welfare states, then certainly the much larger
German state can provide ample opportunities. Finally, Germany, much like the previous
two federations, has a substantial network of institutionalized forums dedicated to
intergovernmental relations between first ministers, ministers and senior bureaucrats.
Together, these very strong elements provide more than enough encouragement for
intergovernmental coordination in Germany.
Unlike Australia and Canada however, the German federation does have certain
features which might reduce the likelihood of intergovernmental agreements. While the
number of subnational governments seems to provide only a weak obstacle to agreement
formation both before and after reunification, intrastate federalism is a different matter.
Germany’s Bundesrat is often regarded as the archetype of intrastate federalism, with the
länder directly participating in the federal legislative process. This high degree of
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intrastate federalism provides a clear alternative to intergovernmental agreements as the
Bundesrat is able to funnel some intergovernmental business through the federal political
institutions. However, given the large number of agreements that have been created in
Germany, this alternative does not seem to have a large enough effect to reduce the
number of agreements, relative to other prolific federations.
Thus, Germany possesses a number of factors which are very conducive to
coordination that are expected in a federation that forms a large number of agreements as
well as an alternative (the Bundesrat) that is more likely to be associated with cases which
have formed fewer agreements. This produces a slightly different summary formula from
that of Australia or Canada:
CON (Strong) – INH (Weak-none) – ALT (Some) = High IGA Formation
With the presence of a clear alternative to intergovernmental agreements, Germany’s
institutional environment is not quite as fertile (in theory) for agreements, yet has formed
more than either Australia or Canada. This is by no means a contradiction of the theory,
but an important consideration to return to once the results of the other country case
studies have been considered. Germany may be a case that is particularly disposed to the
creation of intergovernmental agreements.
In many ways, the desire for coordination is infused into not only the institutions
of German federalism, but the political culture of the federation itself. According to
Charlie Jeffery, the desire to establish national standards has been pervasive:
Even where the Länder retained exclusive powers, there developed an instinct for
coordination also directed at producing common, nationwide standards. The most
well-known example of this ‘self-coordination’ of the Länder is the Conference of
Ministers of Culture, which sets common frameworks for school education from
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primary school through to school-leaving qualifications. In most fields of
responsibility of the Länder, this kind of ‘self-coordination’ became the norm.416
This kind of behaviour helps explains why Germany has one of the most robust and
active systems of intergovernmental relations and agreement creation of the federations in
this comparison.
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Chapter Seven: South Africa

Source: CIA World Factbook

Formal Name: Republic of South Africa
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Capital: Pretoria, Gauteng417
Subnational Governments: There are nine subnational units, known as provinces:
Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, North West,
Northern Cape and Western Cape.

Introduction:
Emerging from the repression of the infamous apartheid regime, the modern
Republic of South Africa has only existed since 1994. Despite its seeming youthfulness,
the South African political system is a product of its long history, and reflects an attempt
to achieve a compromise between unity and diversity. Stereotypes of South Africa tend
to depict it as a tense balance between a black, African majority and a white, Europeandescended minority, but the reality is far more complicated. The country is home to
dozens of ethnic groups and hundreds of tribes; even the white minority is not uniform,
made up of descendents of both British and Dutch settlers. The Constitution officially
recognizes eleven different languages, while making special mention of more than a
dozen more.418 Beyond these ethno-cultural differences, South Africa also has great
economic disparities; it is at once the wealthiest nation in Africa (measured by GDP), yet
also one of the poorest, with a large proportion of its population unemployed and living in
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poverty.419 South Africa’s nine provinces and its national government face the challenge
of managing these many cleavages in this young federation.

History:
The modern political history of South Africa has roots in the colonial legacy of the
region. While native African peoples have lived in the region for millennia, many of the
modern cleavages originated with the arrival of European settlers in the mid-17th century,
when the Dutch East India Company took an interest in the area as a supply port for its
global trading routes.420 The strategic value of South African supply bases drew other
European competitors, notably the British, who also attempted to establish bases and
colonies throughout the area. Competition and conflict arose between European settlers,
as well as indigenous African peoples, intensifying during the 19th century and
culminating in a series of wars including the Anglo-Zulu War (1879) and the First and
Second Boer Wars (1880-81 and 1899-1902, respectively). This last war concluded with
the British annexation of the other South African European colonies as well as the
indigenous nations.
Direct rule by the United Kingdom over South Africa would prove to be shortlived however. Conflict was frequent between the British and the Afrikaners, as the
British government attempted to exercise its newfound dominion and anglicize the region.
These tensions were further exacerbated by the repression of the Zulus as well as the rest
of the black population, leading to protests and revolts. This tumultuous experience
419
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convinced London that direct rule would be too difficult and too costly, leading to the
introduction of home rule. The South Africa Act 1909 created the Union of South Africa,
which formally brought together the four territories that the British possessed into a new
dominion within the Commonwealth.421 Despite the British experiences in Canada and
Australia, the diverse nature of South Africa’s residents and the pre-existing political
boundaries, federalism was not chosen as a model for the new dominion.
The new Union seemed to resolve the tensions amongst the Afrikaners and the
British as it was “celebrated as the reconciliation between (their) interests”.422 Yet, as the
new state was helping to end the conflict between Europeans, it was institutionalizing the
racial divide between the white minority and the disenfranchised black majority. One of
the starkest means of repression was the creation of separate “reserves” for black South
Africans, termed “Homelands” by the South African government and known more
commonly as “Bantustans”.423 These areas, independent in law, but effectively controlled
by the South African government, were part of the justification for the Apartheid regime
instituted in 1948: blacks in South Africa could be disenfranchised as they possessed their
own lands where they were sovereign.424 This was, inadvertently, South Africa’s first
experience with a system resembling federalism.
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Once Apartheid collapsed in the early 1990s, this experience of using a federallike system as part of the repressive regime gave federalism a negative reputation
amongst many in the constitutional debates, notably members of the largest liberation
party, the African National Congress (ANC).425 The ANC sought a strong, unitary
government that would have the power to reconstruct the country and encourage
economic growth, but were opposed by a number of groups seeking a more decentralized
alternative. Important minority groups, such as the Zulus and many white South Africans
saw federalism as a means of gaining autonomy in the new republic. 426 In order to bridge
these divergent goals, South African leaders were inspired by the German model of
cooperative, administrative federalism, as opposed to the Anglo-American theory of
watertight, competitive federalism.427 Nine provinces were established to cover the
territory of South Africa and while some of them were rooted in pre-existing divisions
(such as original European colonies or even black Homelands), the boundaries were not
drawn to accommodate ethnic, racial or cultural groups.428 Although neither the interim
Constitution of 1994 nor the permanent Constitution of 1996 labelled this system as
“federal” – instead, they used terms such as “devolved” or “cooperative governance” –
both documents included the constitutional features that are necessary for a federation.429
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Since 1996, this “federal” constitution has been the basis of politics and law in South
Africa.

Government and Political Structure:
South Africa’s government draws heavily from the Westminster model of its
former colonial authorities. However, unlike Canada or even Australia, South Africa
takes more liberties with its interpretation of the British template, with a republican
executive, proportional representation and the direct involvement of provincial
governments within the national legislature – features more common to continental
European democracies.
The national Parliament is bicameral, with the National Assembly serving as the
chamber of popular representation and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) acting
as a body for provincial representation. The National Assembly is made up of 400
members, elected by proportional representation in nine provincial multi-member
constituencies and one additional national constituency.430 With no single-member
constituencies and a closed-list method for choosing candidates, the system emphasizes
the election of parties, rather than individuals.431 In order to create a legislature that was
inclusive of smaller political movements, the parties standing for election to the
430
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Assembly only need to surpass a threshold of 0.25% of all votes cast, much lower than
the levels in other PR systems.432
By contrast, members of the NCOP are selected indirectly as membership is
determined by provincial elections and decisions of their respective executives and
legislatures. Section 60 of the Constitution allocates each province a delegation of ten
members, consisting of six permanent delegates and four special delegates. The six
permanent members must be selected proportional to the party balance in the provincial
legislature and are nominated by the parties that are entitled to these seats (and
subsequently approved of by the legislature).433 The four special delegates consist of the
Premier (or his/her representative) who chairs the delegation, as well as three other
members who may be changed from time to time and are generally appointed by the
provincial government based upon their specialty regarding the legislative business at
hand.434 In addition to these stipulations, the overall delegation must also be
representative of the party balance in their respective provincial legislatures. For any
matters that affect provincial jurisdiction, each provincial delegation receives only one
vote and must follow the directives of the provincial legislature. For all other votes,
members are able to vote individually, but then the NCOP has a reduced ability to reject
legislation approved by the Assembly.435
432
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In the design of its executive, South Africa departs from other parliamentary
models (both Westminster and continental European) by fusing the roles of Head of State
and Head of Government into the Office of the President. At the beginning of a session
of Parliament, the President is elected by the members of the National Assembly, which
effectively assures this role falls to the leader of the majority party. The President then
resigns his or her seat in the Assembly and appoints a Cabinet primarily from the
members of the National Assembly, who retain their seats.436
This might suggest that the distinction between the South African President and
the Prime Minister from a pure Westminster system is one of semantics; however there
are a number of small, but interesting, distinctions. First, the President, as the Head of
State, maintains all respective functions including conferring honours, summoning
“commissions of inquiry”, issuing pardons and assenting to legislation.437 This last is
important as the President is technically empowered to reject legislation and return it to
Parliament for further consideration if he or she has “reservations about the
constitutionality of the Bill”438. Although this provision has yet to be tested, it
demonstrates a marked difference between the President and a Westminster Prime
Minister. Second, by resigning their seat in the Assembly, the President creates a
distinction between their office and that of legislators and cabinet members. While the
President must retain the confidence of Parliament, this subtle distinction is reflected in
the Constitution in Section 102 which allows for motions of non-confidence in either the
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President and the Cabinet or the Cabinet alone.439 Finally, the national executive as a
whole has the right to intervene directly into provincial administration, subject to the
approval of the NCOP; this will be explored at greater length in the section on
centralization. These distinctions might seem of little importance, as they have generally
not been tested, however they are important evidence of a deliberate departure from a
pure Westminster or European parliamentary model.
The design of the provincial governments is precisely detailed by the Constitution
(Sections 103-150) and generally resembles the national executive and legislature, both in
their structure and their electoral systems. The largest institutional distinction is that
provincial legislatures are unicameral, though other small differences exist as well.
Murray identifies these as: limitations on the size of provincial executive committees to
eleven members (Section 132), the lack of deputy ministers to support elected officials
and the fact that the Premier does not resign his or her seat as the President does.440 A
final important difference is that the provinces have significant responsibilities in
implementing national legislation and programs, similar to the federal systems found in
Germany and Switzerland.441 This means the provinces’ executives have the
responsibility to not only to enact their own policies (which are often shaped by national
legislation), but also to implement the laws and regulations of the national government.
While understanding these institutional features of the South African political
system is essential for any analysis of its federal system, alone it misses an important and
influential characteristic of this federal system: the dominance of the African National
439
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Congress (ANC). As the liberation party led by Nelson Mandela, the ANC famously
challenged the Apartheid regime and became the country’s leading party once free and
fair elections were established in 1994. In the four national elections since the end of
Apartheid, the ANC has never even flirted with defeat, let alone a minority government,
as their percentage of the popular vote was at its lowest in 1994 at 62%.442 Indeed, the
only uncertainty in election results is whether the ANC will manage to achieve the twothirds majority needed to amend the Constitution. Given that the largest opposition party,
the Democratic Alliance, draws the majority of its support from the white minority and
has trouble attracting large numbers of black voters, ANC dominance seems likely to
continue, at least in the medium-term.443
This dominance has important implications for South Africa’s system of
federalism and intergovernmental relations. As previously mentioned, the South African
system of proportional representation puts the emphasis on choosing a party, rather than a
candidate, for both the national and the provincial orders of government. Moreover,
parties in South Africa (most notably the ANC) are single, unified entities without distinct
provincial wings as is the case in federations such as Canada and the United States; thus,
the leadership of a party extends across all orders of government. The dominance of
central party authorities is further exacerbated by the holding of national and provincial
elections at the same time. This timing has allowed Democratic Alliance leader Helen
Zille to challenge the ANC in national elections while also being elected as Premier of
Western Cape simultaneously. However, the most significant effects can be found in the
dominant ANC party, which has not only triumphed in national elections, but has
442
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consistently controlled six of the provincial governments, while fighting over the
remaining two.444 In provinces that have elected an ANC majority, the Premier is
appointed (known as “deployed” in South Africa), by the ANC leader, who has always
served as the President. According to Murray, this has a significant impact on the federal
system:
Deployment from the centre means that the premier is in fact accountable not to
his or her legislature, but rather, to the central authority. Nor is the premier
accountable to the local party organization. Its leadership may be excluded from
cabinet and the provincial government, which now essentially acts as an agent of
the centre.445
This direct relationship between the ANC’s leadership and the Premiers of most
provinces not only exacerbates centralization (which could affect agreement formation),
but it also allows for an additional conduit of intergovernmental coordination that is not
available in all other federations: intra-party relationships.446 It is worth bearing in mind
this unique feature as we proceed through the analysis of the variables affecting
agreement formation.

Intergovernmental Agreements in South Africa:
Until 2005, South Africa lacked a specific term or framework for the formation of
intergovernmental agreements. However, in August of that year, the national government
passed the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (IRFA) which was designed to
create a new environment for intergovernmental relations in South Africa.447 Among the

444

As of the most recent round of elections in 2009, only Western Cape had a non-ANC government, as the
Democratic Alliance won a majority. In the past, however, the Inkatha Freedom Party, an ethnic Zulu
party, has formed the government in KwaZulu-Natal (most recently in 1999).
445
Murray, "The Republic of South Africa," 274-275.
446
Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 3rd ed., 50.
447
South Africa, Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005. (assented to August 10, 2005), South
Africa Government Gazette, Vol. 482, no. 27898, 2005.

219

measures meant to encourage cooperation and reduce conflict was the inclusion of a new
intergovernmental instrument: the implementation protocol. Implementation protocols
have been described by the Department of Provincial and Local government as:
... a mechanism by which two or more organs of state must cooperate in order to
exercise a statutory power, perform a function, implement a policy or deliver a
service. The implementation protocol sets forth the anticipated outcomes of the
joint work, details roles and responsibilities, the sources of funding and other
resources and their envisaged use, performance targets and oversight mechanisms
to ensure that the intended outcomes materialize.448
The IRFA also stipulates that the agreements must be formal, written and signed by all
participants.449 This highly institutionalized framework marked a dramatic departure
from the informal realm of intergovernmental relations prior to 2005 as well as
differentiating South Africa from other federations with less well-defined systems.
Whether under the original, non-institutionalized framework between 1996 and
2005, or the five years since the passage of the IRFA, the result has been the same for the
formation of formal, national intergovernmental agreements: nothing. While the day-today business of intergovernmental relations persists in South Africa, there has been a
complete dearth of formal agreements formed between the national and provincial
governments or solely between the provincial governments. While South Africa is not
short of active intergovernmental forums, the outcomes of these institutions are advisory,
legislative or “not formally binding”.450 The Department of Provincial and Local
Government, the department primarily responsible for intergovernmental relations at the
448
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national level, has recorded no examples of formal national agreements or any usage of
the implementation protocols. This finding has been reiterated by Professor Jaap de
Visser, of the University of Western Cape, a researcher in multilevel governance, who
confirmed that implementation protocols had not yet been utilized by the federal or
provincial governments, nor were there existing examples of formal intergovernmental
agreements.451 The complete lack of any kind of formal, national intergovernmental
agreements sets South Africa as a unique case in this investigation, and the remaining
sections of this chapter will be devoted to understanding how each of the different
variables may have contributed to the lack of agreement formation.

1. The Degree of Overlap that Exists in the Constitution
Enshrining a significant degree of overlap between the orders of government was
one of the explicit goals of the South African Constitution. Rejecting a federation of
watertight compartments in favour of a more European, administrative model was one of
the key compromises made during the debates over the new South African constitution.452
The first section of the Constitution that details the institutions of government addresses
this directly in a chapter entitled “Co-operative Government”. Section 40 affirms the
interconnected nature of the South African federation by declaring: “In the Republic,
government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which
are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated.” Section 41 goes into greater detail,
stipulating that all orders of government must remain unified in the Republic, maintain
friendly relations, coordinate their actions and effectively resolve any conflicts that arise.
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As Steytler argues, this was a deliberate attempt by the framers of the South African
Constitution to enshrine a system of cooperative federalism similar to Germany's. 453
Without further reinforcement and greater specificity in the division of powers,
however, these principles might turn out to be mere platitudes. By applying Ronald
Watt’s analysis of jurisdictional responsibility to South Africa’s Constitution, some sense
of the degree of overlap can be observed. Of the 45 categories directly addressed by the
Constitution, 27 or 60% are explicitly defined as concurrent or are granted in some form
to both orders of government. This clear majority would suggest that South Africa’s
division of powers contains a high degree of overlap. In a comparative context though,
this conclusion might be somewhat tempered. Of the seven countries in this analysis,
South Africa’s rating of 60% overlap in jurisdictions ranks only third, behind Germany
(75%) and Australia (70%). Thus, while South Africa’s division of power has a high
degree of overlap, it is certainly not the highest among the federations considered in this
study.
Describing South Africa as the federation with only the third highest degree of
overlap might lead one to underestimate the level to which its governments are
interdependent. The significant degree of concurrency between the national and
provincial governments is especially evident in the areas outside of exclusive national
authority.454 An examination of Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution reveals that
virtually all policy fields outside of national jurisdiction are held jointly by the provinces
and the national government. Schedule 5, which lists the areas of exclusive provincial
jurisdiction, is exceptionally small, containing guarantees only for specific items such as
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ambulance services, local libraries and museums, provincial sport and recreation,
veterinarians, and provincial roads and traffic. By contrast, Schedule 4 is a substantial
list of areas of concurrent jurisdiction, including important policy areas such as
agriculture, the environment, health services, housing, economic policy, transportation,
trade and welfare. Not only are these powers much more numerous and significant than
the exclusive provincial areas, they tend to crowd out this meagre allowance (it is clear
that healthcare policy as a whole will have at least some consequences for ambulance
services, for example).
Returning to Watts' categorization, this division of powers leaves virtually no
areas of exclusively subnational jurisdiction (only one area, other types of taxation, is
solely held by the provinces) but a very large area of overlapping jurisdictions. Of the 28
policy areas that are not reserved solely to the national government, 27 (96%) are shared
between both orders of government, the highest proportion of this study. If the federal
and provincial governments in South Africa both had significant areas of independent
responsibility, they would be free to legislate and administer these, without the necessity
of coordination. The lack of an exclusive provincial jurisdiction means that fields such as
primary education and municipal services, which are often exclusively subnational in
federal systems, are subject to multiple orders of government, opening these areas up to
potential intergovernmental coordination through agreements.
If we can conclude that South Africa possesses somewhere between a relatively
and very high level of constitutional overlap, why are there no intergovernmental
agreements to show for it? Aside from simply repudiating this hypothesis – a premature
conclusion – the best explanation can be found in a more complete reading of the
Constitution. Rather than simply allowing the governments of South Africa to navigate

223

through the deep and complex web of overlapping jurisdiction, the framers of the
Constitution included a number of centralizing features to ensure coordination between
governments, a reality that will be discussed in the next section.

2. The Degree of Centralization in the Constitutional Division of Powers
South Africa’s federal system has been described in the past as a “quasifederation”, due to the perception that it grants the central government a much stronger
degree of power than the provinces.455 The central government is seen as the dominant
entity because the Constitution provides a number of special powers that allow it to
encroach on provincial jurisdiction or even override their decisions.456
An examination of the division of powers found in the Constitution reveals that 17
(38%) of the enumerated policy areas are reserved to the national government alone. This
ranks third of the seven cases, well behind both the United Kingdom (59%) and
surprising Switzerland (49%), while placing just ahead of Canada (35%). Moreover, the
clear majority of jurisdictions are held concurrently by the national and provincial
governments. This would suggest that South Africa is defined more by overlap and
concurrency than centralization in the powers of its national government. Such a
conclusion would be premature, as a broader reading of the Constitution and an
understanding of the South African political system indicates that centralization, rather
than cooperation among equals, is the norm for this federation.
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While Schedule 4’s expansive range of concurrent powers suggests an equal
partnership between the national government and the provinces, Section 146 grants the
national government clear supremacy. Subsections 2 and 3 present a nearly exhaustive
list of circumstances in which national legislation prevails over provincial, including:


If an issue “cannot be regulated effectively” by individual provinces.



If the national legislation is attempting to provide necessary uniformity by
adopting common norms and standards, frameworks or national policies.



If the national legislation is needed to: maintain national security or
economic unity; protect the common market and the mobility of goods,
services, capital and labour; promote the economy across provincial
borders; ensure equal opportunity or access to government services;
protect the environment; defend the economic, health or security interests
of other provinces or the country; or, finally, if the overridden provincial
legislation “impedes the implementation of national economic policy.”

Although Section 146(5) allows provincial legislation to prevail if none of the above
stipulations apply, it is difficult to envision a situation in which a piece of national
legislation could not be justified on one of these grounds.457 While the courts may
attempt to urge cooperation and harmonization between national and provincial laws
where possible, the provinces have little recourse in any conflict where a decision of
primacy must be made.458 Thus, the inclusion of Section 146 alters the division of
powers from one of clear overlap, to a system allowing for greater centralization and the
expansion of national power.
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One area that might have provided some degree of decentralization is the
provincial implementation of national legislation, as is the case in Germany and
Switzerland.459 Yet this comparison cannot be taken too far, as South African provincial
government have significantly less autonomy in determining how to implement federal
legislation than their European counterparts. Not only does the national government have
the power to specifically set standards and directives for provincial governments through
its wide legislative powers, but the Constitution also grants oversight of the provincial
executive branch. Section 100 provides the national executive with the ability to
intervene directly in provincial jurisdiction if a provincial executive fails to fulfill the
directives and obligations provided by national legislation. The grounds for such an
intervention are similar to the grounds for legislative override, covering broad
justifications such as maintaining national standards, managing the economy and
protecting the country.460 Such an intervention will remain temporary unless approved by
the NCOP, but given the centralized party system, as long as the party in power controls
five of nine provinces, such approval would be easily forthcoming. This adds to the
centralized nature of the South African federation, providing the national government
with ample opportunities to consolidate power and override provincial decisions.461
Finally, even the meagre set of exclusive provincial powers is not safe from
central government control. Subsection 44(2) grants the national legislature the ability to
pass legislation in exclusively provincial matters (Schedule 5). As with the other powers
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mentioned, this ability is subject to restrictions, but these are as weak as those governing
legislative and administrative supremacy.
The South African Constitution may appear, at first, to encourage overlapping
jurisdictions and cooperative government, but a more complete understanding
demonstrates the prevalence of centralizing instruments. Whether a matter of legislation
or administration, the central government has the power to create and enforce a national
solution to any problem requiring intergovernmental coordination. Issues such as public
health, infrastructure development, transportation and economic growth all have
provincial implications or affect concurrent jurisdiction, yet all have been addressed via
national legislation.462 A less powerful national government might be forced to work
with the provinces to coordinate policies via formal intergovernmental agreements;
however the strength of national institutions is exacerbated further by the ANC’s
dominance which leads to a federal system in which national and multi-jurisdictional
issues are directly resolved by the central government through national legislation.

3. The Size and Status of the Federal Spending Power
Even if the national government did not possess a number of constitutional
instruments to achieve a dominant position in the distribution of powers, the South
African federation might be described as highly centralized simply based upon the
financial relations between the centre and the provinces. The national government has
almost total control of all significant revenue sources, while the provincial governments
are reliant upon federal transfers for almost the whole of their budgets.
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Like most elements in a federation, financial centralization begins with the
Constitution. South Africa’s fundamental law reserves virtually all major sources of
income to the federal government alone, including: customs, income tax (both personal
and corporate), natural resource revenues, value added tax, retail sales taxes and excise
duties.463 Only two revenue sources are open to the provinces: user fees and the taxation
of gambling and lottery monies. The largest revenue source outside of direct federal
jurisdiction, property taxes, is reserved specifically to local governments, further
handicapping the revenue-raising powers of the provinces. Thus, the provinces begin
with almost no means to raise their own revenue, making them very dependent on federal
transfers, even more so than local government.464
Watts’ comparison of financial arrangements in federal systems quantifies how
this distribution of taxation authority creates a very centralized financial system.
Examining national government revenues as a percentage of total government revenues,
South Africa’s central government collected 82% of all funds between 2000 and 2004.465
This is a greater share than any other country in this investigation (Australia ranks second
at 74.8%), with the exception of the United Kingdom, which was not included in Watts'
comparison. This high level of centralization in revenue generation has led to the
provinces’ mammoth dependence upon federal transfers for their revenue. Watts found
that in the same period, South African provinces relied on transfers for 96.1% of their
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revenues, highest of all the federations in his study. 466 This is significantly ahead of other
centralized federations such as Nigeria (89%) or Spain (72.8%), and more than double the
rate in Australia (45.6%), the highest-ranked country that appears in both Watts’ research
and this study.
Watts’ results are corroborated by the IMF’s Government Statistics Yearbook,
which has tracked subnational revenue from federal grants for the countries in this
investigation.467 If we begin as far back as 1972, it is clear that South Africa’s
subnational governments have depended upon national transfers for the vast majority of
their revenue (see Table 7.1).

Table 7.1: Percentage of Subnational Revenue from Federal Grants (South Africa)468

S.A.

1973
83.51

1975
N/A

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 AVG Rank
86.23 85.65 83.63 94.38 96.08 96.63 95.96 90.26
2

The average is 90.26%, ranking second, just behind the UK at 91.1%. However, this
longitudinal comparison also includes results from the pre-1994 Apartheid regime. If
only the period from 1995 to 2007 is examined, the average is 95.76%, ahead of even the
UK and closer to Watts’ result. Whatever the measure used, the result is the same: the
national government controls almost all revenue sources and the provinces are highly
dependent upon financial transfers.
With such a significant imbalance in the ability to raise revenue and overlapping
jurisdictions, South Africa should allow for a prominent role for the federal spending
466
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power, and thus, agreement formation. With no national intergovernmental agreements,
this is clearly not the case. Two possible explanations exist for this. First, South Africa’s
distribution of powers allows for the national government to legislate in virtually all areas
of provincial jurisdiction, even before its override powers are considered. As the national
parliament is able to create framework legislation in these areas, it can use its spending
power directly through a legislative framework, as opposed to an intergovernmental
agreement. This contrasts with a country such as Canada, where direct spending across a
more watertight division of powers is more difficult. Second, while it is not possible to
discern exactly where it is found, it may be reasonable to infer that there is a tipping point
in the relationship between the federal spending power and agreement formation. In
countries such as Australia and Canada, subnational governments are reliant upon federal
transfers for an important percentage of their revenues, but not for their entire budgets.
Moreover, their jurisdictions - even in Australia, with its significant degree of overlap –
are more independent than in South Africa, with its powerful central government. As
such, the national and subnational governments must engage in negotiations and reach
agreements in order to determine the spending of federal funds. However, in South
Africa (as well as the United Kingdom), the provinces are so completely dependent upon
the centre for their revenues that they must accept most, if not all, directives from the
federal executive. Thus, the South African case seems to indicate a situation in which the
immense reservation of financial resources to the national government has bolstered
agreement-reducing centralization, rather than an approach that tends towards interaction
and coordination.

4. The Size and Scope of the Welfare State
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Assessing the size and scope of the welfare state in South Africa is more difficult
and complicated than with the other case studies in this investigation. Although there are
a number of statistics, measurements and research papers that track the size of
government, particularly in education, health, social protection and pensions,
comparisons with other countries are difficult as the measurements must include the same
programs to be effective.469 This investigation has used two primary means for
comparing the size of the welfare state across the selected case studies: the OECD’s
Social Expenditure Database, which expresses spending as a percentage of GDP, and the
IMF’s Government Finances Yearbook, which measures welfare state spending as a
percentage of total government spending. Unfortunately, while South Africa is an
affiliated non-member country, the OECD’s measurement does not track its spending.
The IMF does provide some data, though not a complete time series.

Table 7.2: South African Welfare Spending as a Percentage of Total Federal Spending470

S.A.

1972
N/A

1977
N/A

1980
N/A

1985
5.62

1990
N/A

1995
N/A

2000
N/A

2005
N/A

2007 AVG
49.49 27.56

Rank
7

The IMF’s data (Table 7.2) only has entries for two of the periods studied, 1985
and 2007. In the first, welfare spending was tracked at 5.62% of total government
spending, however this measurement is from the Apartheid regime and has limited
relevance to the new constitutional and political order. The data from 2007 lists welfare
spending at 49.49% of total spending and provides a more effective comparison with the
469
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cases in this study. This is the lowest of any of seven countries, almost ten percent lower
than the United States (59.30%), and well below the average of 64.97%. While this does
not give us an indication of trends in spending since the foundation of the post-Apartheid
republic in 1994, it does demonstrate that South Africa lags behind in spending,
compared to the advanced economies of this study.
Although there is a lack of reliable, comparative indicators, studies focusing on
South African spending alone may provide more details of the welfare state. Even if
these numbers cannot be directly compared to other countries, significant changes in
spending over time could have an influence on agreement formation and are worth
analyzing. Looking at the potential growth of the welfare state in South Africa, Burger
found that social spending had been rising in nominal terms since 2000.471 Growth was
especially strong between 2003 and 2006, when spending rose from almost 37 billion
Rand to 57.7 billion.472 When viewed as a percentage of the economy however, this 20
billion Rand increase is less significant. Social grants stood at 2.9% of GDP in 2003, but
by 2006, they had only risen to 3.3%, despite increasing by more than half in nominal
terms.473 Moreover, grants were expected to decrease somewhat in real terms, making up
only 3.2 % of GDP by 2008. Yet, neither the increase in spending (in nominal and real
terms), nor the slight retrenchment of recent years has been seen to drive agreement
formation.
Similar results can be found in a 2010 OECD study which took a wider view of
government spending, examining education, health and social spending. The OECD also
471
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noted an increase in social spending between 2000 and 2006, although their calculations
have it beginning at 3.2% of GDP in 2000 and peaking at 4.8% in 2006, before
decreasing in real terms to 4.4% by 2009.474 This seems to be the only aspect of the
welfare state that has seen a noticeable increase however; health spending has only
slightly increased (2.9% in 2000 to 3.4% by 2009) while education funding has actually
fallen in real terms (5.5% to 5.4% in the same period). Although it is impossible to
perfectly compare these numbers to the OECD’s Social Expenditure database (they use a
different “basket” of polices), it is interesting to note that at its peak in 2006, total
education, health and social spending in South Africa amounted to 13.4% of GDP.475
This would still place South Africa as the lowest of the cases in the OECD’s Social
Expenditure comparison, below the United States at 21.4% (which includes 5.5% of GDP
in education spending, to make the figures comparable).476 While it must be stressed that
this comparison is not a perfect one, the gap is significant enough to indicate that South
Africa is the smallest spender on the welfare state.
As South Africa has no national intergovernmental agreements it is clear that the
size and scope of the welfare state has not driven agreement formation. The evidence that
is available points to a lower level of spending in South Africa than in any of the other six
countries. This would be consistent with the lack of agreements as a smaller welfare state
474

Murray Leibbrandt, Ingrid Woolard, Arden Finn and Jonathan Argent, “Trends in South African Income
Distribution and Poverty since the Fall of Apartheid,” OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working
Papers, 104 (May 2010), (Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs), 53-54.
http://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/download/fulltext/5kmms0t7p1ms.pdf?expires=1318626091&id=id&accname=guest
&checksum=8C714CF778CF7CC9F2166E41439B19D2 (accessed October 10, 2011).
475
This included education spending at 5.3% of GDP, social grants at 4.8% and health at 3.3% for a total of
13.4%.
476
According to the CIA’s World Factbook, American education spending was 5.50% of GDP in 2007. If
this was added to the original total in the Social Expenditure figures, it would place the US welfare state
spending at 21.4% of GDP, well ahead of South Africa’s total. Available at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2206rank.html (accessed May 14,
2011).

233

provides fewer opportunities for intergovernmental coordination than a larger, more
complex one. Moreover, as federal legislation seems to be the dominant instrument of
intergovernmental coordination, any amount of government business that crosses
jurisdictions is likely to be contained in such legislation. Thus, a lower level of welfare
state spending seems to be yet another factor working to limit the likelihood of agreement
formation in South Africa.

5. The Existence of Lasting Forums for Intergovernmental Relations
With a federal order that is highly centralized, a political system dominated by a
single party and no record of agreement formation, it might be expected that South Africa
is also lacking any type of formal arena for intergovernmental relations. In fact, the
opposite is true, as South Africa possesses a number of lasting forums for
intergovernmental relations. When the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act was
passed in 2005, it contained a specific section devoted to “Intergovernmental
Structures”.477 The Act lists the criteria for establishing any national or provincial
intergovernmental forum, as well as laying out basic rules and lines of communication,
confirming their potential importance as a part of South African federalism.
The President’s Coordinating Council (PCC) occupies the peak position as a body
for executive federalism in South Africa. Consisting of the President, the Deputy
President, the finance minister, the public service minister, all nine Premiers and a
representative of local governments, the PCC is seen as the “senior consultative body”. 478
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While the PCC possesses no formal or statutory authority (though its existence is
confirmed in law through the IRFA), it meets twice a year and is the principal body for
federal-provincial relations and for interprovincial relations.479
The PCC is not an orphan of South African intergovernmental relations either, as
it is joined by a number of other intergovernmental forums, notably the MINMECs.
MINMECs are ministerial councils in specific policy fields consisting of the federal
Minister and the nine relevant Members of Executive Councils (hence the abbreviation).
These cover a wide range of policy areas, and some are very active. For instance, both
the Budget Council (Finance Minister and MECs) and the Council of Education Ministers
(CEM) were established through statutes and must be consulted on issues of finance and
education that affect the provinces.480 The Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) was
also created to provide a lasting central body for financial matters, and advises
governments as well as approving loans.481 These are joined by a number of statutory and
non-statutory bodies which cover all aspects of government policies from healthcare to
foreign relations.482
If South Africa has a developed system of intergovernmental structures, why then
does it have no intergovernmental agreements to show for it? Surely, with so many
meetings in an institutionalized setting there would be at least one or two formal
agreements between the participants. The answer to this apparent contradiction is found
479
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in the actual results and outcomes of these bodies. The South African government’s
“Guide for Practitioners” refers to MINMECs and other structures as “consultative
forums”, where issues and legislation are discussed and advice is sought from the
participants.483 While some of these councils may meet often, their discussions are often
informal.484 Even the peak institution, the PCC, is viewed as a “non-formal” body,
making decisions that are “not formally binding and enforceable”.485
In addition to the largely informal discussions and outcomes of these bodies,
South Africa’s intergovernmental forums have been largely subsumed as part of the
national legislative process. Ministers in the national government often use MINMECs to
introduce national legislation so their provincial counterparts can have input as well as be
forewarned about any significant policy changes. Thus, even though the Budget Council
and the CEM are active bodies and must be consulted on new legislation in their
respective fields, these recommendations are folded into national legislation, as opposed
to creating national intergovernmental agreements.
Despite featuring a large and developed network of intergovernmental forums,
South Africa remains without even a single national intergovernmental agreement.
Instead of encouraging agreements, these bodies either remain consultative and informal
or reinforce the principal method of intergovernmental coordination in South Africa:
national legislation. So long as the national Parliament is empowered to legislate on
almost any matter, these forums will continue to contribute to that process rather than
create their own, independent outcomes.
483
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6. The Number of Subnational Governments at the State/Provincial Level
Compared to other federations in this study, South Africa has a relatively small
number of subnational governments. With nine provinces, it comes fifth in this ranking,
well behind the leaders, Switzerland (26) and the United States (50). Countries with
similar numbers of subnational governments – Canada and Australia – have shown robust
histories of agreement formation. Even federations with much larger numbers of
subnational governments – Germany and Switzerland – exhibit at least some
intergovernmental agreements. Moreover, South Africa's provinces are not arranged to
ensure ethnic majorities which might exacerbate the effects of even a small number of
subnational governments, as in Switzerland or the United Kingdom. In short, the number
of subnational governments does not contribute to the explanation of why South Africa
has formed no national intergovernmental agreements.
While the relationship, or lack thereof, between subnational governments and
intergovernmental agreements appears clear, two other elements are worth noting. First,
as explained in the previous section, South African subnational governments seem to
have little difficulty in meeting with each other. Indeed, there are a myriad of
intergovernmental institutions, at the peak, ministerial and bureaucratic level, confirming
that the number of governments is no impediment to intergovernmental relations.
Second, the pre-eminence of the African National Congress should be re-iterated.
Because the ANC has a unified party hierarchy and appoints provincial leadership from
the centre, this should, in theory, further reduce any effects that the number of subnational
governments has on agreement formation because the centre should be able to compel
agreement from most of the premiers and their governments. As no national agreements
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have been concluded, there are certainly better explanations for these results than the
assertion that nine provincial governments create a coordination problem that cannot be
overcome.

7. The Existence of a Body for Intrastate Federalism
Given that the German Bundesrat served as the principal model for the National
Council of Provinces, it is not surprising that South Africa exhibits a complete degree of
intrastate federalism.486 The NCOP provides direct representation for provincial
governments, allowing for their interests and concerns to be addressed within the national
legislative process. The Constitution recognizes the importance of direct provincial
representation through the NCOP by making its approval necessary for the more extreme
means of centralization, such as forcing a provincial executive to comply with national
legislation.487
The NCOP does differ from the Bundesrat in a couple of notable ways which
might affect the degree of intrastate federalism that it provides. First, the NCOP does not
technically have an absolute veto; instead, its objections – provided they are not solved
through a mandatory mediation process – can be overridden by a two-thirds majority in
the National Assembly, for matters that affect the provinces, and a simple majority for
those that do not. In theory, this could allow for situations in which provincial interests
are ignored or defeated by a majority in the Assembly that drew its support from a
minority of the provinces, thus weakening the effectiveness of the NCOP. However,
South Africa’s electoral system makes such a concern highly unlikely, especially for
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national matters that affect the provinces. As provincial and national elections occur
simultaneously, use proportional representation and feature a party system that does not
have separate wings for provincial and local elections, it is extremely unlikely that a party
or coalition that cannot acquire the approval of five provinces in the NCOP could
assemble a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly.488
The second difference between the NCOP and the Bundesrat is the differentiation
in delegates. While the German second chamber sees the states appoint delegates directly
and cast a single vote on all matters, the NCOP uses a more complicated system. Six of
the ten delegates are “permanent” and sit full time as members of the NCOP in Cape
Town, while the remaining four include the Premier (or their representative) and three
other members appointed temporarily. As these special members are sitting members of
provincial governments, their presence in the NCOP is infrequent, possibly allowing for a
rift to develop between permanent and special delegates. This situation seems to have
been anticipated by the framers of the Constitution, who built in several features to ensure
that the NCOP would remain a body of provincial representation and to keep the divisions
between the different types of delegates from becoming unmanageable. One, the Premier
leads the delegation, establishing a symbolic hierarchy of the delegates.489 Two, the
permanent delegates (as well as the delegation as a whole) must be representative of the
party distribution in the provincial legislature.490 Three, for matters affecting provincial
jurisdiction, the delegation may only cast a single vote, similar to the process in the
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Bundesrat.491 This removes the ability of members from minority parties to cast votes
against the interests defined by their provincial government. Moreover, if the previous
safeguards (such as the Premier acting as chair) were not enough, the delegation’s single
vote must be cast based on instructions from the provincial government. While nonprovincial matters allow each delegate their own vote and thus, more freedom (at least the
freedom to replace provincial instructions with central party directives), for core
provincial matters the NCOP functions as a chamber of full intrastate federalism.
The section on centralization described the many ways in which South Africa’s
Constitution enabled the national government to concentrate power and address
interprovincial issues. The NCOP adds to the ability of the national government to
coordinate policy across jurisdictions by giving provincial governments a direct say in
national legislation. This adds to the power of the centre, by granting it increased
legitimacy as well as the ability to address matters that only provincial governments, as
opposed to members of the National Assembly, might raise. The legislation that is
produced tends to crowd out provincial bills, limiting the need for further instances of
coordination via intergovernmental agreements.492 As expected then the NCOP, acting as
a body of intrastate federalism, reduces the need for intergovernmental agreements to act
as the means of formal interaction and coordination between governments

Conclusion
The centralization of power in the national executive and Parliament has been the
major theme of this chapter. This should come as no surprise as virtually all the elements
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of the South African federation strengthen, or at the very least, revolve around the central
government. The constitutional division of powers, seeming to create an overlapping,
cooperative relationship with the provinces, instead empowers the national government to
reach into all aspects of society while also granting it legislative and executive
supremacy. A relatively small welfare state further limits the opportunities for South
African governments to form intergovernmental agreements.
The forces of centralization are so strong in South Africa that even factors that
might normally encourage agreement formation are turned on their heads. The national
government’s spending power is effectively unstoppable, given its size and jurisdictional
reach: rather than encourage negotiation and agreements, it simply increases the
dominance of the centre. Likewise, a robust network of intergovernmental forums
should, in theory, encourage new agreements. Instead, in a uniquely South African turn,
these bodies engage only in informal negotiations and consultations; any decisions or
recommendations they do reach are incorporated into the legislative process in
Parliament, instead of generating separate agreements. National Council of Provinces, by
providing direct representation for the provincial governments, ensures that the practice
of intrastate federalism incorporates some of the business of intergovernmental relations
into the national legislative process. This creates a clear alternative to agreements.
These institutional features create an environment that is far from conducive to the
formation of intergovernmental agreements and provide a strong alternative. Moreover,
as has been discussed throughout this chapter, the African National Congress party serves
to exacerbate the centralizing effects of many of these features. It should be noted,
however, that the ANC is not the sole source of centralization, but rather more of an
accelerator. The existence of a competitive, multiparty system would not, on its own,
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eliminate the numerous centralizing elements of the Constitution, nor would it reduce the
provinces' financial dependence. The only variable that might exhibit a significant
change is the role of intergovernmental forums; however, the effects of these bodies
would still likely be shaped by the dominant powers of the national government.
Even with this caveat in mind, South Africa still represents a strong group of
factors which align against agreement formation. Virtually none of the institutional
features encourage coordination, and while there is little impediment from the number of
subnational governments, the NCOP and the national legislative process provide
alternatives to agreements, as indicated by the formula:
CON (Weak) – INH (Weak-none) – ALT (Some) = Very Limited IGA Formation
This institutional framework is entirely consistent with what would be expected from a
federation with no national agreements. This makes South Africa an important case as it
demonstrates that an institutional approach can offer a convincing explanation for a case
with no agreements as well as in cases with many.
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Chapter Eight: Switzerland

Source: CIA World Factbook

Formal Name: Swiss Confederation (Confoederatio Helvitica in Latin).
Capital: Bern
Subnational Governments: Known as cantons, there are twenty-six in total: Aargua,
Appenzell Ausser-Rhoden, Appenzell Inner-Rhoden, Basel-Landschaft, Basel-Stadt,
Bern, Fribourg, Geneve, Glarus, Graubunden, Jura, Luzern, Neuchatel, Nidwalden,
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Obwalden, Sankt Gallen, Schaffhausen, Schwyz, Solothurn, Thurgau, Ticino, Uri, Valais,
Vaud, Zug and Zurich.

Introduction:
With 7.7 million people and an area of 41,277 square kilometres, Switzerland is
the smallest federation examined in this study. While relatively diminutive in size,
Switzerland is home to a diverse population and holds an important place in the historical
evolution of federal governance as the second formal federation. The Swiss federation
incorporates four national languages (German, French, Italian and Romansh), a major
religious division (Protestants and Roman Catholics), key differences in political culture
(radical populism versus elitist conservatism) and a number of important regional and
local identities, many embodied in the twenty-six different cantons.

History
The modern Swiss state is rooted in the Swiss Confederation of 1291, from which
it draws its formal name. 493 The cantons of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden (later,
Obwalden and Nidwalden) entered into a defensive and cooperative alliance, primarily to
defend against encroachment of powerful neighbours, such as the Austrian Hapsburgs.494
While this original alliance was intended to ensure the independence of the cantons

493

Even though Switzerland is known as the "Swiss Confederation", it has only been a true confederation
prior to the 19th century. Since 1848 Switzerland has formally been a federation. For this reason, the
alliance which existed prior to the new federal Confederation is sometimes known as the "Old Swiss
Confederacy".
494
It is important to remember that at this time, the cantons of Switzerland - both those within and outside
of the original alliance - were all part of the Holy Roman Empire at the time, the supranational
confederation of central European states. Membership within the Empire was not a guarantee of peace
between neighbours (such as the Swiss and the Austrians), as war was a common occurrence throughout the
Middle Ages. Elazar, 1994, 246.

244

against their foes, it was also somewhat expansionist. The Swiss Confederation grew
both through peaceful means - cantons such as Luzern, Zurich and Bern all signed
bilateral and multilateral treaties to join the alliance during the 14th century - and
bellicose methods - at one point even capturing Milan in the early 16th century.495 This
expansion was eventually halted in 1515 when the Confederation lost the Battle of
Marignano to the French and then in 1525, declared a general policy of neutrality, a
position that remains influential even to the present day.496 This political and military
policy shift was quickly followed by the dramatic effects of the Protestant Reformation as
Zurich was one of the epicentres for this religious upheaval. The Reformation divided the
Swiss Confederation as some cantons converted to Protestantism (including many of the
larger cities), while some remained staunchly Roman Catholic. Although the Swiss were
able to largely avoid the total war and devastation of the Thirty Years' War (1618-48),
several conflicts did arise between the Protestant and Catholic cantons which provided the
basis for future divisions.497 In 1648, even though Switzerland had not served as a major
theatre for the war, the Confederation gained full independence from the Holy Roman
Empire in the Peace of Westphalia.
Despite its small size and internal divisions, the Swiss Confederation continued in
one form or another for more than five hundred years. By the turn of the 19th century, it
had reached a tense balance between the two main religious factions, as well as its
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multiple cultures and languages, including French, Germanic and Italian areas.498 This
longstanding confederal form was temporarily swept away by the invasion of
revolutionary France in 1798. The French imposed a unitary state, known as the Helvetic
Republic, upon the once-sovereign cantons, stripping them of most of their rights and
powers. 499 This proved to be massively unpopular, as many of the cantons rejected the
abolition of their sovereignty and the Swiss people rejected the imposition of French
revolutionary ideas.500 The rejection was strong enough that Napoleon introduced the
Mediation Act in 1803, which returned many elements of the cantonal system, though not
a complete restoration of the confederal system that existed prior to 1798. Full cantonal
sovereignty was finally restored to its pre-war status at the end of the Napoleonic wars at
the Conference of Vienna in 1815.
Despite deepening political and economic relationships between the cantons, the
confederal arrangement persisted until 1847. The final collapse of the confederal system
and the emergence of a federal country were rooted in the religious schisms that arose
three centuries earlier. In the early 1840s, Protestant liberals under the banner of the
Radical Party had gained power in many of the cantons and the Conference of Delegates
(Tagsatzung) which was the body through which the Swiss cantons reached common
decisions and policies. Their agenda of greater integration and centralization was
opposed by cantons with Conservative governments, most of which were primarily
Roman Catholic. Moreover, prosecution of religious minorities in the cantons, both
Protestant and Catholic, began to intensify. In response, many of the Catholic cantons
498
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formed the Sonderbund in 1845 to protect their religious and political interests.501 This
violated the 1815 treaty between the cantons, which prohibited special alliances, and as a
result, members of the Sonderbund attempted to withdraw from the Conference of
Delegates causing hostilities to break out.
Although the Swiss Civil War (known as the Sonderbund War or
Sonderbundskrieg) was both short and limited (it lasted less than a month and saw fewer
than 100 killed), the defeat of the Sonderbund led directly to the Federal Constitution of
1848. After being negotiated in the Tagsatzung, it was submitted to the cantons for a
vote.502 Two-thirds of the cantons approved the new constitution, leading to its
acceptance by the Tagsatzung on September 12, 1848 and marking the official beginning
of the modern federation of Switzerland.503 This first constitution was a federal one,
establishing a new national order of government. Some substantial revisions were made
in a new constitution in 1874, notably granting the central government greater lawmaking and financial powers and expanding the elements of direct democracy by
allowing for referendums at the federal level. It is this constitution that forms the basis of
the modern political institutions of Switzerland.

Government and Political Structure
Inspired by the example of the United States as well as their own history, the
Swiss have a federal government founded on bicameralism as well as a unique executive.
The Federal Assembly consists of two chambers: the National Council (similar to the
501
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House of Representatives) and the Council of States (similar to the Senate or the Swiss’
own Tagsatzung). The National Council acts as the representative house, with 200
councillors elected by the people using a system of proportional representation. The seats
are allocated in varying number to each canton based upon its share of the national
population.504 The Council of States acts as the body for cantonal interests in the federal
government. There are 46 Councillors, two coming from each “full” canton and one from
each “half” canton and these Councillors are elected in a manner determined by each
canton.505 Article 148 stipulates that these bodies “shall be of equal standing”,
demonstrating the importance placed on both democratic and federal principles in the
Swiss government.
The Swiss executive demonstrates elements of the consensual and federal political
traditions which are intrinsic to their governing institutions. Rather than the election of a
single individual, such as the American President, the Swiss Federal Assembly elects a
seven person body known as the Federal Council. Each member of the Federal Council
heads their own ministry and though there is an annually-chosen President, this individual
is at most a “first amongst equals”.506 Another important difference between this body
and executives found in some other federations is that it follows a power-sharing
philosophy that attempts to represent the major political, social, religious and linguistic
504
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groups. This is not simply an issue of providing a unified appearance for the sake of
public relations, but rather a political calculation.
Without the support of these groups, the Council would likely lack influence with the
factions present in both chambers of the Federal Assembly and thus, have their power to
influence legislation greatly curtailed.507
Cantonal governments are similar to the federal government of the
Confederation.508 Each canton is led by an executive council composed of five to seven
members. As with the national executive, these ministers are equal and have specific
responsibilities. The only significant difference is that the cantonal executives are
directly elected by the people as opposed to the members of the assembly which is how
selection occurs at the federal level.509 The representatives to the cantonal legislatures are
elected by proportional representation similar to their federal counterparts (the exact
details are governed by cantonal constitutions).510 The primary difference between the
federal and cantonal legislatures lies in the fact that most cantonal governments are
unicameral, as opposed to the bicameral nature of the Federal Assembly.511
The unique nature of Swiss politics does not come from their peculiar executive or
bicameral legislature however, but from the existence of several avenues of direct
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democracy. First, all constitutional amendments must pass through a national
referendum, guaranteeing the people the final say over changes to Switzerland’s
fundamental law. This includes a double majority system that requires that successful
amendments receive support from both a numerical majority as well as a majority of
cantons (again, supporting the balance of democratic and federal principles). Second,
citizens are able to propose constitutional amendments independently of the legislative
process. By securing the support of 8 cantons or a petition signed by 50,000 citizens
(30,000 until 1977), a citizen or organization can have an amendment put to referendum,
ensuring that elites in the federal government are not able to monopolize the political
agenda. Finally, a measure introduced in the 1874 constitutional reforms brought in
popular review of federal legislation. Although no judicial review exists for federal
legislation in Switzerland, any law passed by the federal government may be challenged
by a citizen or organization (provided they can secure the same threshold of support as if
they were putting forth a constitutional amendment). If the referendum is successful, the
legislation is struck down. Although not a common occurrence, it provides an additional
level of popular control over the government of Switzerland.512

Intergovernmental Agreements in Switzerland
Swiss intergovernmental agreements are known as concordats and they are an
important element of Swiss federalism. 513 Unlike other federations such as Australia or
Canada where intergovernmental agreements have emerged as useful, but de facto
instruments, concordats are entrenched in the Swiss Constitution in Article 48. The first
512
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subsection outlines the basis for these accords: “The Cantons may enter into agreements
with each other and establish common organizations and institutions. In particular, they
may jointly undertake tasks of regional importance together.”514 Further paragraphs
specify that concordats are not to be “contrary to the law, to the interests of the
Confederation or to the rights of other cantons”, setting a minimum required standard for
their acceptance. In terms of their legal status though, the Constitution only clarifies that
agreements cannot be contrary to the law, not that they are law. However, Swiss
jurisprudence treats concordats as "binding 'intercantonal law'", establishing them as
formal, legal treaties.515 The rules for approving concordats differ from canton to canton,
though in a majority, the legislature must pass them as a law.516
The data for Switzerland were collected from the University of Fribourg's Institute
for Federalism, which until 2005, maintained a database of concordats concluded in
Switzerland. As this database contained a comprehensive listing of agreements, whether
bilateral, regional or national, it provides strong evidence that concordats are an important
part of Swiss intergovernmental relations for there are hundreds listed. However, it
seems that the Constitution was unintentionally prophetic because “tasks of regional
importance” seem to dominate, as opposed to national matters. Linder and Vatter have
observed that concordats tend to form around regional blocs, instead of national
consensus, with eastern, German-speaking cantons seeming to be more active than French
or Italian ones.517 Unanimity (or anything approaching it) is difficult and rare, as only 15
concordats include more than 90% of cantons. They have been created at a rate of 0.25
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per year (listed in Appendix E). Having the record of Swiss concordats between 1945 and
2005 has also allowed the inclusion of a selection of other multilateral concordats, in
order to give a more comprehensive picture of Swiss agreements. These agreements are
listed in Table 8.4 at the end of this chapter.

1. The Degree of Overlap that Exists in the Constitution
Switzerland’s division of powers finds similarities with those in Germany and
Austria, specifically in its form of administrative federalism.518 These federations are
known for having constitutions that grant broad legislative authority to central
governments while leaving the subnational governments with the authority to implement
government programs. Thus, when examining overlap in Switzerland and its propensity
to affect the formation of agreements, there are two areas to examine: strict overlap of
legislative competencies as defined by the constitution (for example, the fact that both the
Confederation and cantonal governments are responsible for certain types of roads) and
overlap created by administrative requirements (such as the enactment of federal
environmental regulations by cantonal authorities).
In the first instance, legislative competencies, Watts’ comparison of competencies
allocated by federal constitutions provides a useful starting point for examining the
degree of overlap. Of the 47 areas that Watts finds enumerated in the Swiss Federal
Constitution, 23 of these (49%) have some kind of shared jurisdiction between the federal
and cantonal governments (see Appendix H).519 This number of overlapping jurisdictions
is comparable to Canada (46%), but well short of Australia (70%) and Germany (75%)
518
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which are clear leaders in legislative overlap. Much of the overlap seems to be
concentrated in the area of social affairs (which will be discussed specifically in a later
section) and management of the environment.520
It is worth noting that the constitutional revisions of 1999 have increased the
degree of overlap and the potential for intergovernmental collaboration. A new Article 45
was included to reaffirm the importance of communication and cooperative decisionmaking between the Confederation and the cantons.521 Concerns over how the Swiss will
engage internationally, specifically with the European Union, led to the adoption of
Article 55, which explicitly provides for consultations with the cantons on relevant
foreign policy decisions.522
The second instance of overlap, created by the system of administrative
federalism, does not seem to create fertile grounds for agreements. Certain policy areas –
notably agriculture, civil and criminal law, social security and environmental protection are specifically divided between the federal and cantonal governments, with legislation
determined by the former and implementation by the latter.523 These are not the only
areas of cantonal implementation of federal legislation. The Confederation possesses no
“parallel federal administration with its own regional services”, meaning that it is reliant
upon the cantons for implementation of most of its programs, including those explicitly in
federal jurisdiction.524 This opens up potential areas of administrative overlap to include
most of the constitutionally-enumerated policy areas. It also makes it much more difficult
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to determine whether or not Swiss governments are holding to a strict division of powers,
as both the Confederation and the cantons end up being active in most areas.
The numerous areas of overlap, while providing the possibility for national
concordats, have not led to large numbers of national agreements, as is the case in
Australia or Germany. Any need for coordination between the different spheres of
government, as well as between cantons in these areas, seems to be fulfilled in one of two
ways. Firstly, the Swiss traditions of administrative federalism seem to allow for
substantial cantonal flexibility in implementation.525 This allows for federal legislation to
serve as the means of coordinating many areas of overlapping jurisdiction. Further
coordination, via an intergovernmental agreement, could either be redundant or unable to
bridge the wide differences between the cantons. This leads into the second means of
coordination, the regional concordat. As opposed to the much rarer national concordat,
regional accords seem to be much more prevalent.
Switzerland’s Constitution allows for fewer instances of legislative overlap than
many of the other federations in this study; however, the system of administrative
federalism in Switzerland provides at least some opportunities for overlap and thus, a
need for coordination. Despite the initial potential, this coordination seems be achieved
via means other than national intergovernmental agreements. It seems that overlap
between the jurisdictions of the Swiss federal government and the cantons provides
limited grounds for the creation of agreements or is being overridden by more influential
features.
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2. The Degree of Centralization in the Constitutional Division of Powers
The Swiss Confederation has long been held up as the quintessential case of a
decentralized federation. Existing as a confederation of independent states for over 500
years, Switzerland`s political culture placed great importance on the constituent units, as
opposed to the central government. This was affirmed in Article 3 of the Federal
Constitution, which states: “(t)he Cantons are sovereign to the extent that their
sovereignty is limited by the Federal Constitution. They shall exercise all rights that are
not vested in the Confederation.” More than simply allocating reserve powers to the
cantons, this Article affirms the Swiss tradition of cantonal sovereignty, which is the basis
of its “non-centralized” nature.526
Despite this history of decentralization and powerful subnational governments,
from a purely constitutional standpoint, the Swiss federation does not appear as a
decentralized or non-centralized state. Returning to Watts’ comparison of constitutional
competencies, 23 policy areas, or 49%, are the sole responsibility of the federal
government while only 4 areas, or 8%, are entirely reserved to the cantons.527 Of the
seven cases considered here, only the United Kingdom reserves so many areas of
jurisdiction solely to the central government. A similar trend is found in Linder’s
description of the “main powers of the federation and cantons” as the Cantons have
exclusive legislative power over only 2 of 16 areas (Police and Churches). In contrast,
the federal government has complete legislative jurisdiction over 7 areas, as well as
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another 2 areas which specifically require implementation by the cantons.528 While there
is also a high level of concurrency and joint responsibility, it should be noted that in the
case of conflict, federal legislation takes precedence (Article 49). This has the potential
to further centralize the practical division of powers beyond those already reserved to the
federal government, though it seems to be a rare phenomenon due to the consensual
nature of Swiss democracy.529
This apparent centralization raises a couple of questions. One, how does a noncentralized federation acquire such a seemingly centralized constitution? Two, does this
constitutional division of powers lead to a centralized federation in practice, or are there
countervailing factors? If this centralization holds true under scrutiny, then it would help
explain the lack of national intergovernmental agreements because a high degree of
centralization would reduce the likelihood of these accords..
The original Constitution in 1848 was seen by many factions in Switzerland as
leaving too little power in the hands of the federal government, leading to a coalition of
the Radical and Democratic parties to seek constitutional change in 1874.530 If
decentralization was originally a concern, then it is worth examining the Swiss
constitutional change to understand later centralization. Unlike the other federations
considered here, the Swiss high court, known as the Federal Tribunal, has no authority to
rule on the constitutionality of federal legislation.531 In the Swiss tradition of direct
democracy, the decision of whether a piece of federal legislation is constitutional – or for
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that matter, simply whether it is desirable – is left with the people, who can challenge and
repeal any federal act through a referendum.532 Thus, any centralization cannot be
attributed to the judicial interpretation of the Constitution, as is often argued in the United
States. Because Article 3 grants reserve powers to the cantons, the lack of judicial review
as a means of informal constitutional reform leaves formal constitutional reform as the
only primary avenue of centralization. The mandatory referendum associated with any
potential change means that changes cannot exist solely as a compromise between
politicians.
To students of American and Canadian federalism, reliance upon only formal
constitutional change might indicate that relatively little has changed in the Swiss
Constitution in 150 years. Quite the opposite has occurred however, as the Swiss
Constitution has seen dozens of changes. Between two major periods of reform in 1874
and 1976, there were 88 successful amendments to the Constitution.533 An additional 64
proposals were accepted between 1976 and 1997, indicating that constitutional reform has
been an ongoing process for the Swiss.534 Examining these amendments, Aubert and
Grisel identify a clear trend:
Most of the amendments since 1874 have granted the Confederation additional
powers. This was notably the case in the fields of civil and penal law (1898),
economic law (1908, 1947, 1981 and 1982), social security, transportation,
energy, town and country planning (1969), protection of the environment (1971),
culture, and taxation, and protection of tenants (1986).535
532

Challenges to federal legislation are known as “Optional Referenda” (as opposed to Mandatory
Referenda, which must take place to ratify changes to the Federal Constitution). Article 141 specifies the
general procedures as well as what actions of the federal government are eligible for review.
533
Aubert and Grisel (17) also record that 83 proposed amendments were rejected. The vast majority of
successful amendments (81 of 88) were supported by some elements of Parliament, while the majority of
unsuccessful amendments (56 of 83) were proposed by citizens. This demonstrates the importance of
elected representatives, even in a context of direct democracy.
534
Wolf Linder, "Swiss Politics Today," in The Making of Modern Switzerland, 1848-1998, ed. Michael
Butler, Malcolm Pender and Joy Charnley, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 100.
535
Aubert and Grisel, "The Swiss Federal Constitution," 18.

257

Constitutional change, therefore, has been both frequent and centralizing in nature; the
necessity of formal amendments approved by referendum has not proved to be a great
barrier to increasing centralization.536
This explains how the Constitution sets out a centralized division of powers, but
not whether it functions this way in practice. Watts recognized this dichotomy by
observing that while the formal division of powers is indeed quite centralized, in practice,
the cantons hold a great deal of autonomy in the implementation of federal legislation,
leading to a more decentralized federation.537 Additionally, the cantons maintain strong
financial powers that further empower them (this will be discussed in greater detail on the
section concerning the spending power).
As was the case with the investigation into overlap, the constitutional
centralization presented by the Swiss style of administrative federalism can help explain
the limited number of national intergovernmental agreements. We would expect fewer
national intergovernmental agreements from a centralized federation because legislation
from the central government can accomplish the task of achieving coordination between
the constituent units. Effectively, this is what seems to be occurring in the Swiss case.
Federal legislation lays out the parameters of a particular policy and then the cantons have
a great deal of leeway in implementing this; a national agreement would be redundant.
Instead, there seem to be a significant number of regional agreements to further
536
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coordinate between cantons whose policies would be similar. For the purposes of
explaining the formation of intergovernmental agreements, the high level of centralization
in the constitutional division of powers has a clear effect, despite the decentralized
realities of policy implementation.

3. The Size and Status of the Federal Spending Power
In the analysis of the constitutional division of powers, Switzerland was found to
have a comparatively high degree of centralization, especially given the country’s
reputation for decentralized governance. This reputation appears more deserved when
examining the distribution of financial powers and the status of the federal spending
power.
As was the case with the constitutional division of powers, fiscal powers in
Switzerland start from a position of non-centralization, with a slow, but clear movement
towards increased centralization over time.538 Unlike the constitutional division of
power, however, the end result of this is that fiscal powers have remained mostly
decentralized. Between 1974 and 1994, Thorlakson observed that the federal
government’s share of government revenues rose from 53% to 64%, while its share of
expenditures rose from 43 to 52%.539 However, more recently, it seems that the growth
of federal revenues has halted and even retreated, as Watts found the federal share
dropped from 44.7% in 1993 to 40% by 2004.540 Indeed, Switzerland remains one of the
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most decentralized federations when it comes to raising revenue.541 Compared to
federations such as South Africa or Australia, in which the federal government controls
upwards of 75% of all government revenues, Switzerland’s federal government possesses
less financial leverage that might be used to advocate national policies which could
produce intergovernmental agreements.
While the fiscal basis for the federal spending power may be narrower in
Switzerland than other federations, the use of it in practice is certainly not restricted. In
legal theory, the Swiss Constitution restricts federal spending only to those areas in which
the federal government has legislative authority.542 However, as the analysis of the
division of powers demonstrated, the federal government has broad legislative powers
which grant it at least some access to almost all government business. The federal
government’s extensive financial reach is further enhanced by the lack of judicial review
of federal legislation.543 With no court to rule whether a particular federal spending
program is ultra vires, the only legal checks are citizen-initiated referenda. Moreover,
seventy percent of all federal transfers are conditional, with no opt-out provisions.544 As
such, while the difference in fiscal capabilities between the federal and cantonal
governments is less than in other federations, the legal and effective reach of federal
spending is as great or greater.
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Table 8.1: Percentage of Subnational Revenue from Federal Grants (Switzerland)545

SWI

1972
30.81

1975
28.10

1980
27.11

1985
25.64

1990
30.22

1995
28.95

2000
30.97

2005
28.94

2007
28.76

AVG
28.83

Rank
4

In terms of the use of the federal spending power through transfers, Switzerland
ranks somewhere between low to average compared with other federations. Table 8.1
indicates the percentage of cantonal revenue that comes from federal grants, using data
gathered from the International Monetary Fund. While Switzerland does not exhibit the
lowest percentages, averaging 28.83% between 1972 and 2007, it is comparable to figures
in the United States (26.56%) or Canada (19.83%). The Swiss are also significantly
below Australia (48.67%), as well as South Africa and the United Kingdom, both of
which see more than 90% of subnational budgets dependent upon federal grants. Thus,
while this federal contribution is not insignificant, cantonal governments are less
financially dependent than subnational governments in other federations. However, as
Kirchgassner, and also Watts, explain, the consensual nature of Swiss democracy means
that the use of the spending power is the product of careful deliberations between the
federal government, cantons and other powerful interests.546
As it pertains to the formation of intergovernmental agreements, the effect of the
Swiss federal spending power is somewhat inconclusive. While it has a potentially broad
and powerful effect, given the lack of legal restrictions, Swiss cantons are less financially
susceptible to its influence based upon their comparatively greater fiscal resources. In the
same instance, federal transfers still make up a sizeable portion of cantonal revenues, so
federal influence cannot be completely discounted. Fortunately, the record of agreements
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Results were collected from the IMF's World Financial Yearbook series.
Kirchgassner, "Swiss Confederation," 329-333. Watts, The Spending Power in Federal Systems, 17-19.
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can break this potential deadlock. The low number of agreements might suggest the
limited effect that the spending power has in driving agreement formation in Switzerland.
However, given the fact that the spending power is not especially strong, this should not
be a particularly shocking result. What is more telling is the type of agreements that have
been concluded. The largest number (4 or approximately 27%) concern matters of Justice
and Law, not a realm where the spending power is directly applicable. Moreover, even
some agreements that fall into policy fields such as Education and Economic Regulation
seem to have limited connection to the spending power (for example, the Intercantonal
Agreement on the Recognition of Diplomas or the Agreement on the Sale of Salt). While
the policy areas of agreements will be discussed more fully in the next section on the
welfare state, the overall lack of intergovernmental agreements combined with the limited
number of these that could have been prompted by use of the spending indicate a limited
role for it in explaining the formation of Swiss intergovernmental agreements.

4. The Size and Scope of the Welfare State
One consistent theme across all of the cases being studied in this investigation is
the establishment and growth of the welfare state. The Swiss are no exception to this
trend, seeing the establishment of many programs as well as significant increases in
spending that have outpaced most other countries in the last thirty years.

Table 8.2: Swiss Welfare Spending as a Percentage of GDP547

Switzerland

547

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 AVG Rank
13.5 14.5 13.4 17.5 17.9 20.3 16.18
4

Data collected from the OECD Social Expenditure Database.
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Table 8.2 demonstrates the growth of Swiss welfare spending as a function of
GDP, rising just under 7% over a 25 year period. By contrast, Canada – which began this
period with a nearly identical welfare spending percentage at 13.7% - rose to just 16.5%,
while the Americans went from 13.1% to 15.9%. While the Swiss are still only ranked 4th
in average spending out of the seven cases, the increase has been the largest over this
period leaving them in third place with 20.3% (and closer to the U.K.’s 21.3% than
Australia’s 17.1%).
Some of these dramatic increases in spending can be explained by the fact that the
development of the Swiss welfare state has lagged behind other countries. Comparing the
Swiss welfare state with OECD averages, Armingeon found that Switzerland established
major federal welfare programs such as health insurance, unemployment insurance,
family allowance and pensions between eight to seventy years later than the average year
in other countries.548 The principal explanation offered for the slow development of the
Swiss welfare state is the constitutional division of powers and the role of referenda in the
amendment process. In order to establish a national program, such as compulsory health
insurance, the Federal Constitution must be amended to grant that power to the federal
government. This means that such a change must gain approval in a national referendum
that requires a double majority as well as support in the Federal Assembly, and a number
of proposals have been delayed and even rejected by this process.549
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Table 8.3: Swiss Welfare Spending as a Percentage of Total Federal Spending550

SWI

1972 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 AVG Rank
61.18 65.22 64.63 67.06 67.06 71.98 71.49 65.21 75.41 67.69
2

The growth of the Swiss welfare state is also apparent when examining the total
percentage of federal spending allocated to it. Initially, spending rose slowly, gaining
only 6 points in the eighteen years between 1972 and 1990. However, between 1990 and
2007 federal spending rose from 67% to 75% (the implementation of compulsory health
insurance during the years 1994-96 explains much of this increase).551
Comparing these increases with other federations, the Swiss do not stand out in
the same way as when we consider welfare spending as a percentage of GDP. The
federal government of Switzerland increased its expenditures by 14% over this 35 year
period, but this was matched or exceeded by other federations including Australia (14%),
Canada (18%) and the United Kingdom (27%). What is notable however, is the high
percentage of the Swiss federal budget that is allocated towards welfare spending. With
the exception of an aberrant decrease in 2005, Switzerland ranked either first or second in
welfare state expenditures.
This data indicates a significant and growing welfare state in Switzerland, both in
terms of programs and spending, surely creating the potential for the generation of
intergovernmental agreements based on the coordination of welfare policies. Despite this
potential, Switzerland has not produced a large number of national agreements pertaining
to the welfare state. Switzerland ranks well behind Australia, Canada and Germany in
both absolute numbers of agreements as well as yearly averages, and yet, by any measure,
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Swiss welfare spending outpaces Canada and Australia (while closing in on Germany).
This contrast indicates that the existence of a large and growing welfare state is not, by
itself, enough to produce agreements – at least in the case of Switzerland. Some of this
can be attributed to the use of constitutional amendments to establish the welfare state. In
Australia and Canada, the new programs and policies of the welfare state required the
federal and state/provincial governments to negotiate in order to accommodate these new
developments within the existing constitutional order. In contrast, the people of
Switzerland eventually allocated primary authority over welfare programs to the federal
government through constitutional referenda, potentially limiting the opportunities for
new agreements.
The lack of welfare state agreements is further confirmed if the agreements
themselves are examined. In terms of the policy fields occupied by the agreements, a
quarter falls into the category of Justice and Law, making it the most numerous category.
The second-most numerous area, education, would seem to lend some support to the
theory that welfare spending could stimulate the creation of agreements. Among these,
there is at least one coordination agreement (recognition of other diplomas) that would
likely persist whatever the level of spending. A large number of agreements based upon
programs of the welfare state might indicate the influence of these types of programs on
the development of national agreements; however, the results do not demonstrate this.
Moreover, if the growth of spending and welfare programs is related to the formation of
these agreements, we might expect to see two spikes in the number of agreements made.
The first should occur between 1990 and 1995, when welfare spending jumped
dramatically, from 13.4% of GDP to 17.5%, an increase of 4.1%; a second significant
increase in agreements might be expected between 2000 and 2005, with spending rising
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from 17.9% to 20.3%, an increase of 2.4%. Examining the record of agreement
formation, it is clear that the latter period’s increase did not drive the creation of many
national intergovernmental agreements, as only one – an agreement concerning lotteries
and gaming – was formed. The earlier period between 1990 and 1995, however, is one of
the busiest for the formation of agreements as four were concluded at this time. A closer
examination of these agreements would seem to indicate, however, that they are not direct
results of the growth of the welfare state. Only one agreement falls into a category
directly associated with the welfare state (Education) and, as previously mentioned, it
would seem to pertain to basic coordination instead of spending. Of the other
agreements, only one, the Intercantonal Agreement on Government Procurement, might
be related to these spending increases. Even in this case, concerns over procurement
might indicate a “spill-over” effect of welfare spending, but this is debatable. The most
sympathetic reading of agreement formation between 1990 and 1995 would say that
sizeable increases in welfare spending led to one new agreement, which given the size of
the increase, is not a very significant result.
Thus, the record of agreement formation provides evidence that Switzerland,
despite its continuing increases in welfare state spending and their relative importance to
government finances, has not seen a related increase in national intergovernmental
agreements. The one important caveat that must be placed on this conclusion is that
while this is the pattern at the national level, it is not necessarily the case at the regional
level. For example, the period between 2000 and 2005 saw a great deal of activity
between some of the cantons on social policy, leading to a number of agreements
concerning social institutions, joint funding of several education ventures and
compensations for expenses associated with intercantonal cooperation (see Table 8.4).
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Likewise, looking beyond this period, there are a number of smaller multilateral
agreements coordinating income support programs or hospital funding, yet these do not
seem to move to the national level. The issues of regional versus national agreements
will be explored in the section six, concerning the number of subnational governments.

5. The Existence of Lasting Forums for Intergovernmental Relations
In the case of Switzerland, the issue is not focused on determining whether bodies
for intergovernmental relations exist, but rather, if they have any effects on the formation
of intergovernmental agreements. More than 500 intercantonal organizations have been
identified as having been active at one point during modern Swiss history.552 Prominent
among these are the Conferences of Cantonal Directors, which cover policy areas
including Education and Social Affairs. This multitude of intergovernmental bodies is
likely a function of a number of factors. First, the large number of cantonal governments
invariably makes it easier to find common ground in smaller groups.553 Second, the
degree of diversity in Switzerland allows for particular conferences and associations to
develop around cultural, linguistic and religious cleavages, such as associations for
French and Italian education ministers. Finally, Watts has observed that federations with
a doctrine of separation of powers in government tend to have intergovernmental relations
that are more “dispersed”.554 All these factors have likely combined to produce a web of
intergovernmental forums, many of which are focused either on a smaller number of
participants or a particular policy area. Judging from the record of national
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intergovernmental agreements, the specific policy forums seem to have been largely
unable or unwilling to conclude formal, national accords. The Swiss Conference of
Cantonal Ministers of Education (EDK) appears to be one of the few successes in this
regard, with three national education agreements.555
In recent years however, a “peak institution” for Swiss intergovernmental
relations seems to have begun to emerge. Following the passage of a rare unanimous
concordat in 1993, the twenty-six cantons formed the Conference of Cantonal
Governments (often abbreviated as CdC after its name in French: Conference Des
Gouvernements Cantonaux) to act as a permanent body for intergovernmental relations.
With the Council of States popularly elected by the 1990s, the cantons sought a new
forum for intergovernmental relations.556 Serving as a body of executive federalism, the
Conference was formed so that the cantons would be able to coordinate policy among
themselves, especially in matters that involved the federal government.557 In particular,
the cantons were interested in combining their efforts in order to influence federal
policies concerning European integration and other issues of international relations.558
Assessing the effects of the Conference of Cantonal Governments is an interesting
task. Two of Switzerland’s national concordats since 1993 were developed, at least in
part, through the Conference, 559 while new federal legislation in agriculture and scientific

555

1970 Concordat on School Coordination, 1997 Intercantonal University Agreement and the Intercantonal
Agreement on Specialized High Schools. Switzerland. Conférence suisse des directeurs cantonaux de
l'instruction publique, "Liste des accords, 2011," http://www.edk.ch/dyn/14937.php (accessed March 25,
2010).
556
Schmitt, "Swiss Confederation," 360.
557
Ibid., 353.
558
Linder and Vatter, "Institutions and Outcomes of Swiss Federalism," 105.
559
Concordats on Procurement (1994) and Reducing Trade Barriers (1998) are listed on the Conference’s
website. Switzerland, Conférence Des Gouvernements Cantonaux, "Accords sectoriels: Contrats et prises
de position des cantons," 2010, http://www.kdk.ch/int/kdk/fr/wissen/bilatabk/accords_sectorielles.html
(accessed March 25, 2010).

268

research has been influenced.560 When compared to the Council of Australian
Governments (its contemporary as a body for intergovernmental relations), it clearly has
not been as active in the production of agreements, yet this should not be taken to mean
that the Conference has a minimal effect of Swiss intergovernmental relations generally
or agreement formation specifically. While pessimistic of the usefulness of other Swiss
intergovernmental bodies, Linder and Vatter do highlight the Conference as one body
with growing influence.561 Schmitt credits the Conference in part for some of the
revisions in the 1999 Constitution (specifically Articles 42-48 and 55 and 56) which
provide a stronger role for the cantonal governments in federal policy.562 According to
Fleiner, these constitutional changes further empower the executive branches of cantonal
governments, which will in turn support the work and influence of the Conference.563
Thus, while the impact has been minimal in the creation of agreements so far, the
Conference of Cantonal Governments does provide a lasting forum for intergovernmental
relations. With the changes to the Federal Constitution increasing its relevance, it
provides the potential for further development of intergovernmental agreements.

6. The Number of Subnational Governments at the State/Provincial Level
Despite being the smallest federation in this investigation, both in terms of
population and geographic area, Switzerland is ranked second in the number of
subnational governments with twenty-six564, ranking behind only the United States.
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While some distinction is made between “full” cantons and “half” cantons in the laws
governing referenda and the Council of States, for the purposes of intergovernmental
relations (and all other interactions), all twenty-six have equal standing.565 With only 15
national intergovernmental agreements over a 50 year period (an average of 0.25 per
year), the lack of agreements in consistent with what might be expected from a federation
with many subnational governments. 566 However, further examination is required to
identify the true effect of the number of subnational governments as opposed to some of
the other factors that have been discussed.
Having the complete record of Swiss intergovernmental agreements affords the
luxury of being able to identify patterns of agreement formation beyond the national
level. These data make clear that the Swiss are not adverse to the formation of formal
intergovernmental agreements. Table 8.4 details a selection of large multilateral or
regional agreements and this does not include the even larger number of bilateral or
smaller multilateral (three to five participants) concordats. Much like the American case,
formal coordination between a small number of cantons is quite common, but once a
national consensus is attempted, success is less certain. As Linder and Vatter report,
regional agreements have been easier to conclude, especially among a number of the

1978). Carved out of the existing territory of Bern (which the original territory of Jura had been added to
back in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna), the people living in this northern region of Bern had sought
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opposed to those federations that add new units via expansion, such as occurred in the Reunification of
Germany). See: Linder, Swiss Democracy.
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eastern cantons, while there has been less collaboration between the French and Italian
speaking states.567
This last point does raise one important question in the case of Switzerland: are
the problems with national coordination more of an issue pertaining to linguistic and
cultural cleavages as opposed to numerical difficulties? While it would not be
unexpected to observe greater cooperation among members of the same linguistic bloc,
this is not a clear pattern amongst the agreements. Of the non-Germanic cantons, Jura,
Geneva, Neuchatel and Vaud speak primarily French, while Bern, Fribourg and Valais
include both French and German, and finally Ticino and Graubunden speak Italian and
German/Italian respectively. However, if we examine those agreements that almost meet
the required 90% threshold for consideration as a national agreement, we see that while
Geneva has most often elected not to join a concordat, there is not another single canton
or group of cantons that is opposed to joining one of these near-national agreements. Of
the six concordats with between twenty and twenty-three consenting cantons, only eight –
Aargau, Appenzell Innerrhoden, Fribourg, Graubunden, Obwalden, St. Gallen and Ticino
– have agreed to all of them.568 The examination of these agreements demonstrates that
there is not one particular linguistic or cultural group that is consistently opting out of the
largest agreements. With no pattern along Switzerland’s linguistic and cultural cleavages,
it is much easier to consider that a particular concordat might not meet the needs of every
canton, a coordination problem made more difficult by the large number of them. This is
not to suggest that the linguistic and cultural differences have no effect, but rather that
567
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these are likely to exacerbate the coordination difficulties presented by more than twodozen subnational governments, rather than provide a barrier by themselves.

7. The Existence of a Body for Intrastate Federalism
Switzerland possesses a partial degree of intrastate federalism based upon the
Council of States, the second chamber of the Federal Assembly. The Council has
tangible powers, allows for equal representation for subnational governments, but the
representatives are directly elected by the people as opposed to representing their
respective cantonal governments making full intrastate federalism an impossibility.
Before 1848, the Swiss Confederation depended upon the Tagsatzung or
Conference of Delegates for reaching decisions on common matters. When the cantons
formed their new federation, this body became the Council of States as part of a
bicameral federal legislature. Acting as a legislative body premised on federal
representation, the seats in the Council are allocated based on the equality of states,
providing two for each canton. The exception to this is the place of six “half-cantons”,
which each receive one representative. The existence of half-cantons is due to the fact
that the original Federal Constitution in 1848 granted equal representation for all of the
initial 22 cantons, including Unterwalden, Appenzell and Basel.569 These cantons did not
remain unified and became divided, with Obwalden, Nidwalden, Appenzell Ausserhoden,
Appenzell Innerhoden, Basel-Stadt and Basel-Landschaft emerging in their place. As
each of these governments was seen as representing half of the original cantons, each was
given half the representation, allowing the preservation of equality amongst all full
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cantons.570 This allows for the first element of intrastate federalism, the ability for the
subnational governments to meet on relatively equal footing, rather than have the more
populous cantons (such as Zurich and Bern) dominate.
It is in the selection of representatives where the Council of States does not meet
the requirements of a body for full intrastate federalism. Currently, all cantons elect their
representatives to the Council of States via direct election; these representatives serve a
four year term, the same as members of the National Council. Unlike other federations
with similar legislative chambers, such as Australia or the United States, this selection
method is not specifically stipulated in the Constitution or federal law. According to
Article 150, paragraph 3 of the Constitution: “(t)he Cantons shall determine the rules for
the election of their representatives to the Council of States”. In practice, this means that
the cantons determine the eligibility of candidates, the election method and even the term
limits. During the 19th century, this usually meant election by cantonal legislatures.571
By the 1950s, popular election (or election in a canton’s Landsgemeinde) had replaced
legislative selection in all but four cantons.572 With the rise of popularly-elected
representatives, the potential for the Council of States to act as a body of intrastate
federalism has become limited.
With that said, there still exists the potential for cantonal governments to have
some direct input into the Council, through their representatives. A unique feature of the
Swiss Council of States is the ability of its members to sit concurrently in both the
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Council and in their respective cantonal legislatures.573 Approximately twenty percent of
Councillors currently sit at both the federal and cantonal level; in the past, this option was
more prevalent with members of cantonal executives serving as Councillors.574 Despite
this interesting instance of overlap between the cantonal and federal legislatures, the
Council of States only exhibits a partial degree of intrastate federalism. For the Council
to truly act as an alternative to intergovernmental relations, all or virtually all Councillors
would have to sit in cantonal legislatures, instead of just a small minority. Moreover, the
Constitution places substantial constraints on the cantons influencing representatives one
way or another. Article 161 explicitly prohibits voting in the Federal Assembly based on
the instructions of another person.575
In practice, the Council of States seems to reflect the sectional and political
interests of their constituents, with the same political parties running in both it and the
National Council.576 As it does not serve the function of interstate federalism, the
Council of States should not impede the formation of intergovernmental agreements. The
lack of national agreements, therefore, cannot be primarily attributed to Swiss
bicameralism.

Conclusion
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Switzerland always provides a fascinating study for scholars of federalism and
this is no different for this investigation.

In this study, Switzerland presents an

interesting example of an established federation which has developed a limited number of
national agreements, as only 15 were formed between 1945 and 2005 (a rate of 0.25 per
year). This result is in spite of an active practice of intergovernmental relations, a large
and growing welfare state and no impediment from intrastate federalism.
Taken together with the other institutional features which may be conducive to the
formation of agreements however, it seems that these factors are average at best. While
Switzerland's growing welfare state may provide new opportunities for coordination and
thus, agreements, the Swiss style of administrative federalism seems to limit the potential
for intergovernmental agreements. In terms of legislative powers, the federal government
possesses the lion’s share of these and there is little overlap between the orders of
government. In practice however, the cantons have significant leeway in implementing
federal legislation, which could potentially provide features conducive to coordination.
Even with this flexibility, federal legislation can still serve a coordinating function
making this an average conducive factor at best. Additionally, while the creation of a
new, peak institution for intergovernmental relations in 1993 (the Conference of Cantonal
Governments) may provide new opportunities, regional bodies remain important in
intergovernmental relations.
While these institutional features do provide the potential for national
intergovernmental agreements, they are balanced against a powerful impediment.
Though Switzerland’s elected second chamber, the Council of States, provides only a
partial degree of intrastate federalism and thus, a marginal alternative to agreements, the
same cannot be said for the effect of the number of subnational governments.
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Switzerland’s 26 cantonal governments put it in second place, behind only the United
States. The coordination difficulty presented by so many governments may be further
exacerbated by the presence of the different linguistic and cultural communities in
Switzerland, creating an even greater barrier to national coordination and agreements.
The large number of regional agreements serves as evidence to the barriers of achieving
national consensus and demonstrates the strength of this impediment. Indeed, these
regional accords can even be included as a type of alternative to a national agreement.
Switzerland is a case where the distinction between national intergovernmental
agreements (the kind this study is concerned with) and smaller, multilateral/regional ones
is important. While regional associations and agreements flourish, the institutional
environment does not seem to provide the same prospects at the national level, as can be
seen in this summary formula:
CON (Moderate) – INH (Strong) – ALT (Few) = Limited IGA Formation
This summary of Swiss federalism is consistent with the record of agreement
formation in Switzerland, as Switzerland is a case where competing institutional forces
produce a federation with only a limited number of national agreements. Yet, though
Switzerland has formed a relatively low number of agreements in the past, there is the
potential for this to change in the future. The growing importance of the Conference of
Cantonal Governments, as well as the additional pressures of foreign policy (and the
powers that it grants executives) may yet be the impetus for a growth in agreements.
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Table 8.4: A Selection of Large Swiss Regional and Multilateral Agreements
Year

Swiss Agreement Title

Participants

1951

Concordat on non-federally licensed cable cars and ski All but BS, GE, SH &
lifts
TG (22 cantons total)

1955

Concordat concerning the prospecting and exploration
of oil

AG, AI, AR, GL, SG,
SH, SZ, TG, ZH

Intercantonal concordat punishing abuses of
conventional interest
Concordat on the execution of punishments and
measures according to the Swiss Penal Code and the
law of the cantons of Northwestern and Central
Switzerland (law enforcement concordat)
Intercantonal concordat founding the Forestry School
Lyss

BE, FR, GE, JU, NE,
SH, VD, VS

1957

1959

1968

1974

Concordat on the high school and vocational training
center of Wadenswil

1976

Intercantonal agreement on police cooperation

1976

1976

1977

1979
1981
1983

Agreement between the cantons of AI, AR, GL, GR,
SG, SH, TG and ZH on the enforcement of custodial
sentences and measures according to the Swiss Penal
Code and supplies in accordance with federal and
cantonal law
Agreement between the cantons and the Swiss Red
Cross regarding the professional training of nurses, the
medical-technical and the medical-therapeutic staff

AG, BE, BL, BS, LU,
NW, OW, SO, SZ,
UR, ZG
AG, BE, BL, FR, LU,
NE, TI, VS, ZH
AG, AR, BE, BL, GL,
GR, LU, SG, SH, SZ,
TG, UR, ZG, ZH
AI, AR, GL, GR, SG,
SH, TG
AI, AR, GL, GR, SG,
SH, TG, ZH

BL, BS, FR, JU, NE,
NW, SO

All but AG, AI, AR,
BE, SG, SO & ZH (19
cantons total)
All but BE, BS, JU,
Management agreement on the cost of intercantonal
SO, VS & ZH (20
police action under Article 16 of the BV
cantons total)
Agreement on the rehabilitation center for drug addices AI, AR, GL, GR, SG,
at Lutzenberg
SH, TG
Agreement between the Swiss BR and the Government
BE, BL, BS, JU, NE,
of the French Republic concerning the taxation of
SO, VD, VS
income from the work of border workers
Concordat on the enforcement of judgments in civil
matters
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Table 8.4: A Selection of Large Swiss Regional and Multilateral Agreements (Continued)
Year

Swiss Agreement Title
Participants
Intercantonal agreement on subsidies for operating
AG, AR, BL, BS, FR,
deficits and cooperation for the benefit of children and
1984
GL, JU, LU, OW, SG,
youth centers as well as for the disabled (home
SO ,SZ, TG, ZG
arrangement)
Concordat on the implementation of sentences and
FR, GE, JU, NE, TI,
1984
measures for adults and young adults in Romansh
VD, VS
speaking cantons and Ticino
Intercantonal convention for the training in health
BE, FR, GE, JU, NE,
1986 professions (except medical professionals) (agreement
TI, VD, VS
in 1996 on this)
AI, AR, GL, GR, NW,
Agreement on the development and operation of the
1990
OW, SG, SH, SZ, TG,
Intercantonal Forestry School at Maienfeld (FM)
TI, UR, ZG
Inter-regional agreement on contributions at nonAll but GE, JU, NE,
1992 university educational institutions in tertiary education
SO, VD & VS (20
(technical school agreement)
cantons total)
Agreement on cooperation in the hospital sector and the
AI, AR, GL, GR, SG,
1995
remuneration of hospital services (Eastern Hospital
SH, TG, ZH
Agreement)
Agreement on the cooperation and funding for the
AI, AR, GL, GR, SG,
1996
training of health care professionals
SH, TG, ZH
Intercantonal college (specialized schools) agreement All but AR, BL, GE &
1997
(FHV) for the years 1999-2005
UR (22 cantons total)
Intercantonal agreement on the contributions from the
AG, BL, BS, GL, JU,
cantons to the cost of education in vocational training in
1997
NE, NW, OW, SH,
agriculture and rural home economics (Agriculture
TG
Tuition Agreement)
All but AR, GE, LU,
1998 Intercantonal agreement on specialized colleges (FSV)
UR, VD & ZG (20
cantons total)
AG, AI, AR, GL, GR,
Intercantonal agreement on the university for special
1999
OW, SG, SH, SO, SZ,
education ZH
TG, ZG, ZH
Intercantonal agreement on coordinating university
BE, BS, FR, GE, LU,
1999
policy
NE, SG, TI, VD, ZH
Intercantonal agreement on contributions from the
AG, BE, FR, JU, NW,
2001
cantons in education and training costs in vocational
OW, SH, SO, TG, TI
education training (Vocational Agreement)
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Table 8.4: A Selection of Large Swiss Regional and Multilateral Agreements
(Continued)
Year

Swiss Agreement Title

Participants

2002

Intercantonal agreement on social institutions

AG, BE, BL, BS, JU, LU,
OW, SG, SO, SZ, VS

All but AR, BL, GE, GL,
2003
Intercantonal college agreement until 2005
GR, NE & UR (19
cantons total)
AG, BE, BL, BS, LU,
Concordat on the establishment and operation of an
2003
NW, OW, SZ, TI, UR,
intercantonal police school Hitzkirch
ZG
AI, BL, BS, FR, GL, GR,
Framework agreement for intercantoal cooperation
2005
OW, SO, SZ, TI, UR,
accompanied by compensation for expenses
ZG, ZH
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Chapter Nine: United Kingdom

Source: CIA World Factbook

Formal Name: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Capital: London, England
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Subnational Governments: Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales (there is no separate
subnational government for England).

Introduction:
The United Kingdom (UK) has an interesting place in this analysis as both the
oldest and the youngest case. England, the largest component of the union, has existed in
some form since the 10th century. The British Crown, the UK’s head of state, claims a
lineage that goes back to William the Conqueror, whose 1066 invasion established the
early foundations for the modern state. Devolved governments such as Scotland and
Wales also claim a long history, with Scotland existing as a kingdom as early as 843 and
Wales forming a principality during the 12th century. In contrast to these ancient origins,
the United Kingdom as a federal system is quite young; it was not until 1999 when
devolved governments and legislatures were established in Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland.577 Indeed, the UK government still does not refer to their new system of
governance as “federal,” preferring the term “devolution”. Despite these semantics, the
UK possesses a number of traditional features of federal systems – enumerated powers
for subnational governments, separate subnational legislatures, financial arrangements
and intergovernmental relations – as well as the existence of formal intergovernmental
agreements, crucial to this research. While it is still evolving, the United Kingdom
presents an interesting case for examining the role of intergovernmental agreements
within a nascent federal system.
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The first example of any type of decentralization is actually Home Rule in Northern Ireland from 1920
until 1973. However, this was seen as a special circumstance and was not intended to change the structure
of governance in the rest of the UK as the 1999 devolution did.
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History:
While the individual nation-states that comprise the United Kingdom have long
and rich histories in their own right, a reasonable starting point for the history of the UK
as a whole would be the consolidation and expansion of England. Following the Norman
invasion of 1066, the new rulers of England focused on gaining control of their own
territory, before expanding into other lands. The first act of unification came with the
English conquest of Wales by Edward I in 1282-83, which was then ratified into law by
the Statute of Rhuddlan in 1284.578 Any remaining Welsh autonomy was done away with
by Henry VIII, through the passage of the Laws in Wales Acts of 1536 and 1543, which
removed the final elements of Welsh administration and law (including the use of the
Welsh language in court), while granting English citizenship to Welsh nobility and
representation in Parliament.579 By the mid-16th century, England and Wales had become
a single political and legal unit.
Scotland, meanwhile, was in the designs of England as early as the 12th century
and by the 13th, Edward I, fresh from his Welsh conquests, attempted to have himself
proclaimed feudal overlord of Scotland in 1291. Though these claims did not come to
fruition, England and Scotland would engage in a number of wars and armed conflicts
over the next three centuries. Though these conflicts resolved little, the most significant
step towards their union came following the death of the childless (and thus, heirless)
Elizabeth I. James VI, King of the Scots was invited to become James I of England,
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This statute established Wales as a possession of the England, created new administrative divisions and
introduced English common law courts (though it did not fully remove all elements of Welsh law). As a
point of interest, this conquest also established a tradition that has persisted until the present: conferring the
title “Prince of Wales” on the firstborn son of the reigning monarch. In the original case, this was Edward
II, born while his father was attempting to subdue Wales, and granted the title to subsume the original
Welsh institution.
579
Vernon Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 6.
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creating a personal union of the two crowns.580 Though the kingdoms technically
remained separate (with independently-functioning Parliaments and courts), having a
single sovereign brought them closer together. Following the English Civil War, in
which both Parliaments rebelled against Charles I, and the interregnum, these two
countries were brought together in the Act of Union of 1707 as the Kingdom of Great
Britain. In this new union, Scotland retained some religious and legal autonomy, but it
was represented in and governed by the Parliament at Westminster, completing the
political union begun by James I.581 Alan Trench has described this as a means for
Scotland to gain some benefits through a partnership with England, rather than simply
being dominated militarily and economically by the larger power.582
The Irish path to union lay somewhere between the Welsh and the Scottish. It
began with English military dominance: Henry II had himself declared Lord of Ireland
following the defeat of the Irish High King in 1171. This established the English
monarch as the sovereign of Ireland (known as “the Lord of Ireland” until 1542 and King
or Queen, thereafter), though unlike in Wales, this was not accompanied by actual control
of the entire state.583 Beginning in the mid-16th century, the Tudor monarchs, Henry VIII
and Elizabeth I, sought real control to accompany their Irish crowns, and used their
military and economic power to subdue many of the autonomous clans. Despite the
English subjugation of Ireland and the personal union of the crowns in the English
580

James seems to have been invited by the English court based on his Tudor great grandmother, Margaret,
daughter of Henry VII, and his Protestant religion.
581
Bogdanor, , Devolution in the United Kingdom, 8-10.
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Alan Trench, “Introduction: territory, devolution and power in the United Kingdom,” in Devolution and
Power in the United Kingdom, ed. Alan Trench, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press,
2007), 3.
583
At times, the English King’s powers would extend barely beyond Dublin and nearby coastal settlements.
The rest of the country, known as “Beyond the Pale”, fell under the shifting authority of numerous clans. It
was this disunity in the rest of Ireland that allowed the King of England to claim the crown of Ireland
without actually controlling even a majority of the country.
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sovereign, it was more than 250 years later – and almost a century after Scotland – when
Ireland was brought into a union with Great Britain through the Act of Union of 1801.
Irreconcilable religious and cultural differences made this union short-lived as they
provided the seeds for Irish nationalism. By the late 19th century, strong Home Rule and
nationalist movements had arisen. By 1921, after decades of debate and armed conflict,
the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed, recognizing the independence of the Irish Free State
which comprised all of Ireland, minus six counties of Ulster which possessed large
Protestant populations (and became the territory of Northern Ireland).584
It was in Northern Ireland where the first devolved/federal elements began to
appear in the UK. The Parliament of Northern Ireland was given substantial powers to
legislate over local affairs and social policy.585 Although the government and legislature
were suspended in 1972 as “the Troubles” began, this arrangement demonstrated the
possibility of devolved government as well as the asymmetry that would define it. The
1970s also saw resurgent debates concerning Scottish and Welsh nationalism and the
possibility of devolution began to develop.586 While the Conservative administrations of
Margaret Thatcher and John Major were not responsive to what they saw as the
dismantling of the British state, Tony Blair’s Labour Party was elected in 1997 promising
to see devolution realized.587 Following successful referenda, a Parliament was formed in
Scotland, while Wales created a National Assembly. Home rule was also restored in
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The Irish Free State initially gained independence as a British Dominion and was still subject to the
British Crown as their foreign representatives. In practice however, this meant fairly limited powers. The
establishment of the Irish Republic in 1948 ended this lingering relationship with the UK and the British
Crown.
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The Government of Ireland Act 1920 primarily conceded constitutional and foreign policy issues to
Westminster, granting significant authority to the Northern Irish Parliament.
586
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Northern Ireland with the creation of a new Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive (a
replacement for the original Parliament); however, this has been suspended multiple times
since its creation due to breakdowns in the peace process.588 By 1999, devolution in the
UK had, in a sense, moved the country closer to its (centuries) earlier historical
conditions, by restoring some self-government to its constituent nations.

Government and Political Structure:
The government of the United Kingdom is the archetype for parliamentary
democracy, exported throughout the British Empire and emulated by countries around the
world. The Parliament at the Palace of Westminster – the heart of the UK’s political
system - evolved over a period of centuries, from a medieval “Grand Council” of bishops
and barons to a sophisticated institution which controlled the fate of one-quarter of the
world at the height of British imperial power. Without any existing models to influence it
or any written constitutional documents, the historical evolution of the UK's central
political institutions is particularly noteworthy.
Two events stand out in the early development of Parliament. The first was the
famous Magna Carta of 1215, which took the important step of placing the king under the
boundaries of the law. This denied the development of a truly absolute monarchy and
allowed the early Parliament to gain some influence. The second event was the reign of
Edward I, as his attempts to annex Scotland and Wales caused the king to call upon
Parliament to raise funds for the military and to use it as a body for receiving input and
grievances from his many lands. Edward’s Parliaments were among the first which had
representatives of the gentry and individual boroughs, as opposed to only the most
588

Ibid, 198-200.
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powerful lords and bishops. This inclusion eventually led to the birth of bicameralism,
with Parliament splitting into an upper house of the lords and bishops and a lower house
comprised of the gentry and burgesses (sheriffs and other town representatives).589
The events of the 17th century – the English Civil War, the execution of Charles
I and the culmination in the form of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 – saw Parliament
supplant the Crown as the seat of true political power in Britain. However, this should
not be confused with the modern, democratic institution. The House of Lords remained a
powerful body while eligibility for citizenship (and thus, the ability to vote in and stand
for election) was restricted. 590 The Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867 modernized
Parliament and increased the powers of the Commons by reorganizing the seats by the
principle of representation by population and extending the franchise to all male citizens.
These reforms granted the Commons increased legitimacy and assertiveness, leading to
conflict with the House of Lords – a conflict the Lords would lose.591 The Parliament Act
1911 reduced the Lords to a temporary veto only,592 while the Life Peerages Act 1958
allowed lifetime appointments. More recently, the Labour party has reduced the number
of hereditary peers to 92 with the House of Lords Act 1999. Today, Parliament is still
bicameral, but the current Lords play a less powerful role.593 The transition to a chamber
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Nicholas D.J. Baldwin, "The Origins and Development of Parliament," in Parliament in the 21st
Century, ed. Nicholas D.J. Baldwin, (London: Politico's Publishing, 2005).
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Ibid., 14.
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This conflict was especially vehement with the rise of the Liberal party and the administration of Prime
Minister Lloyd George. The hereditary peers in the House of Lords were dominated by Conservatives
(both ideologically and in partisan affiliation) who resisted many of the Liberals’ policies, including new
social programming, higher taxes on wealthy landowners and Home Rule for Ireland.
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This was followed by the Parliament Act of 1949 which reduced the duration of the veto from two years
to one.
593
While the House of Lords is clearly less powerful than it was a century ago, it should not be thought of
as an impotent body. Even after the latest reforms, the House of Lords defeated 245 pieces of legislation
between 2001and 2005, an increase from the 108 defeats between 1997 and 2001. Lest this be thought of
as a toothless veto, only 40% of these defeats were later overturned by the House of Commons. See: Philip
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dominated by lifetime, instead of hereditary peers means that new Lords are appointed to
honour successful citizens, reward retiring politicians and grant representation to groups
that are under-represented in the Commons.
For the last century, most political authority in the UK is found in the House of
Commons and is based on two principles: representation by population and responsible
government. Members of Parliament (MPs) are elected from single member
constituencies on a plurality basis, also known as “first past the post”. Constituencies are,
in theory, organized to ensure that each MP represents an equal number of citizens; in
practice, this rule is often not followed strictly to allow for the representation of historical
communities and rural areas. Once in Parliament, the government is formed by the party
that can command the confidence of the House (usually by winning a majority of the
seats). This government is then responsible to the House of Commons, and must rely on
support there to pass legislation and stay in power.594
The new devolved governments follow strongly in the footsteps of
Westminster. Scotland’s Parliament is very similar to the UK Parliament, with a first
minister and cabinet responsible to the legislature. Where the Scottish Parliament differs
is in the fact that it is unicameral and uses a mixed system to elect members, allowing for
some proportional representation (PR). The Welsh National Assembly also shares these
same distinctions (unicameral, PR) but differs further in the form of its executive.
Between 1999 and 2007, the Welsh executive was a committee of the Assembly, not a
distinct cabinet. However, this difference has been mostly removed with the Government
Cowley and Mark Stuart, “Parliament: More Revolts, More Reform,” Parliamentary Affairs, 56, no. 2
(2003): 188-204.
594
In a “hung” or minority parliament, in which one party does not have a majority, it is quite possible that
the party in power can be defeated by a vote of no confidence. The current parliament, under Prime
Minister David Cameron allows for this possibility.
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of Wales Act 2006, which granted independent executive powers to ministers, akin to the
UK and Scottish models.595 The Northern Irish Assembly596 is also a unicameral body,
but members are elected using the single transferable vote. The unique elements of the
Northern Irish government are found in the executive, which is closer to the original
Welsh format with a dash of consociationalism. The executive is a committee of the
legislature, elected by the Assembly. However, seats on the executive committee are
allocated by the d’Hondt method597, allowing for all major parties to have a role – an
important condition of the peace process.598 The fragile nature of this peace process has
also led to this Assembly being suspended on four occasions since 1999, most notably for
five years between 2002 and 2007.
It is worth noting what does not appear in the above description: England.
Despite being the largest region of the UK in population, geography and economy,
England does not have it own parliament or assembly – local government or the
Westminster Parliament handle all English affairs. This feature will be discussed at
greater length in the section on subnational governments.

Intergovernmental Agreements in the United Kingdom:
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See the Government of Wales Act 2006 especially Part 2 for changes to the executive.
This body should not be confused with the Northern Ireland Parliament, which was created to allow for
Home Rule in 1920 and then suspended during the troubles in 1972. The Assembly was a new creation in
1998 as opposed to a resumption of the old Parliament.
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Although the United Kingdom can only be said to be in the nascent stages of a
federal system, it already has a clearly defined system of intergovernmental agreements.
Intergovernmental agreements are known as concordats and were defined at the very
beginning of devolution.599 The Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary
Agreements between the UK and the three devolved governments presented a set of
guidelines for intergovernmental relations in the new system of devolution, including the
role of concordats:
In addition, the four administrations may prepare Concordats or make other less
formal arrangements to deal with the handling of procedural, practical or policy
matters between them. Concordats are not intended to be legally binding, but to
serve as working documents.600
This presents three important elements of intergovernmental agreements in the United
Kingdom. First, they are sanctioned as a normal element of intergovernmental relations
in this nascent federation. Second, there is a formal category of agreements known as
concordats which are distinguished from informal partnerships. The third and final
element is that while these agreements may be formal, they are not intended to be legally
binding. This is consistent with the British tradition of parliamentary supremacy.
The more complicated feature of intergovernmental agreements in the UK is
determining how to define agreements that are national in scope. The asymmetry of
devolution has created a situation in which all governments are not competent in exactly
the same areas. Moreover, given the different systems of government in each devolved
administration (such as the differences between Scotland’s traditional parliamentary
format and Wales’ National Assembly), it might be expected that common ground does
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not exist between the devolved administrations and the government of the UK. The
situation in Northern Ireland adds a final complication to any discussion of national
agreements. The Assembly is inextricably linked to the peace process in Northern Ireland
and during those times when this process has broken down, the Assembly has been
suspended. During these periods, the functions of the devolved government have been
run directly from the UK administration in Whitehall. This has occurred four times since
1999 for a total combined time of almost 6 years, approximately half of devolution’s
existence. Given this inconsistent record, only the UK, Scotland and Welsh governments
were considered when determining whether intergovernmental agreements were national
in scope.601
Despite these potential obstacles, a number of concordats involving all devolved
governments have been successfully concluded. Between 1999 and 2010, eleven
concordats have been concluded to which Scotland, Wales and the United Kingdom602 are
signatories (these agreements can be found in Appendix F).603 Data for these agreements
has come from the governments of Scotland and Wales, which each maintain an online
registry of the concordats that they have agreed to.
At an average of 0.92 national agreements per year, this would seem to place the
UK just below Australia, Canada and Germany, which conclude national agreements on a
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regular basis. Upon closer inspection however, six of these agreements were concluded
at the beginning of devolution and are related with the general framework of devolution
and intergovernmental relation as opposed to recurring government business. This leaves
only five national concordats between 2000 and 2010, at a much more modest rate of 0.5
per year. As with other elements of the UK’s devolution, this paints a complicated
picture that will be explored in greater detail in the following sections.

1. The Degree of Overlap that Exists in the Constitution
Unlike the other cases in this study, any discussion of constitutional overlap must
begin by identifying what the United Kingdom’s constitution actually is. The UK is one
of only a few countries – and the only federal/quasi-federal one – that does not have a
single, written document to act as the highest law of the land. The lack of one
authoritative document should not be taken to mean that the UK lacks a constitution.
Instead, the British tradition of constitutionalism vests importance in a number of sources:
particular Acts of Parliament (including the Acts of Union and the Bill of Rights),
constitutional convention (such as cabinet government and the office of Prime Minister)
and lasting institutions (most notably, the Crown).604 This leaves the UK with something
of a diffuse constitution as well as one that evolves and changes over time– a “living
constitution” according to Bagehot – while still allowing for the persistence of principles
such as cabinet governance, parliamentary democracy and the rule of law.605
With this in mind, the individual Acts of Parliament that set out the framework for
devolution become the focus for this constitutional inquiry. There are two groups of laws
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that fall into this category: the Acts of Union606 and the Acts of Devolution607. The Acts
of Union are less important to a discussion of overlap, but do lay the basis for devolution
by demonstrating that the United Kingdom is not a unitary state but a union one.608 The
Acts of Devolution however, fulfill most of the functions of a constitution in a traditional
federation, including defining the institutions of government, the system of fiscal
devolution and the division of powers.
As with the structure of devolved governments, the pattern of asymmetry holds
true for the division of powers. Rather than a single set of rules clarifying which powers
may be exercised by the central government and which are in the purview of subnational
governments, the UK actually has three separate sets of rules – one for each devolved
government. Comparison between each devolved government is further complicated by
the different formats that are used to allocate competencies. In many federal systems,
government powers and responsibilities are divided by specifically reserving power to
one level of government while leaving the unstated remainder to the other. In the UK
however, reserve power alternates between the national and subnational government,
depending on the devolved administration in question. The Government of Wales Act
1998 allows the Welsh National Assembly to legislate only upon those matters that are
specifically devolved to it (see Schedule 2 for the specific provisions; Schedule 5 in the
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2006 Act). In contrast, the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and the Scotland Act 1998 stipulate
the powers that are reserved to the UK and its Parliament, while devolving all other
matters to the respective legislatures (see Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act and Schedule 3
of the Northern Ireland Act for specific lists of reserved matters). In spite of these
different formats, however, the devolved administrations possess remarkably similar
spheres of authority. A 1999 report from the House of Commons Library which listed the
competencies of both the Welsh and Scottish governments demonstrates that the only
major differences are in the Scottish Parliament’s control of criminal and civil law and the
Welsh Assembly’s authority over the Welsh language.609 Examining all three devolved
administrations, Alan Trench found an “extensive” list of common devolved powers,
including: education (all levels), healthcare, local government, housing, personal social
services, the environment, agriculture and fisheries, public transport, roads and cultural
matters.610 This list does not even take into account other common areas, such as dealing
with EU policies or managing intergovernmental relations, demonstrating a large body of
common interests between the devolved administrations.
With a better understanding of the UK’s division of powers, what degree of
overlap exists? There are two answers to this question: one grounded in a strict reading
of the Devolution Acts and another in the record of legislating and governing over the
past eleven years. In the first case, a prima facie reading of the devolution acts of
Scotland and Wales would indicate separate spheres of authority, with a low potential for
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overlap. This is made clear by formatting the division of powers into Watts’ comparison
of competencies in federations (see Appendix H).611 The Government of Wales and
Scotland Acts contain no explicitly concurrent areas and only a limited number of fields
in which both the national and subnational governments have some authority. According
to Watts’ method, only 22% of policy fields exhibit some form of overlap between
different governments. This is the lowest overlap total in this study, below countries such
as Canada (46%) and Switzerland (43%) and far below Germany, the federation with the
greatest amount of overlap (75%). Yet, if constitutional overlap is to be based on a strict
reading of constitutional documents, the division of powers does not provide enough
information. Such a limited reading would neglect Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act,
which states in the section on the powers of the Scottish Parliament that: “This section
does not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for
Scotland”.612 Despite devolving powers to Scotland and Wales, as well as setting up
independent legislatures and executives, the Government and Parliament of the United
Kingdom have not relinquished final authority. Incorporating this into the earlier
calculations on overlap would mean that all areas of subnational authority are technically
areas of overlapping jurisdiction. This would effectively double the number of joint areas
in the division of powers, as the nine areas of subnational authority would be included,
putting the UK on par with other federations.
In practice, however, the UK is bound by the Sewel convention, which stipulates
that the UK Parliament will not legislate on devolved matters unless given expressed
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consent from a devolved legislature.613 This permission is given via a “Legislative
Consent Motion”, and when passed by Parliament, it allows for Westminster to legislate
on matters that are devolved to Scotland and Wales.614 The data from Scotland indicate
that these Motions (and thus, clear incidences of overlap) are not rare phenomena, with
more than 102 having been passed since the beginning of devolution.615 Moreover, these
Motions have been spread over a number of policy areas, including (but certainly not
limited to): energy, the environment, welfare, social services, crime and justice, municipal
services, education and government institutions.616 This seems to indicate that the
limitations placed on the UK Parliament by devolution are not absolute and overlap
occurs even in devolved jurisdictions. Keating effectively sums up the current status of
overlap:
On paper, the division of powers between Westminster and Holyrood looks fairly
clear, with each tier free to act within its own competences. In practice, there is
considerable overlap and mutual dependence, so that a great deal of policy must
be made by cooperation between two levels.617
In Wales, these elements of constitutional overlap are further exacerbated by the
role that the UK government, through the Secretary for Wales, plays in assisting with the
implementation of legislation.618 Moreover, until 2007 and the new Act, the Welsh
Assembly could only produce secondary or implementing legislation, giving Westminster
access to primary legislation, even in devolved jurisdiction.
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The record of national intergovernmental agreement formation seems to reflect
some of these trends. The large number (on a per year basis) would seem to indicate that
overlap in devolution provides fertile ground for coordination and thus, agreements.
Many of these agreements appear to be intended to create institutions and organization for
devolution – a necessity for a situation in which overlapping jurisdictions are the norm.
Yet despite the high yearly rate of agreements, the majority occurred in the early years of
devolution and there are no national agreements on important issues such as criminal and
civil law, education, and the environment, all of which have some degree of overlap
(there is one healthcare agreement relating to soldiers and the Ministry of Defence).619
There are three possible explanations for this pattern in the data. First, it may simply be
that another variable, such as centralization, is influencing national intergovernmental
agreement formation to a greater degree. It is too early to accurately confirm this
possibility – we will return to this in the conclusion later in the chapter. Second, it may
be that while overlap is extensive among all jurisdictions, the asymmetrical nature of
devolution leads governments to address their concerns in different ways and not via a
national concordat. While Scotland has formed a larger number of bilateral concordats
with the UK government (in comparison to Wales), this explanation alone does not
appear to be sufficient. Many of these additional concordats are meant to establish the
relationships between Ministers for the UK and Scotland, something not possible in
Wales given the different nature of their executive. These organizational concordats,
however, do not replace agreements that might be created to address a specific policy
issue. The third and most compelling explanation (at least until the other variables are
discussed) is the role of Legislative Consent Memorandums and the “uploading” of
619
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responsibility for certain national issues to Westminster. As one example, in 2007 when
the governments of the UK were attempting to create a framework to address climate
change, the issue was addressed at Westminster, with the devolved legislatures passing
LCMs in order to allow the UK Parliament to act.620 As the UK Parliament is still fully
competent in all policy areas, issues of Union-wide importance can still be addressed
there, provided the devolved governments give their consent. Such a mechanism is likely
to decrease the number of concordats by providing a means of national coordination other
than an intergovernmental agreement.

2. The Degree of Centralization in the Constitutional Division of Powers
The United Kingdom has existed for centuries as a unitary government, with
power exercised by the central government in London. In contrast, devolution is barely
more than a decade old and still not fully formed. It should come as no surprise then, that
the UK exhibits a significant degree of centralization in its constitutional division of
powers. In terms of the raw totals provided by Watts’ comparison, the UK outpaces all
federations in this study; with 27 areas exclusively in federal jurisdiction, only
Switzerland comes close with 23. These powers are not trivial either, as they include
virtually all economic powers, including full control over monetary policy, financial
regulations, trade and transportation (both inter-regional and international). While we
will return to financial issues in the discussion of the spending power, it is also worth
mentioning that nearly all revenue raising powers are reserved solely to Westminster.
Only South Africa limits the financial powers of its subnational governments to such a
620
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degree. Unlike Switzerland however, the UK does not counterbalance this centralization
by implementing anything resembling the administrative decentralization observed there;
indeed, the Welsh Assembly is still attempting to acquire the ability to produce primary
legislation.621 Watts describes the UK Government as occupying a “dominant” position,
especially in light of its limited constitutional restraints.622
Yet despite these numerous and important national powers, an official in Scotland
or Wales might refer back to the list of common subnational competencies listed in the
last section. This list included authority over important fields such as healthcare,
education, agriculture and the environment – giving “extensive” policy room to the
governments of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.623 If we were to weight the
importance of a particular policy field based upon how much governments spend, then
devolved governments have full authority over the two largest spending priorities
(healthcare – the largest – and education), while also sharing control over welfare
(another significant area of expenditure).624 Although the UK technically retains
jurisdiction over these matters as well, they are limited by the Sewel convention, reducing
the possibility of unilateral intrusion. Should Westminster ever attempt to circumvent
this convention (or simply extend its authority through existing legislation), there are
further protections for devolved administrations. Unlike most federal systems, there is no
established order of precedence in legislative authority, which usually favours the
national government. Because of this, the UK Parliament is not able to easily crowd out
621
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devolved legislation, as occurs in South Africa and occasionally, the United States. 625
Likewise, although the courts can technically rule on whether devolved legislation is ultra
vires – another potential means of centralization - though no cases have been brought
before them.626
It would be a mistake, however, to assume this degree of autonomy makes the UK
a decentralized system. Comparing the authority of the national and devolved
governments, Trench observes that “their (devolved governments) powers are contingent,
dependent on the passive restraint and non-opposition of the UK Government or its active
cooperation.”627 Beyond the financial dependency, many of devolved powers depend on
authority held by Westminster. Local economic development can easily be stymied by
the national government should Whitehall decide to utilize its more powerful economic
levers in a direction opposite to that of devolved administrations. Likewise, a new
university supported by Scotland or Wales would encounter significant problems without
the support of the Research Councils, a matter reserved to Westminster.628 It would also
be inaccurate to claim that the Sewel convention has established “watertight containers”
for subnational powers and decentralization. Scotland has passed 102 Legislative
Consent Motions between 1999 and the middle of 2010, an average of almost ten per
year. This represents a 100% success rate for LCMs that have come to a vote in the
Scottish Parliament; only five others failed to make it from the Memoranda stage to
formal motions.629 The device that is supposed to protect devolved jurisdictions from
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intrusion by Westminster, the Sewel convention, seems to be more of a step in the
legislative process than a guarantor of decentralization.
As the Parliament at Westminster is already capable of legislating in a large
number of policy areas (the largest of all seven case studies), its ability to intervene in
devolved jurisdictions leaves even less room for other forms of intergovernmental
coordination. The relatively low number of national concordats that have been formed
after the first year of devolution supports this reading of the UK’s division of powers and
level of centralization. As long as Westminster maintains the ability to legislate on crossjurisdictional matters of national importance, the governments of the UK will be less
likely to turn to national concordats to address these issues.

3. The Size and Status of the Federal Spending Power
When examining the size and status of Westminster’s spending power in the UK,
the devolution arrangements provide a useful starting point. The Scotland Act clearly
reserves to London virtually all aspects of taxation, micro and macro-economic
management and borrowing in Section II, Heading A of Schedule 5 (the division of
powers section):
Fiscal, economic and monetary policy, including the issue and circulation of
money, taxes and excise duties, government borrowing and lending, control over
United Kingdom public expenditure, the exchange rate and the Bank of England.
The situation in Wales is no different than that in Scotland.630 Whereas debate in
federations such as Canada and the United States is concerned over which governments
occupy the most “tax room”, there is no such ambiguity in the UK – the national
630
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government controls all of these revenues. Effectively, only two sources of revenues
remain open to devolved governments: non-domestic rates, a property tax on businesses
that is primarily allocated to local governments and specific grants from the European
Union (such as Common Agricultural Policy subsidies).631 Writing just after devolution,
Travers found that in 2001, this division amounted to the UK collecting 96% of all taxes,
leaving devolved and local authorities only 4%.632
Devolved governments are clearly dependent upon the UK government for
funding, but how much is transferred and in what form? Unfortunately, the World Bank’s
data on the UK does not yet include a breakdown for devolved revenues, as it does for the
other cases. Instead of this, budget documents have, on some occasions, clarified the
source of government revenues. In the fiscal year 2001-02, approximately 90.2% of
Scotland’s funding came from the UK’s transfers, with most of the remaining 9.8%
derived from local business rates.633 Non-UK revenues were also significant in 2006-07,
when approximately 91% of Scotland’s funding came from the UK’s transfers, with 7%
from local taxes and 2% from the EU.634 These appear to have been the high points for
sources other than transfers from London however, as by the next fiscal year (2007-08),
UK Government spending made up 94% of Scotland’s funding, with only 6% from
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business rates and a negligible amount from the EU.635 In the most recent budget, 201011, these local taxes provided £2 billion in revenue, out of a total budget of £29.6 billion,
or less than 7% of total revenue; EU sources were budgeted to provide zero revenue.636
The situation in Wales appears to be similar, with local business rates making up 6.4% of
revenues in 2001-02 as well as 2009-10.637
Whatever minor variations may occur over the years, devolved administrations
consistently depend on the UK for more than 90% of their total government funds.
Compared to the other countries in this study, only South African provinces depend more
on the central government for their revenues than do devolved governments in the UK.
The next-most dependent subnational governments are found in Australia, but their
reliance is approximately half of what it is in the UK (48.67%).
Before suggesting that this financial dominance should lead to more
intergovernmental agreements, it is worth examining the format of these transfers and
how the UK’s spending power is actually used. Funding is calculated based on the
Barnett Formula, which begins by transferring the original funding for programs in all
areas of the UK before devolution to the new administration (these were originally
administered by the various cabinet offices, such as the Wales Office). From this point,
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any changes to program spending in England by the UK government will increase or
decrease transfers to devolved governments by an amount proportional to their
population. For example, if the budget for schools in England was increased by £100
million, then Scotland, with one-tenth the population would see its transfer payment
increased by £10 million. This percentage is further augmented based on whether the
matter is reserved, non-reserved or one that falls under both national and devolved
jurisdictions. For example, education is completely devolved in all areas, so the full
amount would be eligible (again, proportionate to population). However, in the case of a
new transportation project, perhaps 50% might be deemed spending for devolved
programs, while the other half would fall under reserved matters. This would mean only
half of the amount would be eligible to be transferred to devolved governments, while the
other half would be Whitehall’s to spend.638 Perhaps the most important element of these
transfers – at least for the study of intergovernmental agreements – is that they are
packaged as a single block grant, with no formal conditions on the distribution of the
funds. This also holds true for any future changes: should the UK budget increase
healthcare spending, the devolved governments are able to put this money into education,
welfare or any other priority.639
Without the ability to make funds conditional, the UK has no means of compelling
devolved governments into agreements, without completely changing the funding
formula. The devolved governments, meanwhile, have no incentive to trade autonomy
for increased funds - if it were even possible - due to the dual role of the UK Parliament
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in the intergovernmental system. Because Westminster is also responsible for
government spending in England, the national cabinet is compelled by the Barnett
Formula to increase spending everywhere. Moreover, in any circumstance where
Westminster would want to dictate funding priorities, it can do this directly through
national legislation and the fact that it controls virtually all government revenues. Thus,
while the UK’s national government wields a tremendous spending power, it is
constrained in its application, making it unlikely to encourage the formation of national
concordats.

4. The Size and Scope of the Welfare State
Because of the short history of devolution, examining the scope of the welfare
state in the United Kingdom is a different process than with older federations. During the
post-war decades, when the various parts of the welfare state were being constructed
throughout the developed world, the UK was a unitary government, with the decisions
about programming and spending coming solely from London. Thus, by the time
devolution was established in 1999, the major pillars of the welfare state – the National
Health Service, public schools, welfare programs and the State Pensions – were already
well-established. While this potentially limits the ability to study the effects of changes
in government spending on agreement formation, we can still examine the relationship
between current spending and new concordats, especially through a comparison with
other countries.
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Table 9.1: UK Welfare Spending as a Percentage of GDP640

United Kingdom

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 AVG Rank
16.7 19.8 17.0 20.2 19.2 21.3 19.03
2

The United Kingdom immediately stands out, compared to the other countries in
this study, as a state that devotes a relatively high percentage of its economy towards
welfare spending. While still well behind first-place Germany (which averaged 24.60%),
the UK’s significant degree of spending should provide fertile ground for national
agreements as governments attempt to address the cross-jurisdictional issues created by
the welfare state. During the period affected by devolution, average spending was even
higher, amounting to 20.2% of the UK’s GDP.

Table 9.2: UK Welfare Spending as a Percentage of Total Federal Spending641

UK

1972
41.34

1977
N/A

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
46.13 45.22 48.74 52.27 58.18 69.17

2007
N/A

AVG
51.58

Rank
6

If we examine the IMF’s data on welfare spending as a percentage of total federal
spending a couple of commonalities with the previous data emerge. First, spending has
generally increased over time, though it stalled and even retrenched slightly during the
1980s, which is consistent with the cutbacks of the Thatcher administration. Second,
spending increased significantly during the late 1990s and early 2000s, hitting a high in
2005 at almost 70% of national government spending. Again, this indicates a substantial
level of welfare spending during the period of devolution, increasing the opportunities for
agreement formation, and ranking 2nd compared to other countries.

640
641

Data collected from the OECD Social Expenditure Database.
Data collected from the IMF World Financial Yearbook.
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Finally, Derek Birrell has tracked welfare spending throughout the UK since
devolution, providing data not only on spending at Westminster, but throughout the
devolved administrations. He found that health spending per head in all regions of the
UK more than doubled over the decade between 1998 and 2008, an increase dwarfed by
increases in the budgets for housing and community services which increased by 3.5
times over the same period.642 Other areas of the welfare state have also seen
comparatively “modest” increases, as education spending increased by an average of
77%, while social protection rose by 57%.643
By any measurement, the British welfare state is not small and it has been
growing, especially over the last decade. According to the original hypothesis, we would
expect to find a greater number of national intergovernmental agreements to coincide
with larger amounts of government spending in order to coordinate these programs across
jurisdictions. The experience in the UK, however, is not consistent with this expectation.
While the yearly average for agreements is relatively high, as has already been observed,
the majority of these agreements occurred at the beginning of devolution. Perhaps more
relevant to the relationship between government spending and agreement formation is
examining the policy areas which these agreements fall under. If rising government
spending is encouraging the formation of concordats between the UK’s governments,
there should be a number of them in fields such as education, healthcare and welfare.
When examining the policy fields of the existing agreements however, there are no
agreements concerning education or welfare and only one pertaining to healthcare (and
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that agreement also involved the Ministry of Defence). The vast majority of concordats,
7 of 11 or 63.6%, fall into the category of “Institutions and Governance”. This is
consistent with the earlier observation that the majority of national concordats in the UK
are concerned with setting up the parameters of a nascent system of federalism and
intergovernmental relations, but is also inconsistent with what might be expected from the
hypothesis on welfare-state spending. At least in the case of the United Kingdom, it
seems that the capacity of spending to encourage agreement formation is not powerful
enough to overcome countervailing forces, such as substantial centralization.

5. The Existence of Lasting Forums for Intergovernmental Relations
During the early stages of devolution, it seems to have been understood by
members of all governments that unforeseen circumstances and cross-jurisdictional issues
would arise, which would require intergovernmental relations to address. The
Memorandum of Understanding – the original intergovernmental agreement which set out
the parameters of UK intergovernmental relations – introduced a dedicated forum for
intergovernmental relations known as the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC). The JMC
was to have four roles: to consider reserved matters that impacted devolved ones and vice
versa; to discuss devolved issues and their different treatment across the UK; to keep
intergovernmental relationships between the UK and devolved administrations under
review; and finally, to address disputes and conflicts between governments.644 The JMC
would meet as a plenary once a year (including the Prime Minister and devolved first
ministers), as well as allowing for other meetings between ministers and officials. The
body would also be used to coordinate policy in relation to Europe, through a permanent
644
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subcommittee which would meet before major EU meetings (approximately four times a
year). The early experience of the JMC appeared positive, as it quickly formed policyoriented sub-committees in November, 1999, including ones focused on poverty,
healthcare and the knowledge economy.645 Between October 2001 and October 2002, the
JMC and its various subcommittees met ten times, exemplifying early enthusiasm for the
Committee as an effective means of intergovernmental coordination.646
Despite these early successes in creating formal structures for intergovernmental
relations, this progress soon gave way to apathy and dysfunction. The JMC’s
subcommittees on the knowledge economy, health and poverty met inconsistently and
often seemed to function at the whims of the UK minister atop the respective portfolio.647
Moreover, meetings of the JMC and its various subcommittees seemed unable to fulfill
their original functions. Even though a number of controversies and debates arose
between Westminster and the devolved governments, Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland generally preferred to address these disagreements through more informal and
often bilateral channels.648 The substantive policy roles for these meetings also seem to
have been lacking, as press releases released limited and bland statements, while officials
described meetings as “largely ceremonial”.649 The clearest evidence of the JMC’s
limitations came between 2002 and 2008, when the plenary body and the policy
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subcommittees did not meet at all.650 The one exception to this trend was the JMC on
Europe, which continued to meet regularly to discuss a common-UK position for EU
meetings.651
Only recently has there been any indication that the JMC might one day establish
itself as a lasting forum for intergovernmental relations. This was the first plenary
meeting in six years, and the 2008 meeting benefitted from the initiative of the new
Government in Scotland.652 Perhaps learning from the troubles of having multiple bodies
in the past, the new JMC was reorganized as the “JMC(Domestic)”, to take its place
besides the already successful JMC(Europe). The annual meetings have continued for the
last three years, but for now, the prospect of the JMC encouraging more
intergovernmental agreements appears slim. Meetings in 2008 and 2009 yielded no
public schedules or concluding statements of any kind; the most recent in 2010 produced
a summary that highlighted the business of the meeting (focused primarily on EU
involvement and consultations concerning the new austerity package), but no formal
accords.653 Given the inconsistent track record of the JMC, at least domestically, it is
unlikely that it will serve as a means of consistently encouraging the formation of national
concordats, at least until it becomes a stable feature of intergovernmental relations in the
UK.

6. The Number of Subnational Governments at the State/Provincial Level
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The United Kingdom provides an interesting problem when trying to identify the
number of subnational governments. Surely both Scotland and Wales should be counted,
which makes two, but what about Northern Ireland? Given the lengthy suspension of
devolution in Northern Ireland, its inclusion is problematic; as such, it was not included in
the definition of a national concordat (though it is a signatory of most of them as many
were negotiated before the lengthy suspension of 2002-2007). However, even if Northern
Ireland could be definitively included – bringing the total to three – the issues concerning
England are even more complicated.
If the UK were a classical federation, England would have a separate government
that would count to the total for subnational governments. Because of the unique nature
of devolution, however, all government business for England outside of the local sphere
is addressed by Westminster. This dual role for Westminster has led to the difficulty
known as the “West Lothian Question”.654 Various solutions have been advanced to deal
with this problem, including the formation of an English-only committee of Parliament,
the recusal of non-English MPs from votes affecting only England and even a new
devolved government for England as a whole.
While none of these solutions have been implemented yet, the last (devolution)
has been resisted, thus far, for two reasons. First, the English people seem to have no
interest in an English legislature that would differ from Westminster, as opposed to the
other devolved territories in which significant portions of the population were advocating
for greater autonomy. Second, given the immense size of England in both population and
654
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resources (compared to the other devolved territories), it is feared that an English
Parliament would dwarf all other institutions in importance, including Westminster.655 A
possible solution to this is devolution to regions within England, as opposed to treating it
as a whole unit. The recently-created Greater London Authority (GLA) is an experiment
in the sort of regional government that would address regional issues, while possessing
greater authority and resources than local governments. Midway through 2010 however,
the GLA still possessed less autonomy and authority than the devolved governments in
Scotland and Wales and the campaign to produce other such organizations had stalled.656
Thus, for the past ten years, as well as for the foreseeable future, England has had but one
government, seated at the Palace of Westminster.
Returning to the question of how many subnational governments can be identified,
even if Westminster is counted as a subnational government for England this would only
bring the total to four. With only four constituent units, the UK would still rank last
amongst the federations compared here. With so few governments, there is no reason that
the number of subnational governments should impede agreements. This would seem to
be somewhat consistent with the data, as a number of agreements have been formed, even
if the distribution of these is inconsistent over time. It is possible, however, that the small
number of governments may have the opposite effect, encouraging bilateral
intergovernmental relations, as opposed to national business in a multilateral forum. With
only three devolved governments (and from 2002 until 2007, only two), the UK can
address them individually, forming something of a “hub and spoke” model with the
655

BBC News, "No English Parliament - Falconer," BBC News, March 10, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_politics/4792120.stm (accessed July 10, 2011).
656
Peter John, Steven Musson and Adam Tickell, “Coordinating governance in the South-East mega region:
towards joined-up thinking?” in Devolution, Regionalism and Regional Development: The UK Experience,
ed. Jonathan Bradbury, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 120-121.

311

national government at the centre. Evidence for this can be found when looking at the
complete list of Scotland and Wales’ concordats (both national and bilateral). Not
including the original set of devolution concordats in 1999, Scotland lists twenty-two
concordats while Wales records only nine.657 Scotland in particular exhibits many more
bilateral agreements between Westminster and Edinburgh than national ones including
Wales, indicating both the power of asymmetry and bilateralism.658

7. The Existence of a Body for Intrastate Federalism
The Parliament of the United Kingdom is the oldest model of bicameralism found
in this investigation - stretching back centuries to 1341, when the House of Commons and
the House of Lords were separated into distinct chambers. Longevity aside, the House of
Lords is perhaps the farthest removed from acting as a body for intrastate federalism.
While the Lords still maintain some real authority and influence in Parliament, even after
the limitations of the Parliament Act 1911, their membership has no representation for the
devolved governments or regions.
Membership in the House of Lords is based upon one of two criteria: holding a
hereditary peerage or the appointment to a lifetime peerage by the Queen.659 The number
of hereditary peers was greatly reduced by the Labour government of Tony Blair via the
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House of Lords Act 1999, making lifetime peers the largest component of the
membership.660 This rise in lifetime peers has not led to a rise in regional or subnational
representation. Appointments are decided by the Prime Minister, who is free to select
members based on any criteria he or she chooses.661 While custom has led to the Prime
Minister appointing leading citizens and members of other political parties (unlike in
Canada, where government partisans dominate), it has not led to appointments by
devolved governments.
Aside from its origins as a council of feudal nobles, the closest that the House of
Lords has come to a body for intrastate federalism is in proposals for reform. The
Wakeham Report of 2000 considered the possibility of having representatives of
devolved governments sit in the upper chamber, but ultimately chose to recommend
democratically elected representatives of regions and nations, as opposed to
governments.662 Even these representatives would be only a proportion of the members
of the House – it would not be a completely federal chamber. In the more recent 2003
and 2007 debates and parliamentary votes on House of Lords reform, the option to
include an elected element based on regional constituencies had strong support among
MPs in the House of Commons, but none of these proposals has been put into force.663
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For the purposes of this research, the House of Lords is the farthest a second
chamber can be from intrastate federalism. It is a centrally-appointed body, with no
representation from subnational governments. As such, there is no means to address
intergovernmental issues in the upper chamber, which might reduce the number of
national agreements. This leaves such matters to be addressed through other avenues,
such as concordats or national legislation introduced through the House of Commons.
The House of Lords, therefore, seems to have no impact on the formation of
intergovernmental agreements and thus, other factors should be more salient.

Conclusion
In many ways, devolution has brought the United Kingdom “full circle” in respect
to its political history. The government of these islands began a millennium ago with a
collection of new, independent nation-states and over the course of centuries, became
united under one banner through a long process combining conquest, dynastic marriage,
politics and religion. In the last few decades however, this unity has been shaken
somewhat as the constituent nations of the UK sought greater autonomy, culminating in
the process of devolution in 1998-1999. Now, as a nascent federation, with a unique
system of intergovernmental relations, the UK serves as an interesting, but complicated
case study for the examination of intergovernmental agreements.
It should already be clear from the discussion in this chapter that the United
Kingdom presents some difficulties when it comes to testing the hypotheses of this
investigation. As a nascent federal system, the UK has only a limited record of
agreements to analyze, making it difficult to discern whether patterns exist in the data or
not. This process is further complicated by the fact that, unlike South Africa (the other
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“young” federation), the UK`s record of agreements is not consistent or uniform. Of the
eleven concordats developed since the beginning of devolution in 1999, six were made in
the first year while the remaining five were created between 2000 and 2010. Thus, while
the overall average is 0.92 agreements per year, the average of the last ten years is only
0.5. It is impossible to predict whether this average will continue to drop further or
whether agreements will become a more frequent feature as devolution develops.
However, this does not mean this case cannot be studied or included in this comparison.
As the UK is the median case in terms of agreements per year and has a record of
agreement formation that has been prolific at one point and scant at another, the
combined effect of the variables should produce moderate potential for agreements. Even
with a limited data set to work from, an extremely favourable or unfavourable
environment for agreements would be expected to have produced much more definitive
results, as was the case in South Africa.
It seems that this average position is reflected in the mixed results of the variables
that affect the United Kingdom’s factors which are conducive to coordination. Because
devolution is a new and evolving system of federalism and although the UK is
transitioning away from a unitary model of governance, it remains a highly centralized
federation. Thus, there is little potential for agreements to be found in the degree of
centralization or the spending power, which is both very large (like South Africa's), yet is
also not conditional. Similarly, the institutions devoted to intergovernmental relations –
the Joint Ministerial Committees – are still in relative infancy. At times, these have been
active bodies, which may be contributing to coordination, but they have also been
dormant for long periods as well, providing only an average contribution to overall
likelihood of agreements. These weak to average conducive factors are weighted against
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a notable degree of overlap and a large welfare state (although this latter has not yet made
strong contributions to agreements). This balanced distribution of weak, average and
strong conducive factors combine together for moderate potential for intergovernmental
coordination.
Balanced against this are only moderate barriers to agreement formation. The UK
has only a small number of subnational governments, though the asymmetric nature of
devolution does provide at least some difficulties in forming a national consensus among
so few actors. Additionally, while the UK's national government is still quite powerful,
limited the likelihood of agreements, the House of Lords itself provides no element of
intrastate federalism and thus, no direct competition for the normal processes of
intergovernmental relations.
It seems that the UK's institutional environment, as it currently stands, is a
reasonable fit for the record of agreement formation. With moderate conducive factors,
limited inhibitors and a single potential alternative, the UK represents the closest thing to
a median case:
CON (Moderate) – INH (Weak-Moderate) – ALT (None) = Moderate IGA Formation
The moderate institutional framework is consistent with the more recent trend of
agreement formation. It must be emphasized however, that it is still too early to
definitively state whether the UK will continue along this trajectory or whether it will see
a significant change in its nascent federal system. The governments of Northern Ireland,
Scotland and Wales are still exploring their capabilities and testing their boundaries. As
the Right Honourable Ron Davies, a former Secretary of Wales, once stated: “devolution
is a process, not an event”. Ten years from now, this nascent federation may have
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changed dramatically, but we will have to wait to see what effect this might have on
intergovernmental agreements.
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Chapter Ten: United States of America

Source: CIA World Factbook

Formal Name: United States of America
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Capital: Washington, District of Columbia
Subnational Governments: Known as states, there are 50 in total: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.664 There is also a federal capital territory known as the District of Columbia.

Introduction:
The concept of multilevel governance may extend back millennia in forms such as
empires, leagues and confederacies, but the first country to formally adopt a federal
system was the United States of America. Following their formative revolution against
Great Britain and a failed experiment with a confederal arrangement, the American states
agreed to their famous Constitution of 1787 which, among other things, invested
sovereignty in the people and divided jurisdiction between two orders of government.
This novel form of political organization has proven to be remarkably durable, lasting
more than two centuries and surviving a divisive civil war. Today, it serves as the
foundation for the world’s largest economy and third largest country by both area and
population, and has remained an important and influential model for federalism.
664
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History:
The history of the modern American state finds parallels in the histories of
Australia and Canada in that they all proceeded in earnest with the arrival of European
colonists. During the 16th and 17th centuries, these colonists began arriving throughout
the Americas, with the British settling an area along the Atlantic coast that would become
the eastern seaboard of the United States. British settlers – some officially commissioned
by the Crown, others effectively refugees fleeing religious and social persecution –
founded a number of colonies in this region, and by 1732 consolidated into the “Thirteen
Colonies” that formed the initial foundation for the United States.665
The colonies were fast-growing and prosperous, developing diverse economies
and robust political cultures.666 This success, however, led to increasingly divergent
interests between the colonies and the imperial government in London. A series of
smaller conflicts built upon one another, culminating in the development of
“irreconcilable differences” between Great Britain and the Thirteen Colonies, leading to
the American War of Independence.667 The Colonies' success in this war not only won
their sovereignty from Britain, but it also provided a sense of unity and a common cause
among them. This unity of purpose gave the colonies the impetus to form a single
country following the war, rather than exist as a collection of thirteen independent states.
665
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This unity was still nascent when the colonial leaders drafted the first American
Constitution, the Articles of Confederation, during the heart of the revolution in 1776 and
1777.668 As implied in the title, this was the framework for a confederate union akin to
Switzerland or the Iroquois Confederacy, rather than a federal system. Article II
guaranteed each state its “sovereignty, freedom and independence” while Article III
defined the new union as a “firm league of friendship” rather than a single country or
nation. The Congress of the United States was structured like the modern Senate, but the
best comparison might be to an international institution such as the United Nations, with
one vote allowed per delegation. This Congress had minimal powers to use on behalf of
the states, primarily restricted to defence and foreign affairs.669 Even these powers were
largely constrained as Congress was entirely dependent upon the states for
implementation of treaties and reliant on transfers for funding.670
With the hindsight of history, it seems that the confederal model of the fledgling
country was doomed to failure. Zimmerman has identified five shortcomings of the
confederation which would serve as the basis for the new federal system:
1) Congress was granted no ability to generate tax revenue and no powers to
enforce the collection of dues from states, some of which did not contribute
the required amounts.
2) Congress had no means to enforce national laws or international treaties.
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3) No provisions were made for the regulation of interstate commerce, leading to
the development of mercantilist protectionism.
4) Congress’ responsibilities for national defence were handicapped by the
inability to finance any armed forces.
5) There was no effective arbiter to enforce the Articles of Confederation and the
threat of dissolution of the United States mounted.671
As these failings became apparent to American political leaders, a constitutional
convention was called for Philadelphia in September 1787. This convention produced the
American Constitution that is still in effect today, making it one of the oldest in the world
(and the senior example in this comparative study). The Constitution made several
crucial and innovative contributions including a system for democratic government based
on popular sovereignty, the division of political and legal power amongst separate
branches of government and a federal system of sovereignty divided between two orders
of government.
This new Constitution departed from the Articles by investing in the state and
national administrations independent powers; that is, abilities that were not derived from
or dependent upon the other order of government. In addition to its pre-existing defence
and foreign policy competencies, the new federal government gained the authority to
“tax, regulate interstate and foreign commerce... and subject people to federal laws” as
well as the broader ability to make any law “ ‘necessary and proper’ to the implementing
of its expressly delegated powers”.672 While state powers were not enumerated, they
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maintained the important residual power, which gave them jurisdiction over any matter
not explicitly delegated to the national government.
While no longer a confederation, the new American federal system could still be
considered decentralized, given the limited enumerated powers.673 Since this beginning
however, the overall balance of power between the federal government and the states has
shifted towards Washington. The early rulings of the Supreme Court, notably McCulloch
v. Maryland (1819) and Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) from the Court under Chief Justice
John Marshall helped to expand the scope of federal jurisdiction.674 Yet, the influence of
these rulings pales in comparison to the effects of the American Civil War (1861-65). In
addition to the central issue of the abolition of slavery, the balance of power between the
federal government and the states contributed to the conflict. With the victory of the
Union forces and the defeat of the South, the balance swung decisively in favour of the
federal government. The 13th, 14th and 15th amendments to the Constitution expanded
federal jurisdiction in an effort to eliminate the last vestiges of slavery and allow for the
Reconstruction of the southern states.675 This trend continued in the 20th century,
particularly through the federal response to the Great Depression. President Franklin
Roosevelt, through his New Deal legislation, developed the welfare state and greatly
expanded the role of Washington.676
Even with the rapid industrialization and globalization of the 20th century,
federalism proved to be an important facet of American politics. The development of the
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welfare state in particular led to new dynamics between the orders of government and a
competition over resources and authority.677 The ever-shifting balance between the
federal government and the states persists to this day: one need look no further than the
debate over President Barack Obama’s healthcare legislation, much of which is driven by
competing conceptions of federalism.

Government and Political Structure:
American government is generally synonymous with a brand of republicanism
that emphasizes divided government and a diffusion of power across multiple institutions.
The foundation of government in the United States is a division between three branches:
executive, legislative and judicial. The executive is embodied in the President or
Governor, as well as the federal and state bureaucracies, the legislative power is found in
Congress and state legislatures and the judiciary is made up of a system of federal and
state courts, culminating in the Supreme Court, the highest body of appeal and final word
on the judicial interpretation of the Constitution. What is often forgotten in this model,
however, is that federalism is an equally important principle underpinning American
political institutions.
For a country that gained its independence in a revolution against a “tyrant king”
it is interesting that the Founding Fathers decided to invest significant authority and
prestige in the President, opting not to create a parliamentary democracy. The President
acts of the head of state and the chief of the executive branch, responsible for hundreds of
senior appointments, the development of a budget and implementing legislation. The
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President is also the senior figure in foreign policy and national defence, serving as
Commander-in-Chief of America’s armed forces. While the separation of executive and
legislative branches prevents the President from acting as a sole head of government, akin
to the Prime Minister in parliamentary democracies, he still plays a significant role in
lawmaking through the veto power. In order for a bill to become law in the United States,
it must be signed by the President or passed by a two-thirds majority in both the House of
Representatives and the Senate. Given the infrequent nature of such large majorities in
both chambers, the President’s veto allows for his involvement in the legislative process.
In recent years, the growth of mass media has enhanced the prestige of the President as
“leader of the nation”, providing informal powers of agenda-setting to enhance his role in
working with Congress.678
Voting for the President occurs every four years and all eligible citizens may cast
a single vote. Rather than simply aggregate these and declare the most popular candidate
the winner, however, these votes are used to select representatives from each state to vote
in the Electoral College and these electors are the ones that actually choose the President
and the Vice-President. The 538 electors are allocated along state lines with each state
receiving a minimum of three votes and the remainder allocated in proportion to the
population of each state.679 This has two relevant consequences for federalism. First, by
setting a floor for electoral votes, it over-represents smaller states, ensuring their
importance in a national contest. Second, it forces political parties to organize their
campaigns along state lines and address local issues. This is even apparent in the
“primary” system by which parties nominate their presidential candidates through a series
678
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of state-by-state contests. Given the importance of the Presidency, it is notable that the
Founding Fathers chose to select the candidate via the principle of federalism, rather than
popular representation.680
Instead, direct representation of the people is found in one-half of Congress, the
legislative branch of the federal government. Congress is a bicameral institution, divided
between the House of Representatives and the Senate. The House of Representatives is
the chamber organized around “representation by population” as its 435 seats are divided
amongst the states strictly on this basis.681 The members are elected to represent a single
member constituency by a simple plurality of the vote. The whole House stands for
election every two years, a uniquely short term.
The second chamber of Congress is the Senate which is organized around the
principle of state representation. Based in part on the original model for Congress under
the Articles of Confederation, the Senate ensures equal representation for all states by
allotting to each two Senators. In another concession to the importance of state
sovereignty, originally their governments were responsible for the selection of the
Senators, allowing for direct state participation in the federal government. A wave of
democratization at the turn of the 20th century culminated in 1911’s 17th Amendment
which made state-wide elections mandatory for Senators.682 Senators serve six-year
terms, with one third of the chamber up for re-election every two years.
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The powers of the House and the Senate are remarkably similar, at least where
legislation is concerned. Both chambers must pass any bill before it becomes law, both
have extensive committee systems for the review of policy matters and both are able to
introduce amendments on legislation. Should the House and the Senate pass different
versions of the same bill, they must enter “Conference” – a joint committee including
representatives of both chambers – in order to produce an identical piece of legislation
that must pass a vote again. This is not to suggest there are no differences between the
powers of the House and the Senate. For example, all money bills, including the budget,
must be introduced in the House of Representatives first as there can be no taxation
without fair representation.683 This, however, does not remove the requirement for these
bills to be passed by the Senate before becoming law. Indeed, if either chamber can be
said to have special or unique powers, it is the Senate. As another holdover from the
Articles of Confederation, only the Senate’s approval is required for the ratification of
international treaties; these must be passed with a two-thirds majority. The Senate also
has a special relationship with the executive branch as most senior appointments of the
President must be approved by the chamber, including: Cabinet secretaries and
undersecretaries, directors of independent and regulatory agencies and ambassadors.684
The President’s judicial nominations are also subject to Senate approval. These
additional powers possessed by the chamber for federalism, rather than popular
representation, is in contrast to other federations such as Australia, Canada and
Switzerland where the chambers are either equal or the popular body possesses more
authority.
683
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Government in the states has evolved in a remarkably similar fashion to the
federal government. State governments are founded on a separation of powers between
the executive, the Governor, and the state legislatures, which are almost universally
bicameral.685 The key differences between the national government and state institutions
can be generally summarized by the lack of federalism as a guiding principle. For
instance, governors are elected directly, without the intermediary of the Electoral College.
Similarly, while 49 states have a Senate, they are not structured along the lines of regional
representation, but rather larger jurisdictions, relatively equal in population.686
The United States’ system of republican government with an emphasis on the
separation of powers would, by itself, distinguish it in this comparison. Upon further
review however, the government of the United States is also founded around the
principles of federalism, which infuses America’s political institutions, making it notable
among these seven countries.

Intergovernmental Agreements in the United States:
The United States has two main types of intergovernmental agreements: interstate
compacts and administrative agreements. Interstate compacts are the more formal of
these two instruments. They are established in the Constitution under Article I, Section
10, Clause 3 which stipulates that states may enter into “agreements or compacts” with
other states. This clause also mentions that states require not only the approval of state
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legislatures and executives but also of Congress to enter into compacts.687 These are
essentially treaties between states and as such are legally enforceable. According to
Zimmerman, one of their primary functions is to address interstate matters that Congress
might otherwise legislate on. Because of their legal nature and the role of Congress,
compacts are often used to address important and permanent matters, such as changing
the boundaries of states or setting up commissions to regulate bodies of water which cross
state lines.688 A full database of American interstate compacts is kept by the Council of
State Governments in their National Center for Interstate Compacts.689
Compared to interstate compacts, administrative agreements are a much more
ambiguous type of intergovernmental instrument. Unlike compacts, they are not defined
in the Constitution, but instead appear to have evolved through the process of
intergovernmental relations. Administrative agreements cover a broad range of formats:
they can be full, written accords between states formally signed by governors or
memoranda of understanding or common practices or even verbal pacts between
individuals.690 Unlike compacts, they do not require the cooperation of all branches of
state governments, only the relevant portion of the executive branch. Given such breadth,
there are thousands of these agreements, in bilateral, multilateral, regional and, rarely,
even in national form. While there has been some research done on administrative
agreements, no definitive database or collection exists for them, even the formal, written
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ones.691 Information on agreements used in this analysis was primarily collected from the
works of Zimmerman as well as mentions in documentation from intergovernmental
bodies such as the Council of State Governments.
There is one other potential instrument for formal, intergovernmental coordination
that must be mentioned: uniform state law. This is the process by which the states,
working individually or collectively, pass the same version of a particular piece of
legislation in order to harmonize their laws and regulations. This effort is coordinated by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), which
brings together non-partisan legal representatives from each state in order to identify
policy areas in which uniform laws would be beneficial.692 While uniform law might
seem to be a good candidate for inclusion in this study, as a third element of formal
interstate coordination, it is dissimilar from compacts and administrative agreements in
several important ways. First, uniform laws are often not the result of intergovernmental
negotiation, but rather the proposal of third parties. The Commission itself was a creation
of the American Bar Association and not of state governments.693 Thus, the variables that
affect uniform law might include a greater focus on interest groups than existing
intergovernmental forums and institutions. Second, uniform laws are fully amendable
and the definition of what is "uniform" is somewhat elastic. A uniform law may be
anything from replicating a single piece of legislation to simply adopting the general tone
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or framework of a bill.694 As a result, some laws have been sufficiently altered or
amended by states so "as to impair their uniformity".695 Finally, even if a case could be
made for their inclusion, uniform laws conform to the pattern in the results for
agreements: there are very few national examples. Between 1945 and 1985, only four
new laws were adopted by forty-five or more states, and this does not account for whether
or not the laws were actually uniform.696 Thus, uniform laws are not only a poor fit with
this study of intergovernmental agreements, but they would add little to the results even if
they were adopted.
Given the data available, there appear to be very few formal, national
intergovernmental agreements in the United States, even allowing for the 90% threshold
(see Appendix G). Between 1945 and 2008, only 8 national agreements were formed - a
rate of 0.13 agreements per year.697 Of these, six were interstate compacts and two were
administrative agreements. While this figure may slightly underestimate the number of
national administrative agreements, even a tripling of this total would leave the United
State with a small number, relative to most other cases. The remainder of this
examination will be devoted to investigating what factors may be affecting the number of
national intergovernmental agreements in the United States.
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1. The Degree of Overlap that Exists in the Constitution
A common interpretation of the initial federal structure in the United States was a
clear separation of power between the national government and the states.698 The first
federation was also home to the first attempt to construct “water-tight compartments” in
the division of powers. The Founding Fathers were quite economical in apportioning the
competencies of the two orders of government: only the powers of the federal
government were detailed while the states were granted a broad residual power and
jurisdiction over all other matters. No concurrent powers were explicitly stipulated by the
Constitution, further suggesting an avoidance of explicit overlap.
Yet, the lack of explicit concurrency does not guarantee that both the federal and
state governments will occupy separate policy areas and avoid overlapping jurisdictions.
Watts’ comparison of federal constitutions and their divisions of powers provides at least
some indication of how much the American constitutional framework provides. Of the 45
policy areas identified by Watts in the Constitution, 24 or 53% of these allowed for the
involvement of both federal and state governments. This ranks the United States exactly
in the middle (4th) of the cases considered in this study, behind third-place South Africa
(60% overlap) and ahead of Canada (46%).699 With both the federal and state
governments possessing some authority in just over half of all policy areas, this presents
something of an inconsistency when compared with the more “watertight ideal” of the
initial Constitution. The solution to this inconsistency is found in a number of areas
including: the differences in the treatment of federal powers between the Articles and the
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Constitution, the overall direction of judicial interpretation, and the role of constitutional
amendments.
While separated by just over a decade, America’s first attempt at a constitution –
the Articles of Confederation – and the final Constitution of 1787 treat the powers of the
federal government very differently. As Katz points out, the Articles put the enumerated
powers of the federal government in a very restricted context and allowing for latitude in
state residual powers.700 Article II is indicative of this, stating:
Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to
the United States, in Congress assembled.701
This clear and absolute restriction is in stark contrast to the permanent Constitution
drafted in 1787, which included greater leeway for federal powers in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 18:
The Congress shall have Power – To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States , or in any
Department or Officer thereof.
The flexibility provided to federal powers by this declaration, especially the "necessary
and proper" provision, has given this passage the nickname of “the elastic clause”.702 It
has continued to act as a blanket justification for the broadening of federal competencies
outside of the explicit wording of the enumerated powers. It has proven to be more

700

Ellis Katz, "United States of America," in Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal
Countries, ed. Akhtar Majeed, Ronald L. Watts, Douglas M. Brown and John Kincaid, (Montreal &
Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 301.
701
United States, Articles of Confederation, Article II.
702
Devotion Garner and Cheryl Nyberg, "Popular Names of Constitutional Provisions," (Seattle: University
of Washington School of Law, 2008), http://lib.law.washington.edu/ref/consticlauses.html (accessed
October 5, 2011).

333

influential in judicial proceedings than the Tenth Amendment, which contains a lessstringently-worded version of the Articles’ restriction on federal power.703
This movement from a restrictive to an expansive modifier of federal powers
between the Articles and the final Constitution provided a crucial foundation for early
judicial interpretation of the division of powers. The clause was cited by the Supreme
Court led by Chief Justice John Marshall as a justification for a broader interpretation of
federal powers, particularly in the landmark case of McCulloch v. Maryland (1819).704 In
addition to this “necessary and proper” clause, the Marshall Court also gave a wide scope
to the so-called “commerce clause” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3) which allows
Congress “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States and
with the Indian Tribes”. In Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), the Court ruled that the national
government had exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce. As a great deal of
activity within a state can be said to have consequences for interstate commerce, this
opened a broad avenue for the expansion of federal powers.705 While more recent courts
have had narrower interpretations of these clauses, they did allow for the expansion of
federal jurisdiction into areas normally reserved to the states such as transportation,
welfare, education and local economic development.706
Aside from these significant catalysts of constitutional overlap in the United
States, the steady progression of constitutional amendments has also contributed to the
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erosion of watertight jurisdictions. Even if one were to allow that the original American
Constitution created a clear division of powers with very minimal overlap (admittedly a
controversial claim in light of judicial interpretation), the amendments generally moved
the United States in the direction of greater centralization and overlap. Specifically, two
groups of amendments have been responsible for broadening federal powers and
increasing overlap: those following the Civil War and the amendment authorizing federal
income tax. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were passed in the
five years following the Civil War (1865-70) in order to provide constitutional protections
for the abolition of slavery, civil rights and the ability of the federal government to
reconstruct the country. The eventual effect of these amendments on federalism was to
give Washington the authority to intervene in state jurisdiction in the name of civil
rights.707 The Sixteenth Amendment, enacted in 1913, allowed the federal government to
collect income tax for the first time. This helped to lay the foundation for the expansion
of the federal government and allowed the eventual funding of the welfare state in the
1930s.
Yet if these various factors have combined to increase constitutional overlap in the
United States they seem to have had little effect on the formation of national
intergovernmental agreements. With only eight national agreements since World War II,
the opportunity afforded by increased overlap seems to have done little to encourage this
type of intergovernmental institution. While it may be the case that the effect of
constitutional overlap in the United States is less significant compared to other factors –
such as the number of subnational governments – the way in which overlap developed
may provide the answer. For the most part, the overlap found by Watts’ comparison can
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be attributed to the steady expansion of the federal government, whether via judicial
interpretation or constitutional amendment. This will be discussed in the next section, as
changes to federal powers have led not only to overlap, but centralization. An
increasingly-powerful federal government is likely to limit agreement formation as
opposed to encourage it.

2. The Degree of Centralization in the Constitutional Division of Powers
There are few federations that can claim origins as decentralized as the United
States. American states began as fully sovereign entities, bound together by a common
revolutionary cause, a confederal constitution and a commitment to a “firm league of
friendship”. While the final American Constitution of 1787 moved in a more centralized
direction, beginning from such a decentralized starting point might still suggest a
relatively decentralized union. Looking purely at the division of powers and the relevant
policy areas that each government occupies would seem to offer some evidence for this
prediction. The previous section indicated that just over one-half of all policy areas
involve a role for both the federal and state governments. The remainder is divided
(roughly) equally between the national and subnational governments with the federal
government occupying 10 areas (22%) exclusively while the states have jurisdiction over
11 (24%) areas. The figure for the states is significant since it is the highest of all seven
federations in this analysis, five percent higher than second-place Canada or the United
Kingdom.
If this was the end of the story, it might be safe to declare that the United States is
a relatively decentralized federation, one that should allow for increased opportunities for
the development of national intergovernmental agreements. However, it seems that a
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broader reading of the Constitution – beyond simply the division of powers – as well as
an understanding of American federalism in practice suggests the polar opposite to this
conclusion. Instead of a decentralized federation where the states have significant
autonomy, the United States has instead evolved a system of “regulatory federalism”
where Congress wields significant powers to pre-empt and override subnational
governments.708
The previous section detailed how overlap had been created in great part by the
broadening of the federal enumerated powers through judicial interpretation and
constitutional amendments. In particular, the “necessary and proper” as well as the
“interstate commerce” clauses were identified as important points for the broad
interpretation of federal powers. This overlap can have a centralizing effect through the
usage of the “Supremacy clause”, which is stated in article VI, paragraph 2 of the
Constitution as:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges
in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any
state to the contrary notwithstanding.
Thus, the Supremacy clause allows for federal law to pre-empt or overrule state or local
laws should they come into conflict. With the slow but steady expansion of the federal
government’s enumerated powers, this clause has not simply increased overlap but has
also increased the areas that could be affected by federal pre-emption. This has provided
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more than enough opportunities for Congress to use its regulatory powers. Between 1790
and 2004 a total of 522 pre-emption statutes were enacted, an average of 2.44 per year. 709
Aside from simply declaring national pre-emption over entire areas of legislation,
Congress has several other tools to ensure the compliance of the states with federal policy
which are listed in Table 10.1. These regulatory instruments draw upon the many
advantages possessed by the national government in the American federal system
including: broadly defined constitutional authority, the supremacy of federal laws, the
spending power, federal and civil law enforcement and a well-developed bureaucracy.
Combined into a set of regulatory instruments, these advantages work as override clauses
which ensure federal pre-eminence across a large number of policy areas.
Table 10.1: American Intergovernmental Regulatory Instruments710
Program Type:
Direct Orders
(Mandates)
Cross-Cutting
Regulations

Cross-Over
Sanctions

Partial Preemptions

709

Description:
Mandate state or local action
under the threat of criminal or
civil penalties.
Applies to all or many federal
assistance programs.

Threaten the reduction or
termination of aid provided
under one or more specified
programs unless requirements of
another program or satisfied.
Establish federal standards but
delegate administration to states
if they adopt standards
equivalent to national ones.

Major Policy Areas:
Public employment,
environmental protection
Non-discrimination,
environmental protection,
public employment,
assistance management
Highway safety and
beautification,
environmental protection,
health planning,
handicapped education
Environmental protection,
natural resources,
occupational safety and
health, meat and poultry
inspection

The use of pre-emption statutes has grown rapidly since the Second World War. Before 1900, only 29
were passed by Congress. Beginning in the 1960s, however, their use increased quickly. Between 1965
and 1969, 36 were used, followed by 102 instances in the 1970s, 93 during the 1980, 83 in the 1990s and 41
in the period from 2000 to 2004. See: Zimmerman, Congressional Preemption, 4-11.
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The effects of federal regulatory instruments can apply nation-wide and as a
result, there are significant implications for intergovernmental agreements. For a national
agreement to be formed, there must be a common challenge as well as a common policy
or plan of action chosen by virtually all governments. The existence of regulatory
instruments in the United States changes this dynamic entirely. If Congress is able to
identify a matter of pressing concern across the country, it can act unilaterally to attempt
to impose a remedy, rather than seek to build consensus through negotiation. As an
example, at the beginning of the 21st century, nineteen states had adopted laws
establishing a blood-alcohol limit of 0.08, with the possibility of more states joining in.
This type of situation has the potential to yield intergovernmental coordination and
agreement in some circumstances. In this case, however, the federal government chose to
use its power of pre-emption to pass a law legislating a national limit, forcing states to
comply.711 Since the 1960s this has been far from an isolated incident as direct orders,
cross-cutting regulations, cross-over sanctions and partial pre-emptions were used a total
of sixty times between 1961 and 1990.712 In theory, that is as many as sixty opportunities
for national intergovernmental agreements which were eliminated because of the power
of the federal government in the United States.
These regulatory instruments effectively remove an entire avenue of national
intergovernmental agreements. The federal government of the United States is under
little to no obligation to negotiate with the states as it can simply impose its will
nationally through some form of pre-emption. It is telling that the peak institutions for
711
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interstate cooperation such as the National Governors Association and the National
Conference of State Legislatures take it upon themselves to lobby Congress to further
their interests, rather than negotiate with the federal government as relative equals.

3. The Size and Status of the Federal Spending Power
Assessing the effect of the federal spending power on the formation of national
intergovernmental agreements in the United States is one that requires both depth and
context. Depth is needed because the initial numbers do not necessarily give an accurate
impression of the state of American fiscal federalism. Context is required because the
status and usage of the spending power is greatly affected by the unique role of the
federal government and its ability to pursue regulation in intergovernmental relations.

Table 10.2: Percentage of Subnational Revenue from Federal Grants (United States)713

USA

1972 1975 1980
26.31 25.17 44.16

1985
20.5

1990 1995 2000
19.96 23.78 25.97

2005
N/A

2007
N/A

AVG
26.56

Rank
5

Looking solely at state reliance on federal transfers, it seems that American states
are not especially dependent, at least compared to the other federations. Only about a
quarter of state budgets are drawn from financial transfers from the federal government,
less than any other federation aside from Canada and Germany. These numbers are
confirmed by Watts’ review of American federal-state financial relations: between 2000
and 2004, federal grants amounted to only 25.6% of state revenues, which ranked 12th
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out of 16 federations.714 This comparatively low level of financial dependence is based
on a number of factors, but particularly the ability of the states to raise revenues from
almost any source (with the exception of levies on interstate or international trade) and
the lack of large federal-state welfare programs, such as the health systems of Australia
and Canada.715 Although even a small amount of transferred revenue between the two
orders of government can be fertile ground for intergovernmental agreement formation,
the record of agreements for the United States shows that this is not the case for this
particular federation.
A better understanding of the relationship between the spending power and
agreement formation in the United States can be found by examining other measurements
of financial transfers. Notably, while overall transfers to states are relatively small
compared to other federations, conditional transfers are another matter. A full 100% of
all transfers from the federal government to the states are conditional, the highest of any
federation. Moreover, since all payments and grants are conditional, the United States is
near the top (4th of 14) in a comparison of conditional transfers as a portion of subnational
revenues.716 This high level of conditionality is justified on the basis of accountability –
if the federal government is responsible for raising this revenue (and the political costs
associated with taxation) then it is essential that it ensure the money is spent properly.717
These conditions are realized, in part, through the regulatory instruments discussed
earlier, such as cross-cutting sanctions. The effects of these conditions are further
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enhanced by the amount of tax room occupied by the federal government. Since 1952,
the federal government`s tax share has grown to approximately 20% of Gross National
Product.718 State revenues have grown over this same period, doubling in GNP value but
have remained between one-quarter and one-half the size of the federal share. This
change has been more in a response to rising costs and welfare commitments rather than
increased fiscal independence, as the levels of grants remains high.719
When placed into the context of regulatory federalism and the instruments
possessed by the President and Congress to establish nation-wide standards and policies,
the federal spending power becomes more meaningful. Rather than act as an opportunity
for intergovernmental coordination and potential agreements, the American spending
power has the opposite effect. The high degree of conditionality ends up reinforcing the
agreement-limiting effects of centralization as federal cash is joined to the national
government`s legal and regulatory powers to coerce state action, rather than form national
agreements. Thus, not only does the United States have a relatively small federal
spending power, but what there is works in concert with other variables to reduce the
opportunity for the formation of national intergovernmental agreements.

4. The Size and Scope of the Welfare State
One of the most persistent political stereotypes of the United States is that it is a
land of small government and self-reliance, especially when compared to socialdemocratic European states. Such a stereotype would suggest that the size of government
and the welfare state in America will provide only limited opportunities for
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intergovernmental relations and ultimately, agreements. This raises the question: do the
data confirm this? As a generalization, the answer seems to be yes, but with a few
interesting nuances.
Two basic trends are apparent in the welfare spending data for the United States.
First, as is the case with most advanced, industrialized democracies, welfare spending has
been rising since the Second World War. Even in the United States, there has been a
steady growth in government spending as a whole, fuelled by large expansions in the
Entitlement programs: Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security.720 Second, while
spending has grown, America remains one of the lowest-spending federal systems in this
study, whatever the measure used.

Table 10.3: American Welfare Spending as a Percentage of GDP721

United States

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 AVG Rank
13.1 13.1 13.4 15.3 14.5 15.9 14.22
6

These trends are evident in welfare spending data from the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). As a percentage of GDP, American
welfare spending has remained the lowest of the six cases for which data are available; at
an average of 14.22% of GDP it is almost half a percentage point less than fifth-place
Australia. 722 This is clearly consistent with the lack of national intergovernmental
agreements in the United States. Of the eight agreements identified, only one is related
directly to welfare, pensions or healthcare (and this is a reciprocity and transfer
720
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agreement), and only one to education spending.723 Moreover, while the United States
experienced a clear increase in spending, notably between 1990 and 1995, this does not
seem to have had any effect on agreement formation.

Table 10.4: American Welfare Spending as a Percentage of Total Federal Spending724

USA

1972 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995
52.60 51.56 50.45 44.95 44.44 53.60

2000
53.09

2005 2007 AVG
59.23 59.30 52.14

Rank
5

Even when examining welfare spending through a different lens (as a percentage
of total federal spending) the same patterns seem to hold true. Although the United States
ranks higher in terms of expenditure, it is still lower than the majority of other
federations. Moreover, the United States’ ranking falls if only recent data are considered,
placing it ahead of only South Africa. In contrast, the country would have ranked third in
federal spending in 1977, ahead of Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. While
America has seen spending increases like most other countries, these appear to have been
smaller than in other federations. The clear result of this is fewer opportunities for
intergovernmental agreement formation.
The heterogeneity of government programs in the United States may also
contribute to the lack of national agreements pertaining to the welfare state. With the
exception of the federal entitlement programs, many education, health and welfare
programs are left up to each state. This contrasts with other federations which have large
national programs – or at least some national consensus - for matters such as healthcare,
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income support and post-secondary education. The recent healthcare legislation
championed by President Obama and the Democratic majority in Congress from 2009-10
contained numerous exemptions and qualifiers to account for the differences inherent in
existing programs.725 Massachusetts in particular already had a system of universal
insurance that would make a federal plan redundant. Given the differences between state
programs it makes finding common ground difficult – especially with fifty participants.
These variations, combined with the comparatively low level of spending, provide fewer
opportunities for intergovernmental agreement formation and are consistent with the
overall number of national agreements.

5. The Existence of Lasting Forums for Intergovernmental Relations
The question of whether or not there are lasting and institutionalized forums for
intergovernmental relations in the United States rests, in part, on the effects of the large
number of states. While this will be discussed at greater length in the next section, the
effectiveness of any forum devoted to intergovernmental relations in America faces a
significant challenge in simply assembling representatives from each of the 50 states, let
alone working together to form intergovernmental agreements.
Despite this barrier, the United States is still home to a number of
intergovernmental bodies. Stephens and Wikstrom found that there are over 100 national
associations of state and local officials, listing the most prominent as:
(T)he Council of State Governments (1935), National Conference on Uniform
State Laws (1892), National Governors’ Association (1908), National Conference
on State Legislatures (1948), Conference of Chief Justices (1949), National
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Association of Attorneys General (1907), National Association of State Budget
Officers (1945), and National Association of State Purchasing Officials (1947).726
Clearly, not all of these institutions are comparable to bodies for executive or interlegislative federalism in other federations; indeed, some of them, such as the Conference
of Chief Justices, are judicial bodies. It seems then, that there are intergovernmental
forums that could, in theory, provide opportunities for national agreement development.
In practice, however, these bodies seem to have had almost no impact on agreement
formation.
There are a few potential explanations for the limited connection between
America’s network of institutions for intergovernmental relations and the formation, or
lack thereof, of national agreements. First, there is no permanent or formal body for
federal-state executive federalism. In all other federations in this study, save perhaps
Switzerland, there is at least a semi-regular forum for the heads of government to meet.
While the President may occasionally host the Governors at the White House, this
appears as more of a political event instead of an opportunity for negotiation and
intergovernmental relations. This may be a consequence of the immense advantage that
Washington (both the President and Congress) has in dealing with the states, but whatever
the origin, the lack of a permanent forum removes the possibility of a peak institution for
intergovernmental relations that could contribute to national agreement formation.
Second, the level of centralization in American federalism has had a drastic
impact on the organization of several of the most prominent national associations of state
officials and legislators. Rather than act solely as forums for interstate coordination,
organizations such as the National Governors Association, National Conference of State
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Legislatures and Council of State Governments devote a substantial portion of their
efforts to lobbying Congress and the executive branch in Washington.727 The substantial
powers of the federal government and the common causes they provide for the states
mean that rather than focus efforts only on developing consensus amongst themselves,
their cooperative efforts are directed elsewhere.
Third, as the next section will illustrate, the large number of states in America is
itself a barrier to effective national intergovernmental relations. Even getting 90% of
governors to participate in a single meeting is a relatively rare occurrence. While
intergovernmental forums can still serve important functions without perfect attendance,
notably for the discussion of common interests, the study of best practices and the
aforementioned lobbying of the federal government, it is difficult to conceive of them as
bodies which can address issues and form a formal, possibly binding, consensus for
action when it is not clear which states will be represented at any one meeting.
Fourth, whether it is because of the three previous factors or simply in addition to
them, intergovernmental forums in the United States seem to have evolved for specific
purposes other than deliberate, collective action. For instance, the Council of State
Governments declares itself “a region-based forum that fosters the exchange of insights
and ideas to help state officials shape public policy”.728 The National Conference of State
Legislatures “provides research, technical assistance and opportunities for policymakers
to exchange ideas on the most pressing state issues” while also acting as representatives
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to Congress.729 This focus on research, technical support and the exchange of ideas - as
well as lobbying the federal government - stands in contrast to peak intergovernmental
institutions in other countries such as Australia and Canada, where the role of institutions
such as the Council of Australian Governments or the Council of the Federation (Canada)
is to engage in policy development and implementation, build relationships amongst
leaders, and provide national leadership.730 In the case of the American institutions, the
goal is directed more towards support and communication (as well as lobbying) while
other federations place a higher priority on the meetings of the national and subnational
leadership for policy development; clearly the latter is more likely to encourage
agreement formation than the former.
The United States is certainly not lacking for forums for intergovernmental
relations, but the ones that are present are not especially conducive to encouraging
national intergovernmental agreement formation. American intergovernmental forums
have focused more on research, lobbying and support as opposed to executive federalism.
As long as the federal government remains dominant, the states remain numerous and the
current intergovernmental political trends persist, the status quo in American
intergovernmental relations will continue.

6. The Number of Subnational Governments at the State/Provincial Level
If these variables had been arranged by order of importance then it might have
made sense to begin with a consideration of the number of subnational governments in
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the United States. Compared to the other federations in this analysis, the United States
has, by far, the greatest number of subnational governments, nearly double that of secondplace Switzerland. This significant disparity is not the product of an unrepresentative
selection of all federal systems, as the United States has more subnational governments
than any federation in existence. America’s 50 states are more numerous than the
subnational governments of other large federal countries such as Nigeria (36), Mexico
(31), and India (28).731 Given such a large number of states, even the minimum threshold
for an agreement to be considered national in scope in the United States (45 states), is
higher than the number of all of the subnational governments in Australia, Canada,
Germany, South Africa and the United Kingdom.
As the previous section previewed, with so many states, the simple act of
gathering representatives from each government together to discuss common issues – and
potentially intergovernmental agreements - becomes a difficult undertaking. The
National Governors’ Association (NGA) serves as a good example of this challenge. The
NGA has acted as a forum for state executives to meet together since 1908 and is one of
the more prominent forums for American interstate relations. It holds an annual meeting
for all governors and since 1966 has added a second, winter meeting. Despite numerous
opportunities, there has not been a single meeting that has included the governors from
every state.732 As Table 10.5 at the end of this chapter demonstrates, only 38 governors
(76%) on average participated at the annual meetings, while Table 10.6 shows that winter
meetings have seen only marginally higher attendance with an average of 40 governors
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(80%).733 These numbers are especially significant if meetings are to be an opportunity to
produce national intergovernmental agreements. Only 15 of the 66 (22.7%) annual
meetings involved more than 90% of the governors, and none since 1968. The winter
meetings – which seem to have become the more well-attended forum in the last twenty
years – have exceeded 90% participation only 14 of 45 times, or less than one-third.
While single meetings of all governors - to say nothing of legislative
representatives – are not the only possible means of forming national agreements, they
present a useful opportunity for discussion. Without the ability of all participants to meet
together and reach the terms of an agreement, the process instead becomes gradual and
piecemeal. A closer look at many of the agreements formed, specifically the compacts,
provides further evidence of this. The range of dates given for some of these agreements
is not due to inaccurate record-keeping, but rather the fact that there was a period of time
over which states entered into the agreement. Unlike the other federations compared
here, where most national agreements are negotiated during meetings involving all
governments, American agreements seem to start with a smaller group, before gradually
expanding to include others. This process may make it easier for individual state
governments to choose not to opt-in to an agreement as there is less pressure than being
the single intransigent in a room full of governors or representatives.
In a sense, the results speak for themselves. Not only are there only eight national
intergovernmental agreements between 1945 and 2008, but only half of these actually
include all 50 states. The difficulty of getting even 45 states, separated by a host of
733
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cleavages such as region, geography, economy and politics, to agree to a set of principles
or practices is clearly one of the biggest reasons why the United States has a very small
number of national agreements.

7. The Existence of a Body for Intrastate Federalism
The Senate of the United States provides only a partial measure of intrastate
federalism. If this analysis was conducted a century earlier, the United States would be
closer to full intrastate federalism, albeit in the midst of a transition. The Senate began as
a close facsimile to the original Congress under the Articles of Confederation with equal
representation for all the states and representatives chosen by the legislatures. The major
difference brought by the Constitution of 1787 was to change the membership and voting
rules from a single delegation vote to one where the two Senators each cast an
independent vote.
This system, which would persist until the turn of the 20th century, came close to
the model for full intrastate federalism: equally-represented subnational units with a role
in the national legislative process. The only difficulty came from the fact that because of
divided government, these representatives were selected by state legislatures and not
governors and sometimes splits in the legislature led to Senators from different parties or
ideologies being selected, undermining the coherence of the state’s representation.734
Controversies in some states over the selection of Senators – corruption allegations were
rife – and growing populist movements convinced several state governments, beginning

734

United States Senate. "Direct Election of Senators."
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Direct_Election_Senators.htm (accessed
February 28, 2011).
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with Oregon, to allow direct elections in 1907.735 This success finally forced the Senate
to concede to the reformers and this culminated in the 17th Amendment to the
Constitution which made direct elections for the Senate mandatory in all states.
Since 1913 – and over the period that is being considered in this study – the
Senate has had elected representatives which has limited its ability to act as a means for
intergovernmental relations within the federal government. This should have a neutral
effect on national intergovernmental agreement formation. When compared to a
federation like Australia however, there is some evidence that the American Senate may
do a marginally better job in addressing matters of intergovernmental relations than
comparable bodies. The United States and Australia have upper chambers which provide
equal representation for all subnational governments, their rules allow these members to
cast independent votes and both countries allow for the direct election of Senators by the
citizenry. Yet vastly different party systems and political traditions alter the outcomes of
these similar institutions. In Australia, party discipline is quite strong in the Senate,
exacerbated by the system of proportional representation used to select members.736 This
leads to a body which is more focused on the competition between national political
parties than subnational representation.737 In contrast, party discipline is relatively weak
in the American Senate, allowing members to make state representation one of their
highest priorities. Indeed, United States Senators have been criticized for concentrating
too much on the needs of their states, resulting in the development of “pork-barrel
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Ibid.
Galligan and Wright, "Australian Federalism," 2002.
737
Ibid. This is not to suggest that the Australian Senate is devoid of subnational representation, only that it
is not the primary focus of the body.
736
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politics” and a concern for local matters.738 This is not to imply that party has no effect in
the American Senate only that comparatively looser discipline may allow Senators to
directly address the needs of their constituents – concerns that might otherwise have to be
taken up within intergovernmental relations. When combined with the ability of the
federal government to use regulatory instruments to address matters in state and
concurrent jurisdiction, the Senate may be contributing to the lack of national
intergovernmental agreements.
In summary, the United States Senate fulfills one of two roles in relation to
intergovernmental agreement formation. It may be a standard example of partial
intrastate federalism, in which it has little to no effect on potential intergovernmental
business that might lead to agreements. Or, its role as a valid representative for state
interests might help to funnel some interstate matters into the federal legislative process
which may lead to regulatory federalism. In the former, this makes intrastate federalism a
non-factor in agreement formation, meaning other variables are at play, and if it is the
latter, it serves as a further restriction on national agreement creation. The answer would
seem to lie somewhere in the middle and as such, the American Senate acts as a minor
alternative to intergovernmental relations and the formation of agreements.

Conclusion
In many ways the United States of America today is completely different from its
origins in 1777. It has evolved from a decentralized confederation of thirteen former
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Ronald Utt, “How Congressional Earmarks and Pork-Barrel Spending Undermine State and Local
Decision-making,” The Heritage Foundation, 1999,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1999/04/congressional-earmarks-and-spending-underminedecisionmaking (accessed, March 3, 2011).
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colonies on the eastern coast of North America to a continent-spanning, relativelycentralized federation of fifty states. These changes have had important implications for
the study of federalism and specifically this analysis of intergovernmental agreements.
While intergovernmental agreements are certainly not rare in American federalism, only
eight could be found that met the minimum 90% threshold of subnational participation
between 1945 and 2008 (0.13 per year). With only South Africa forming fewer
agreements, the institutional environment in the United States should be amongst the
most inhospitable to new intergovernmental institutions.
This expectation is certainly confirmed by the factors which encourage new
agreements. These present a figurative cornucopia of weak and limited possibilities for
intergovernmental coordination. America has the smallest welfare state of the six
developed federations, ranking just ahead of South Africa, providing fewer areas of
potential policy coordination between the orders of government. Overlap is also limited
by the “watertight containers” model of the division of powers; while this has eroded
somewhat over time, overlap in American federalism is not nearly as significant as in
countries like Australia or Germany. Even intergovernmental forums provide fewer
pressures for coordination than might otherwise be expected. While the US has several
organizations devoted to intergovernmental relations, including potential peak institutions
such as the National Governors’ Association, attendance rarely reaches even 90%.
Perhaps most surprising however, is the degree of centralization present in American
federalism and intergovernmental relations. The spending power, though not
exceptionally large, is supported by numerous coercive conditions and is complimented
by a series of other override instruments, such as sanctions and direct orders. With such
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limited features which are conducive to national intergovernmental coordination, it is not
surprising that the US has formed so few agreements.
The weak pressures towards coordination might, by itself, be enough to stymie
any agreement formation. This, however, is not the end of the factors working against
national agreements as a substantial inhibitor exists to further reduce the potential for
agreements in the United States. While the modern Senate provides only a partial degree
of intrastate federalism and thus, a limited alternative, the difficulty caused by the large
number of subnational governments may be the most significant barrier of any case in this
comparison. With fifty states, America has just shy of double the number of constituent
units as the next largest federation here (Switzerland). This presents an enormous
coordination problem to any kind of national action as getting even 45 states to agree on a
single measure presents great difficulties.
With so few conducive features and the presence of significant inhibitors and
alternatives, it is not surprising that the US has formed only a handful of national
agreements; perhaps the real question is how they managed to form so many. This is
even more apparent when expressed as the summary formula:
CON (Weak) – INH (Strong) – ALT (Few) = Very Limited IGA Formation
With such an unfavourable institutional climate, the US provides a useful case that
demonstrates the consistency of the hypotheses even in cases with limited agreement
formation.
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Table 10.5: State Governors' Participation at the Summer Meeting of the National
Governors' Association (NGA), 1945-2010:

Year

No. Governors

Year

No. Governors

1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

43
27
43
37
42
43
45
45
42
42
45
46
45
44
42
45
44
44
48
48
49
47
40
45
43
42
44
43
43
44
43
41
39

1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

40
35
42
41
43
39
29
41
31
40
33
34
26
34
26
29
33
25
29
42
38
39
36
36
28
30
29
27
26
30
29
23
33

Average

38.2
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Table 10.6: State Governors' Participation at the Winter Meeting of the National
Governors' Association (NGA), 1966-2010:

Year

No. Governors

Year

No. Governors

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

36
No meeting
44
41
39
49
42
32
49
31
26
30
37
28
43
49
Data not available
46
49
42
33
31

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

28
36
42
34
47
48
25
28
44
45
48
47
46
46
44
45
41
33
44
45
43
45

1988

31

Average

39.8
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Chapter Eleven: Comparison and
Analysis of the Results
Introduction
The individual country analyses have provided useful information regarding the
formation of intergovernmental agreements and concerning federalism and
intergovernmental relations in each of the federations. More than simply increasing our
understanding of these federations, the case studies have served as a reasonable test for
the seven factors that may affect a country’s potential for agreement formation. Together,
these cases supply a wealth of data and insight on agreements and the theories about their
creation. This chapter will build upon the results provided by the individual country case
studies and compare these results in three ways. First, each of the seven variables will be
summarized and evaluated for its individual consistency with the results of
intergovernmental agreement formation. This analysis will attempt to determine which
variables had the largest individual effects in encouraging or discouraging agreement
creation as well as which were the most consistent with their expected outcomes. Second,
the seven variables will be examined together, summarizing the findings of the case
studies and their respective summary formulas. The goal of this section is to evaluate
whether these variables provide a complete explanation for the pattern of agreement
formation across the cases or whether some federal systems cannot be adequately
explained by this analytical framework. This will also provide the opportunity to
comment generally about the seven countries included in this investigation and the effects
of the institutional variables working in concert. Third, this chapter will conclude by
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reviewing the findings of this study and the contributions it makes to the understanding of
federalism, intergovernmental relations and comparative politics.

Evaluation and Summary of the Variables
In order to summarize each of the seven variables in this analysis there are two
questions that must be answered. First, how strong are the perceived effects of a variable
on the formation of intergovernmental agreements? In other words, how much does a
particular variable encourage or discourage the creation of new agreements and is this
effect consistent across federations? Second, is the observed effect consistent with the
original hypothesis, inconsistent or simply inconclusive? For example, the presence of
full intrastate federalism should, in theory, provide an alternative to agreement formation,
but in practice, the findings may indicate otherwise. Together, these two questions will
give some comparative context to each of the variables as well as determining whether or
not each is consistent with the records of agreement formation. Table 11.1 summarizes
the answers to these questions based upon the country analyses of the preceding chapters.
The summary table makes clear a couple of interesting trends among the seven
variables. Each of the factors that affect intergovernmental agreement formation is
strongly present in at least two of the federations and weak-to-non-existent in at least two
others. The diversity of the cases allows for all of the variables to be considered across
the federations and any differences to be observed. As with the strength of the variables,
not one of the seven is entirely consistent or inconsistent. Though certain hypotheses
seem to be more accurate than others – for example, the number of subnational
governments versus the degree of constitutional overlap – all of the variables operate as
predicted in at least some of the federations studied. Each of the variables will be

Table 11.1: Summary Table of Findings and Results from the Case Studies
Country and Rank

Australia (3)

Canada (2)

Germany (1)

S . Africa (7)

S witzerland (5)

UK (4)

US A (6)

Totals

40.29
0.83 AVG

No. of Agreements

76

92

40 (80 )

0

15

11

8

Average

1.27

1.46

0.89 (1.77)

0

0.25

0.92

0.13

1) Degree of
Constitutional
Overlap

S trong
Opportunity
(Consistent)

Weak
Opportunity
(Inconclusive)

Very S trong
Opportunity
(Consistent)

Very S trong
Opportunity
(Inconsistent)

Weak
Opportunity
(Inconclusive)

Moderate
Opportunity
(Inconclusive)

Weak
Opportunity
(Consistent)

2) Centralization
in the Division of
Powers

Moderate
Opportunity
(Inconclusive)

S trong
Opportunity
(Consistent)

Moderate
Opportunity
(Inconclusive)

Very Weak
Opportunity
(Consistent)

Weak-Average
Opportunity
(Consistent)

Weak
Opportunity
(Inconclusive)

Very Weak
Opportunity
(Consistent)

3 Consistent; 1
Inconsistent; 3
Inconclusive (+2
Consistent)
4 Consistent; 3
Inconclusive (+4
Consistent)

3) The S ize and
S tatus of the
Federal S pending
Power

S trong
Opportunity
(Consistent)

S trong
Opportunity
(Consistent)

Very Weak
Opportunity
(Inconsistent)

Weak
Opportunity
(Consistent High)

Weak
Opportunity
(Consistent)

Weak
Opportunity
(Inconclusive High)

Weak to
Moderate
Opportunity
(Consistent)

5 Consistent; 1
Inconsistent; 1
Inconclusive (+4
Consistent)

4) The S ize and
S cope of the
Welfare S tate

Moderate
Opportunity
(Inconclusive)

Moderate
Opportunity
(Inconclusive)

Very S trong
Opportunity
(Consistent)

Weak
Opportunity
(Consistent)

Weak, then
S trong
Opportunity
(Inconsistent)

S trong
Opportunity
(Inconsistent)

Very Weak
Opportunity
(Consistent)

3 Consistent; 2
Inconsistent; 2
Inconclusive (+1
Consistent)

5) Forums for
Intergovernmental
Relations

Very S trong
Opportunity
(Consistent)

Very S trong
Opportunity
(Consistent)

Very S trong
Opportunity
(Consistent)

S trong
Opportunity
(Inconsistent)

Weak, then
Average
Opportunity
(Consistent)

Moderate
Opportunity
(Consistent)

Weak
Opportunity
(Consistent)

6 Consistent; 1
Inconsistent (+5
Consistent)

6) No. of S ubNational
Governments

Weak
Impediment
(Consistent)

Weak
Impediment
(Consistent)

Weak
Impediment
(Consistent)

Weak
Impediment
(Inconclusive)

S trong
Impediment
(Consistent)

Moderate
Impediment
(Consistent)

Very S trong
Impediment
(Consistent)

6 Consistent; 1
Inconclusive (+6
Consistent)

7) Intrastate
Federalism

Weak
Impediment
(Consistent)

Very Weak
Impediment
(Consistent)

S trong
Impediment
(Inconsistent)

S trong
Impediment
(Consistent)

Weak
Impediment
(Inconclusive)

Very Weak
Impediment
(Consistent)

Weak
Impediment
(Inconclusive)

Alternatives to
IGAs?

No

No (Defunct
powers only)

Yes (Federal
legislation)

Yes (Federal
Yes (Federal
legislation & intra- legislation &
party relations)
regional IGAs)

Yes (Federal
legislation)

Yes
(Regulatory
instruments)

Overall IGA
Environment

Very S trong
Potential

Very S trong
Potential

Moderate S trong Potential

Moderate
Potential

Weak
Potential

Very Weak
Potential

Weak Potential

4 Consistent; 1
Inconsistent; 2
Inconclusive (+3
Consistent)
S ome form in all
but Canada &
Australia
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examined individually in an effort to better understand their relative successes and
failures in explaining the formation of intergovernmental agreements.739

1) The Degree of Constitutional Overlap that Exists
Constitutional overlap is an interesting variable to begin with as it was one of the
least successful in terms of confirming the original hypothesis. While the hypothesis was
clearly inconsistent with the record of agreement formation in only one of the federations
(South Africa), it was inconclusive in three others. It would be premature, however to
conclude that overlap provides a poor explanation for intergovernmental agreement
formation. In two of the federations (Australia and Germany), a significant degree of
overlap is an important element of the account of why both federations produce a large
number of intergovernmental agreements. In the case of the United States, the lower
degree of overlap is less conducive to coordination and is consistent with the small
number of national agreements formed.
Even if overlap is an important part of understanding intergovernmental
agreements in two federations and consistent with the outcomes in a third, there are still
four other cases in which it has proven to be inconsistent or inconclusive. However, a
brief review of these countries indicates that perhaps overlap is not quite as unsuccessful
as the summary table might imply. In Canada, constitutional overlap as measured by the
number of policy areas in which both orders of government have jurisdiction is
comparatively low, yet those areas with some degree of overlap tend to produce a

739

As with the summary formula, the summary table is meant to reiterate and repackage the basic findings
of the country analyses in one place. It is not meant as a precise model or as a replacement for the
preceding discussions.
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significant number of agreements.740 While other factors are much stronger in the
Canadian case and seem more likely to be driving the formation of agreements, overlap
appears to have a role to play and this case is certainly not inconsistent with the
hypothesis.
With Switzerland, the difficulty in making definitive statements about overlap is
due to the decentralized practice of administrative federalism there. Overlap exists in a
number of fields, with the federal government possessing broader legislative powers
while the cantons have administrative authority. Unlike other instances of administrative
federalism – such as Germany – the cantons have great flexibility to interpret and
implement federal legislation.741 Thus, it is difficult to definitively ascertain whether
Switzerland is a federation with a high degree of overlap and if not, whether this lack of
overlap is contributing to a low number of national agreements. As such, it is more
accurate to say that there is not enough evidence to claim that overlap has strong
influence on Swiss results.
The inconclusive result for the United Kingdom is something of a reverse of the
Swiss case. While the UK’s framework for devolution possesses at least some potential
overlap, it is not clear whether the record of agreement formation reflects this. While the
UK’s rate of agreement formation is quite high at 0.92 per year, most of the 11
agreements were formed at the beginning of devolution. As such, the UK’s record of
national agreements is divided between a very active period early in devolution and a
much more subdued era since then.742 Moreover, the very nature of overlap in the UK’s
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See the section on Canadian overlap in Chapter 5 for the complete discussion.
Linder and Vatter, "Institutions and Outcomes of Swiss Federalism," 105.
742
The difficulty presented by the United Kingdom’s record of agreement formation will be addressed in
greater detail later in this chapter.
741
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devolved “constitution” is still evolving, making it difficult to place this nascent
federation at one extreme or the other. Given the uncertainty in the degree of overlap and
the record of agreement formation, it seems prudent to regard the UK as an inconclusive
case.
This leaves South Africa as the only truly inconsistent case. South Africa has,
along with Germany, the largest degree of overlap of the seven federations studied. Yet,
with no agreements to speak of, constitutional overlap seems to be insufficient (at least by
itself) to precipitate even one agreement. As mentioned in the chapter on South Africa,
however, this can be explained in part by the powerful role of the national government.
Constitutional overlap is significant in South Africa, but the true story of the
constitutional division of powers is the significant authority. Yet this cannot entirely
mitigate or explain away the failure of overlap to encourage at least a small number of
agreements in South Africa, perhaps indicating that this variable can be overwhelmed by
the effects of others.
Taken together, the analysis of the seven cases suggests that the overlap
hypothesis is as likely to offer little explanation for a federation`s record of agreement
formation as it is to contribute to our understanding of it. Overlap cannot be completely
dismissed though, as it is important in explaining agreements in Australia and Germany.
Additionally, overlap records an “inconsistent” result only in South Africa. While there
are other variables that are more consistent with the data, the degree of constitutional
overlap remains an important element in understanding intergovernmental agreements in
at least some federations.

2) The Degree of Centralization in the Constitutional Division of Powers
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The relationship between centralization in the division of powers and the
formation of intergovernmental agreements has proven to be one of the most fascinating
and complicated of the seven variables. Initially, centralization was conceived of as a
straightforward evaluation of constitutional jurisdiction – a centralized federation would
be one in which the national government had exclusive jurisdiction over a large number
of policy fields. When applied to the country case studies, it became clear that while it
was quite possible to determine whether a federation was more or less decentralized, this
assessment relied on a host of factors beyond the totals of jurisdictional powers.743
One of the greatest sources of difficulty and complexity in assessing centralization
came from the European federations, Germany and Switzerland. Both practice a form of
administrative federalism in which the national government is granted broad legislative
powers but limited administrative or executive ones. Switzerland, in particular, looks
very centralized when evaluated solely on the basis of how many policy areas are
exclusive to the national government (49%) while Germany appears much more
decentralized (21%). In practice, however, the situation is almost reversed. The Swiss
national government generally passes broad framework legislation leaving the cantons
with substantial freedom to implement policies, while in Germany, the national
parliament possesses more tools to direct the länder. In both cases, it is difficult to
precisely quantify or categorize the degree of centralization, especially when the goal is to
study intergovernmental agreement formation. The autonomy of the Swiss cantons may
classify it as a decentralized federation in other studies, yet in this application, even broad
national legislation may replace agreements as instruments of coordination.

743

Because determining how centralized a federation is requires more than the total policy areas possessed
by the national and subnational governments, any measurement of this variable is, to some extent, relative.
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The other interesting (and unforeseen) element of centralization came in the form
of “override powers”. In Comparing Federal Systems, Watts describes these as special
powers which provide the national government with the means to “invade or curtail”
normal subnational powers in certain circumstances (often emergencies).744 In the study
of intergovernmental agreements however, it may make sense to expand our
understanding of these powers beyond crises and quasi-federal institutions. In this
application, override powers or instruments allow for a federal government to impose a
national decision upon subnational governments, even if this lies beyond its explicit
jurisdiction. Depending on the federation, such powers can have a number of potential
influences on the creation of intergovernmental agreements. In Canada, the override
powers of reservation and disallowance are effectively defunct (though still present in the
Constitution). Similarly in the United Kingdom, Westminster possesses something of an
override power by virtue of the devolution arrangements being created by statute (and
thus, they are amendable), though this has remained unused. In South Africa, the
numerous override clauses further reinforce the already formidable powers of the national
government.
The United States represents something of an alternative case in which the
override powers are present and active, but run contrary to other elements in the division
of powers. America’s states have, in percentage terms, the largest number of exclusive
policy areas of any of the federations in this comparison. However, the federal
government possesses a number of intergovernmental regulatory instruments such as
direct orders, sanctions and pre-emptions, which enable it to obtain national coordination
without the potential difficulties of an intergovernmental agreement. In this way, the
744

Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 3rd ed., 90.
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override powers in the United States act as a means of significant centralization and serve
as an alternative to agreements – an important concept which will be reviewed in the next
section.
The last “complication” of the centralization variable worth mentioning was the
lack of truly decentralized federations to analyze. While there were good examples of
very centralized federations (South Africa, United Kingdom) as well as ones which were
neither strongly centralized or decentralized (Australia, Germany), only one case, Canada,
could be said to be clearly on the decentralized end of the spectrum. When the cases were
initially selected, it was hoped that Switzerland and/or the United States might also fulfill
this role; however, upon review, both federations were found to be more centralized than
anticipated – at least in relation to the study of intergovernmental agreements. Override
powers in the United States represent a tremendous centralizing influence while Swiss
administrative federalism allows for national legislation, however flexible, to serve as a
means of intergovernmental coordination.
Despite these unexpected findings concerning centralization in these federations,
this variable still proved to be relatively successful in explaining the formation of
intergovernmental agreements. It is one of only two of the seven hypotheses that did not
register a single “inconsistent” result. While there are three inconclusive results, none of
these are particularly damaging to centralization’s contribution towards the understanding
of agreements. In the cases of Australia and Germany, neither federation is clearly
centralized or decentralized to the extent that one could claim that the results are
consistent or inconsistent with the prolific agreement formation found in both countries.
As such, it is more accurate to simply acknowledge that centralization is not a critical
ingredient in the understanding of these two cases. The other inconclusive result, the
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United Kingdom, was more difficult to categorize based on its unique record of
intergovernmental agreements. The division of powers under devolution is clearly
centralized, but as was the case with the effects of overlap, it is still too early to tell
whether the early flurry of agreements was a unique event. If centralization is indeed a
dominant influence on the formation of concordats in the United Kingdom, then the
recent paucity of agreements is likely to continue and the overall average will continue to
fall. This may be the more probable outcome – and thus, one could make the case that the
UK should be deemed consistent with the centralization hypothesis – but given the
relatively short history of devolution, it is safer to deem it inconclusive for now.
Perhaps most importantly for the reliability of the centralization variable is that
the hypothesis was confirmed in the most pronounced cases. The analysis of Canada, the
most decentralized federation in this comparison, indicated that the wide powers
possessed by the provinces created an excellent – and well-realized – impetus for
agreement formation. Likewise, the most centralized country, South Africa, and the
surprisingly centralized United States had the smallest number of agreements, consistent
with what would be expected.
While centralization’s effects are not always clear, it does seem to have a reliable
effect on the potential for national agreement formation when it is present. The
hypothesis that “as the powers of the national government are greater, the opportunities
for intergovernmental coordination are fewer,” may not be a linear relationship, but rather
one in which more extreme manifestations are more likely to influence agreement
creation.

3) The Size and Status of the Federal Spending Power
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In virtually every federation – and certainly each of the seven in this study – the
transfer of money is a significant issue in intergovernmental relations. Generally, though
not exclusively, money is transferred from the national government to the subnational
administrations, sometimes with certain conditions to ensure that the funds are spend on
specific tasks. The hypothesis stated that this federal spending power, depending on its
size and usage, could provide increased opportunities for intergovernmental agreements
to form. As initially conceived, the relationship between the spending power and
intergovernmental agreements was strictly numerical: as federal transfers increased in
size, so would the potential for new agreements. This original notion would have proved
to be a very poor understanding of both the spending power and its potential to encourage
new intergovernmental agreements, but fortunately, two important refinements have been
included in the final version of the theory.745 One concerns the “status” of the spending
power – that is, the way it is used, its constitutionality and its place in the federal system –
while the other is a better understanding of the effect of federal financial powers at the
extremes.

745

If the consistency of the spending power hypothesis was tested strictly as a numerical measurement, then
the final results would be: two consistent (Australia, Switzerland), three inconsistent (Canada, Germany,
South Africa) and two inconclusive (United Kingdom, United States).

Table 11.2: The Percentage of Subnational Revenue Received Through Federal Grants746
Year

1972

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2007

Australia

52.90

57.27

57.02

56.19

44.66

40.94

37.25

46.62

45.16

48.67

3

Canada

25.99

24.24

20.66

20.42

18.20

17.48

14.44

18.07

18.94

19.83

6

Germany

18.25

20.20

17.75

15.51

16.09

17.05

16.56

15.98

14.85

16.92

7

South Africa

83.51

N/A

86.23

85.65

83.63

94.38

96.08

96.63

95.96

90.26

2

Switzerland

30.81

28.10

27.11

25.64

30.22

28.95

30.97

28.94

28.76

28.83

4

UK

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

90.20

91.10

91.10

90.80

1

USA

26.31

44.16

44.16

20.54

19.96

23.78

25.97

N/A

N/A

29.27

5

Average

39.63

34.79

42.16

37.33

35.46

37.10

44.50

49.56

49.13

46.37

Average Rank

746

Data gathered from the IMF World Financial Yearbook series. Canadian and South African data for 1972 is from 1971 and 1973 respectively. Swiss data for
1990 is from 1991. United States data for 2000 is from 2001 (this was the last year for American data). UK data was gathered from the Scottish budgets of 200001 and 2006-07.
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The status of the spending power, while not as neatly quantified as the size of it, is
an important consideration in any federation. A national government may have
substantial resources to transfer to the states or provinces or to spend in their jurisdiction,
but if the constitution forbids such spending, then such financial capabilities are moot.
Similarly, another federation might have limited national resources to spend on
subnational matters, but complete freedom to allocate this money and a tradition of joint
action between orders of government. This latter hypothetical is close to the situation in
Canada. As Table 11.2 indicates, Canada’s provinces rely upon federal transfers for just
under 20% of their revenues, the second lowest total of these seven federations. Yet, not
only have governments in Canada formed a large number agreements, but any student of
Canadian federalism knows that the federal spending power has been an active (and
contentious) element of intergovernmental relations. In the Canadian case, the status and
use of the spending power gives the relatively small spending power a disproportionate
effect in creating opportunities for intergovernmental agreements. Australia has a similar
tradition of the federal spending power contributing to agreements, but the percentage of
federal transfers is much higher than in Canada.
The United States also presents an example of the status of the spending power
affecting agreement outcomes. While American states are not as reliant upon federal
money as their compatriots in Australia or even Switzerland, they still receive a larger
percentage of their budgets from transfers than Canadian provinces. Unlike Canada or
Australia however, the federal government of the United States makes use of various
regulatory instruments such as cross-cutting regulations, cross-over sanctions and other
conditions on grants, rather than negotiations, to transfer money to the states. In this way,
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the federal spending power is important to American intergovernmental relations, but
contributes next to nothing to the formation of intergovernmental agreements.
The realization that the status of the federal spending power was at least as
important as numerical measurements of its size also paved the way to the second
refinement of this hypothesis. In federations such as the United States, it is clear that the
status and usage of the federal spending power prevents it from facilitating
intergovernmental agreement formation. What also became clear from the individual
country analyses was that the size of the spending power could reach a point where it
would exhibit different properties. As Table 11.2 demonstrates there are sizeable gaps
between federations and the reliance of subnational governments on federal grants.
Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the United States are all within a 12% range (using
the average) between 16.92% and 28.83%. Australia occupies a tier of its own; at an
average of 48.67% it is well behind the leaders, but significantly ahead of the four
federations clustered among the lowest results. Towering above all of these are South
Africa and the United Kingdom, where the subnational governments rely upon transfers
from the centre for more than 90% of their revenue. This is more than five times the
reliance of Germany, the lowest-ranked country in this comparison.
It became clear in the analyses of South Africa and the United Kingdom that such
overwhelming financial dominance by the national government was bound to affect the
relationship between the spending power and the formation of intergovernmental
agreements. South Africa in particular, presented challenges as no national agreements
have been formed there; if the potential for intergovernmental agreements simply
increased in lockstep with the size of the spending power, surely 90% would produce at
least one! A return to the original logic behind this variable presented the solution. The

